78 Iowa 315 | Iowa | 1889
I. The action was commenced October 22, 1883. The petition, as amended, asks for the specific performance of a contract to convey land, entered into with plaintiff by Joseph and Mary A. Cameron on the nineteenth day of June, 1883. Two dollars cash were paid when the contract was made, four hundred and ninety-five dollars were to be paid when a sufficient deed should be delivered, and the balance of the consideration, eleven hundred and fifty dollars, was to be paid in four years, with, eight per centum per annum interest, and secured by a promissory note and a mortgage upon the land. A deed to plaintiff for the land was sent to a bank for delivery, and plaintiff did deposit with and pay to the bank the note and mortgage and the cash payment required by the contract, but defendants directed their deed to be returned to them, and refused
II. The cause was submitted to the district court for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, which tends to support the allegations of plaintiff’s petition as to the contract for the purchase of the land, and his performance thereof. It is shown that the bank to which Cameron and wife had sent their deed to plaintiff on the seventeenth of October, 1883, refused to accept the cash payment on the land, on the ground that it was directed to hold the deed and not to deliver it until further directions should be given. On the eleventh day of October, 1883, defendant Wicks purchased the land of agents of Cameron and wife for two thousand dollars; five hundred dollars cash and the balance to be secured by note and mortgage at eight per cent, per
VI. It is argued that the plaintiff acquired the ownership of the land before Wicks’ purchase. It cannot be claimed that plaintiff had the title to the land before Wicks bought it, but it may be assumed that he' had a contract therefor. This does not give him the ownership. It confers nothing more than an equity, which, however, cannot be enforced against a good-faith purchaser for value, without notice, actual or constructive, of plaintiff’s equity. Wicks was such a purchaser.
VII. It is claimed that the deed from the Camerons to Wicks is defectively acknowledged. If it be assumed that this position is true, it does not follow that we must conclude that plaintiff has the superior claim. He has no deed at all. Wicks has a defective deed. They both have contracts for the land. Wicks paid for the land under his contract without notice of plaintiff’s claim, and has proceeded to perfect his title, while plaintiff holds no title at all. It is plain that both the legal rights and equities of Wicks are superior to those of plaintiff. These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the judgment of the district court ought to be
Aeeirmed.