119 Mass. 249 | Mass. | 1876
The plaintiffs’ right to recover is not disputed because the defendant is a married woman, or upon any other ground but that the contract sued on is a promise to answer for the debt of another, within the statute of frauds.
The evidence at the trial tended to show the following state of facts: In February, 1878, the defendant and one Warren entered into a written contract, by which Warren agreed to build a house and barn for the defendant, and to do all the carpenter’s work and furnish all the material, for a gross sum. During the following summer, Warren ordered of the plaintiffs, in his own name, the windows and doors necessary for this house and barn. After most of these had been finished and delivered to Warren and placed in the buildings, the defendant’s husband, acting in her behalf, called at the plaintiffs’ shop to get the rest of the windows, and was informed by them that they had doubts of Warren’s solvency, and had concluded not to trust him for the goods which he needed for the defendant’s house, and for that reason had withheld the remaining windows; and the husband thereupon directed the plaintiff to send the goods to Warren and charge them to the defendant, and promised to pay for them. The plaintiffs, after this conversation, gave no credit to Warren, but wholly to the defendant, but did not inform Warren of the conversation, and afterwards delivered the goods to Warren as he called for them. The plaintiffs seek to recover the value of the goods so delivered after this promise of the defendant.
These facts warranted the jury in finding that the promise sued on was an express promise to pay the defendant’s own debt, and not a promise to answer for any debt of Warren; and the case was submitted to them with appropriate and sufficient instructions.
Upon the facts which the evidence tended to prove, and which must have been found by the jury under the instructions of the court, the goods in question were sold directly to the defendant, and exclusively upon her credit. Even if the plaintiffs had previously agreed to deliver the goods to Warren, Warren had acquired no title in the specific goods, nor any interest in them which would prevent the plaintiffs from" making a valid sale of them to another person. The plaintiffs could not indeed rescind their