Lead Opinion
Petitioner appeals as of right from a Tax Tribunal decision dismissing its appeals of respondent’s property tax assessments for tax years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. We affirm.
Petitioner is the lessee of real property in Macomb Township pursuant to a long-term lease that requires it to pay the property taxes for the property. The lease provides that petitioner is entitled to contest the validity of any tax; the property owner must cooperate in any contested proceeding and execute any necessary documents. In March 2002, respondent’s board of review adopted a rule under which “[a] person who is filing a petition to appear before the Board of Review, on behalf of a property owner, must furnish written authorization from the property owner appointing them as the agent/representative.” On March 1, 2003, petitioner timely filed with respondent’s board of review a written appeal and objection to respondent’s 2003 tax assessment. Petitioner attached a letter that identified petitioner as the taxpayer and that authorized its designated representative to appear before the board. However, petitioner did not provide any documentation showing that it had an ownership interest in the property or that the property owner had authorized petitioner to appear before the board. The board of review dismissed the appeal for lack of standing: respondent’s assessment roll showed that M. Tartaglia,
Petitioner appealed the adverse ruling to the Tax Tribunal. There, petitioner filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the board of review improperly found that it lacked standing. Specifically, petitioner argued that it had an ownership interest in the property and was a party in interest because it was responsible for paying the property taxes. The hearing referee requested additional information and delayed a decision on that motion several times. In the interim, petitioner was permitted to amend its petition to include challenges to the 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax assessments as well. In December 2006, the hearing referee issued a ruling that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the property tax assessments for each of the tax years. Accordingly, it denied petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and granted judgment in favor of respondent pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). This appeal followed.
Our review of a Tax Tribunal decision is very limited. In the absence of fraud, we are limited to deciding whether the tribunal committed an error of law or adopted a wrong legal principle. Liberty Hill Housing
The parties have stipulated the facts. At issue is whether the Tax Tribunal correctly determined that, on the basis of those facts, petitioner lacked standing to challenge the tax assessments. The concept of standing in the context of a legal proceeding means that a party must have suffered an actual, particularized impairment of a legally protected interest, that the opposing party can in some way be shown to be responsible for that impairment, and that a favorable decision by a court could likely redress that impairment. See Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs,
The General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., governs proceedings before local boards of review. MCL 211.30 sets forth procedures to be followed when
At the request of a person whose property is assessed on the assessment roll or of his or her agent, and if sufficient cause is shown, the board of review shall correct the assessed value or tentative taxable value of the property in a manner that will make the valuation of the property relatively just and proper under this act.
Subsection 3 provides that “[p]ersons or their agents who have appeared to file a protest before the board of review at a scheduled meeting or at a scheduled appointment shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard by the board of review.” Subsection 4 further provides that “nonresident taxpayers” may support any such protest by submitting a letter. Subsection 7 permits governing bodies to authorize “resident taxpayers” to submit protests by letter and without personally appearing. Thus, when read as a whole, MCL 211.30 affords “taxpayers” the opportunity to be heard on tax protests, but only “a person whose property is assessed on the assessment roll or his or her agent” may actually make such a property tax protest before the board of review.
MCL 211.24(l)(a) provides in part that each March, the local assessor shall make and complete an assessment roll and include
[t]he name and address of every person liable to be taxed in the local tax collecting unit with a full description of all the real property liable to be taxed. If the name of the owner or occupant of any tract or parcel of real property is known, the assessor shall enter the name and address of the owner or occupant opposite to the description of the property. If unknown, the real property described upon the roll shall be assessed as “owner unknown.”
MCL 211.24(l)(g) recognizes that property may be assessed in the name of someone other than the owner.
Therefore, it is apparent that respondent’s obligation to send the required notices extends to those names that appear on the assessment roll, whether they are the owner or an owner’s agent. MCL 211.30(4) is consistent with the notice requirements and confers on any person whose name appears on the assessment roll, including an owner’s agent, standing to challenge a tax assessment. In this case, however, petitioner never demonstrated that it took the necessary steps to have its name placed on the assessment roll or to obtain the owner’s written authorization to appear before the board of review on behalf of the listed owner. Indeed, the evidence affirmatively shows that petitioner was not ever placed on the assessment roll for the parcel at issue in this case; rather, only M. Tartaglia, L.L.C., appeared on the assessment roll.
We disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the plain language of MCL 211.30(4) gives petitioner the right to protest the assessed value of this property. Because petitioner is not a “person whose property is assessed on the assessment roll,” and because petitioner did not provide the board of review with any indication that it was the agent of a “person whose property is assessed on the assessment roll,” the statute does not give petitioner any rights. Accordingly, petitioner failed to establish its standing to protest the 2003 tax assessment.
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Tribunal erred in relying in part on the definition of “taxpayer” in MCL 211.44(10)(c), even though that definition is expressly
Petitioner alternatively argues that MCL 211.27a(6)(g) establishes its standing as a tenant under a long-term lease that exceeds 35 years. That statute provides that a “transfer of ownership” for purposes of taxing property includes a conveyance by lease if the duration of the lease is more than 35 years. Here, however, petitioner did not present evidence showing that it complied with the notice requirements in MCL 211.27a(10) to provide respondent with notice of the property transfer, and petitioner was not listed on the assessment roll. Accordingly, even if petitioner’s lease agreement qualifies as a “transfer of ownership” under MCL 211.27a(6)(g), it does did not establish petitioner’s standing pursuant to MCL 211.30.
We do not suggest, as the dissent implies we do, that a long-term lessee like petitioner has no interest in the property it leases. But, even if the terms of the lease obligate it to pay the taxes, that does not mean that petitioner has a “legally protected interest” under the GPTA. See Lee, supra at 739. Petitioner was not “a person whose property is assessed on the assessment roll” or the agent of that person. Rather, the assessment roll showed that another individual was responsible for the taxes. The lease might make petitioner the agent of the person whose property is assessed, but no evidence thereof was submitted to the board of review. Petitioner, as the party seeking the benefit of standing, had the burden of showing standing. Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Tribunal erred in dismissing its additional claims for the 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax years. We disagree. Although MCL 205.737(4) permitted petitioner to join its claims for those tax years with its appeal involving the 2003 tax year, petitioner was still required to establish its standing to challenge the tax assessments for those years before the board of review. Because petitioner failed to establish its standing to challenge the 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax assessments for the same reasons previously discussed relative to the 2003 tax year, those claims were also properly dismissed.
Finally, we find no merit to petitioner’s argument that even if the Tax Tribunal did not err in denying its motion for summary disposition, it improperly granted judgment in favor of respondent under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The evidence demonstrates that there was no genuine issue of material fact that petitioner did not have its name placed on the assessment roll, obtain the property owner’s written authorization to appear before the board of review on the owner’s behalf, or even tender a copy of its lease to the board for the same purpose. Accordingly, the tribunal appropriately determined that petitioner lacked standing to protest the property tax assessments and, accordingly, that respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Notes
The dissent correctly notes that the board of review adopted a more specific policy explicitly requiring a “Letter of Authorization” a few days after petitioner filed its appeal. We also recognize that the board of review apparently deemed this policy relevant to its rejection of petitioner’s appeal. However, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, we do not find the later policy of significance here, and we express no view thereon. Again, petitioner did not provide any sort of “written authorization from the property owner appointing it as the agent/representative” for the purpose of appearing before the board of review, and that was the basis for the board’s rejection. Petitioner did not even tender to the hoard a copy of the lease as evidence of such authorization, which counsel for respondent conceded at oral argument would have sufficed.
The dissent raises the specter that the assessed property owner might, for some reason, refuse to provide that written authorization to a lessee who is responsible for the payment of taxes under the terms of the lease. However, we believe, as did counsel for respondent at oral argument, that submission of the lease itself would constitute “written authorization.” We reiterate that we have no occasion here to consider the later, more specific, policy, and we decline in any event to engage in speculation over a situation that the instant case does not factually support.
In its statement of questions presented in its brief on appeal, petitioner lists as Issue V that the Tax Tribunal’s “second order constitutes fraud, error of law, the adoption of wrong principles, and/or relies on factual findings not supported by the record.” Petitioner does not present any supporting argument for this issue in its brief. Therefore, the issue is abandoned. Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v City of Ecorse,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the Tax Tribunal improperly found that petitioner had no standing. Additionally, the rules created by respondent’s board of review were invalid and denied petitioner its due-process rights. I would reverse.
