54 Cal. 386 | Cal. | 1880
In 1871, the plaintiff and his attorney united in a conveyance of all the property involved in this action, as appears from deeds recorded at that time. Since that time their successors in interest, through their attorneys, have taken charge of the
Had the plaintiff in the action the right to dismiss it, after having transferred his interest in the subject-matter of the action to other parties? Section 385 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, that in case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued in the name of the original party, or the Court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action. Under that section, it was the right of the successors in interest in this case to prosecute this action in one of these forms. The party who had transferred his interest divested himself of any power to control the action. He could not dismiss it, because his successors had a right to have it continued. The validity of the order of dismissal in this case rests solely upon the consent of the original plaintiff, given ten years after he had transferred his interest in the action. As he had no right to interfere with the action, the Court, on being advised of that, should have vacated the order based upon it.
The attorney who signed the stipulation, as the attorney for the plaintiff, did not assume to act as the attorney of his successors in interest. In his affidavit, he says that he himself was the real plaintiff in interest at the time of the commencement of
We cannot discover that this gave him any right to stipulate away the rights of his successors in interest. The attempt to do so should be defeated, if the Court possesses the requisite power to defeat it. The act involves a flagrant breach of good faith, and that is a thing which justice abhors, hi or is the act of signing that stipulation palliated in the least by the shameless confession of the attorney who signed it, that he had no title to the land which he sued for, and subsequently conveyed. The Court which made the order dismissing the action must have been imposed upon, and after discovering the fraud and imposition, the order should have been promptly vacated.
Order denying the motion to vacate and set aside the order dismissing the action, reversed, with directions to the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, to vacate and set aside said order dismissing said action, and the judgment entered upon said order of dismissal.
Thornton, P. J., and Myrick, J., concurred.