486 S.E.2d 77 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1997
Appellant Veronica Walker filed suit against appellee Betty Hambrick on March 6, 1996, alleging that appellee converted at least $60,000 in proceeds from assets that appellant inherited from the decedent, appellant’s mother, in June 1991. The complaint requested an accounting of appellee’s finances since June 1991 and a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) preventing appellee from dispersing or otherwise disposing of any assets over which appellee gained control by virtue of a power of attorney granted her by the appellant.
Appellee was served with appellant’s complaint on March 20, 1996, and appeared pro se at a hearing the same day to challenge
Appellant alleges two errors by the trial court which are essentially based upon one assertion, that the trial court erred by entering a judgment in favor of the appellee. We agree.
1. The record indicates that the appellee was served on March 20, 1996, the same day that she appeared pro se at a court hearing to challenge the appellant’s request for a TRO. Therefore, she was entitled to 30 days to answer the appellant’s complaint, and there was no default at that time. OCGA § 9-11-12 (a). Following the TRO hearing, the parties agreed upon a TRO which ordered, inter alia, the appellee to provide an accounting and which restrained the appellee from disbursing or otherwise diminishing the disputed assets from the decedent’s estate. This agreement effectively adjudicated the appellant’s cause of action, with the exception of the count alleging conversion.
However, several months passed before a final hearing was held on the appellant’s conversion action; the appellee filed no answer to the complaint prior to the final hearing. Therefore, appellee was automatically in default, and appellant was entitled to a verdict and judgment “as if every item and paragraph of the complaint or other original pleading were supported by proper evidence.” OCGA § 9-11-55 (a); see Floyd v. First Union Nat. Bank &c., 203 Ga. App. 788, 792 (417 SE2d 725) (1992). Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in rendering a judgment in favor of the appellee.
2. Further, following appellee’s default, the trial court was required to award liquidated damages, since no further hearing on the issue of liquidated damages is required under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). Appellant submitted a bank draft transferring $60,000 from a Wachovia Bank joint account held by both appellant and appellee to an individual account at Bank South to which only appellee had access. The bank draft is affirmative evidence of a conversion in the amount of $60,000, and the record is devoid of any denial by the appellee as to its conversion. Therefore, the $60,000 represents a sum certain, liquidated damage amount. See Jennings Enterprises v. Carte, 224 Ga. App. 538, 541 (4) (481 SE2d 541) (1997) (the term “liquidation” means “an amount certain and fixed, either by act and
Judgment reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.