Whether a party has standing comprises a question of law that is subject to review de novo. Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs,
“[T]he doctrine of standing [is] a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches. It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.” [Id. at 735-736, quoting Lewis v Casey,518 US 343 , 349;116 S Ct 2174 ;135 L Ed 2d 606 (1996) (citations omitted).]
In Lee, our Supreme Court adopted the same test to determine standing as that used by federal courts:
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — -the injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent*69 action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” [Lee, supra at 739, quoting Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,504 US 555 , 560-561;112 S Ct 2130 ;119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).]
The “injury in fact” must be “both concrete and particularized, as well as actual and imminent, in order to establish standing.” Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools,
Although the majority recognizes petitioner’s liability to the owner for the payment of the taxes under the terms of the lease, it dismisses petitioner’s argument that it is “the real party in interest” under MCR 2.201(B) on the basis of its conclusion that the owner is the “real party in interest” because it ultimately remains liable to the township for payment of the taxes. “A real party in interest is one who is vested with the right of action on a given claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another.” Hoffman v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
Given that petitioner is the real party in interest pursuant to MCR 2.201(B) and has met the requirements of standing, the Tax Tribunal erred in concluding that petitioner had no standing.
Separate from the question of standing is whether petitioner was authorized by statute to bring its claim before the board of review. See Rhode, supra at 343-355 (providing separate analyses for the statutory requirements to bring suit and whether the plaintiffs had constitutional standing, and concluding that while the former was met, the latter was not). On March 5, 2002, respondent’s board of review adopted the following policy: “A person who is filing a petition to appear before the Board of Review, on behalf of a property owner, must furnish written authorization from the property owner appointing them as the agent/representative.” On March 6, 2003, the board of review adopted a more specific policy:
Resolution adopted requiring a person who is filing a petition to appear before the Board of Review, on behalf of a property owner, must furnish written authorization from the property owner appointing them as the agent/representative. This Resolution was also adopted providing for all future petitions submitted by a representative on behalf of the property owner must be submitted with a Letter of Authorization signed by the property owner. The Letter of Authorization must contain the parcel number for the parcel or parcels being protested, a valid legible signature, a valid printed signature and must be original signatures. [Emphasis added.]
Using the 2002 rule, I conclude that petitioner provided sufficient documentation to proceed with its appeal before the board of review. Petitioner had a signed lease expressly permitting it to contest the validity of the property taxes. That document is sufficient to constitute written authorization from the property owner, appointing petitioner as the agent or representative before the board of review. Therefore, I conclude that the board of review erred in concluding that petitioner had no “standing” to protest the taxes.
Indeed, “[t]he right to a hearing by the assessor, sitting as a board of review, is one of which a tax-payer cannot be lawfully deprived.” Village of Three Rivers Common Council v Smith,
Additionally, even if the March 6, 2003, policy did apply, I would conclude that it was both invalid, as it was not authorized by the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., and unconstitutional because it violated petitioner’s due-process rights.
A rule is invalid when it conflicts with the provisions of the governing statute. Michigan Sportservice, Inc v Dep’t of Revenue Comm’r,
At the request of a person whose property is assessed on the assessment roll or of his or her agent, and if sufficient cause is shown, the board of review shall correct the assessed value or tentative taxable value of the property in a manner that will make the valuation of the property relatively just and proper under this act.
Leases provide a real-property interest. Adams Outdoor Advertising v East Lansing (After Remand),
In addition to being invalid, the rule adopted by respondent’s board of review is also unconstitutional. Both the United States and Michigan constitutions prevent the taking of property without due process of law. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. “The ‘property’ protected by the constitutions includes not only title, but all character of vested rights, including possession, dominion, control, and the right to make any legitimate use of the premises.” Ligon v Detroit,
Because I conclude that petitioner had standing and was permitted to challenge the tax assessment before the board of review, and that the rule implemented by the board of review was both invalid and unconstitutional, I would reverse the decision of the Tax Tribunal.
That petitioner’s lease required the property owner to execute any written documents required to contest the validity of taxes is irrelevant. The property owner could refuse to perform its obligation under the lease, preventing petitioner from ever being able to dispute its tax Lability before the board of review. In that event, although petitioner would have a contract claim against the property owner, damages would be difficult or impossible to calculate, because there is no way to determine what the board of review would have decided had petitioner been permitted to appeal the taxes and what effect that would have had on future tax years.