21 Mo. 289 | Mo. | 1855
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only point made before us in argument is in reference to the measure of damages, and in this we think the court erred. It is desirable to have as definite and precise rules upon this subject as possible, and a proper administration of justice requires that these rules should be strictly adhered to. It is in vain that the legal rights of the parties are settled by the courts if the amount of compensation for violations of these rights is left to the arbitrary discretion of a jury, and hence it is both the policy and tendency of our law to reduce the measure of damages, in all cases where it is practicable, to fixed legal rules, and to enforce a rigid adherence to them.
“ Damages,” Lord Coke (Co. Lit. 257, a) tells us, “hath a special signification for the recompense that is given by the jury to the plaintiff for the wrong the defendant hath done
The most favorable measure of damages for the plaintiff, on account of the wrong here complained of, and that to which, we think, he is entitled, is that which would have been applicable, had the action been against the execution plaintiff for the alleged seizure and sale of the property — trespass de bonis as-portatis ; and, in that event, there being no aggravating circumstances in the transaction, the damages would have been confined to the actual loss sustained — the value of the property and interest, allowing nothing for the profits the party might have made by raising the stock. It is said by Sedgwick (Law of Damages, 69,) “ that both the English and American courts have generally concurred in denying profits as any part of the damages to be compensated, and that, whether in cases of contract or tort.”
In Conrad, against The Pacific Ins. Co. (6 Pet. (U. S.) Rep. 268,) which was trespass against a marshal for seizing and selling the property of the plaintiff under an execution against another, the instructions given by the Circuit Court to the jury, as to the measure of damages, were approved by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, and we extract a part of the charge relating to this matter. " Where a trespass is committed in a wanton, rude and aggravated manner, indicating malice or a desire to injure, a jury ought to be liberal in compensating the party injured in all he has lost in property, in expenses for the recovery of his rights, in feeling or reputation, and even this may be exceeded by setting a public example to prevent a repetition of the act. In such cases, there is no certain, fixed standard, for the jury may not only
In New York, the measure in some cases, it seems, is the highest value of the property between these two periods, (Per Sutherland in West v. Beach, 3 Cow. 83 ;) while in other cases, the value at the time of the trespass is adopted as the proper measure. (Dillenback v. Jerome, 7 Cow. 294. Sedgwick on Damages, 479.) In our own state, it is believed,
In the present case, it is not pretended that there were any aggravating circumstances, and the proof was accordingly confined to the value of .the property. The witnesses, after stating its value at the time of the trespass, proceeded to state what they thought it would have been worth at the time they testified, taking into consideration the growth of the animals, and the increased value of such property; and the court, at the instance of the plaintiff, directed the jury that they were not confined to the value of the property at the time of the trespass, but might allow for the growth and the present value. All this was manifestly erroneous. The effect of the evidence and instruction was to allow the plaintiff to recover, not only all the profits that he could have made, if he had kept and raised the animals — allowing, too, nothing for the expense of taking care of them, and the accidents to which they are liable — but also the increased price of such property at the time of the trial, beyond what it was worth when the trespass was committed. The damages here to be allowed the plaintiff were to be a compensation, not only for the injury actually arising from the act done, estimating the property according to its value at the time when it was worth the most, but also for profits lost; and no case, it is believed, has ever gone this length.
The judgment must be reversed, and upon a re-assessment of the damages, they must be confined to the value of the property when the trespass was committed, upon which the jury may allow interest. The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the cause remanded.