189 Mich. App. 373 | Mich. Ct. App. | 1991
Lead Opinion
Plaintiffs, inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan in Jackson, requested under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq., that the director of library services at the prison provide them the opportunity to inspect the final Department of Corrections decisions and orders, as well as supporting records, in various prison disciplinary cases. After the director denied plaintiffs’ requests, the present action was filed, on January 17, 1986. On March 23, 1987, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the grounds that the foia publication requirements do not apply to prison disciplinary hearings and decisions and that, even if they were to, MCL 791.252(k); MSA 28.2320(52)(k) requires that such decisions be given only to the affected prisoner. Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s decision. We affirm.
Section 11 of the foia, MCL 15.241; MSA 4.1801(11), provides in pertinent part:
(1) A state agency shall publish and make available to the public all of the following:
(а) Final orders or decisions in contested cases and the records on which they were made.
(б) As used in this section, "state agency”, "contested case”, and "rules” shall have the same meaning as ascribed to those terms in Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 24.201 to 24.315 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
The provision of the Administrative Procedures Act to which the foia refers, MCL 24.203(3); MSA 3.560(103)(3), defines a "contested case” in relevant part as "a proceeding ... in which a determination of the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a
The question presented is whether the Legislature’s removal of prison disciplinary hearings from chapter 4 of the apa was intended to and did in fact remove prison disciplinary hearings from the definition of "contested cases” for the purposes of the foia. We hold that it did. While the Legislature did not exclude disciplinary cases from the definition of "contested cases,” we hold that for the purposes of the foia that was the Legislature’s intent. MCL 791.255; MSA 28.2320(55), the legislation added in 1979 involving the Department of Corrections hearings, specifically provided that chapter 6 of the apa, MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201) through MCL 24.306; MSA 3.560(206), governing
We hold that the creation of the procedure to obtain information regarding prison misconduct hearings evidences the legislative intent that prison misconduct hearings are not "contested cases” for the purposes of the foia. The Legislature intended to provide an alternative resolution process and publication procedure to that offered by the apa and the foia for prison hearings. The creation of this specific statute should control over the general provisions of the foia. In re Johnson Estate, 152 Mich App 200, 205; 394 NW2d 136 (1986). The creation of the hearing procedures,
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Section 11 of the foia, MCL 15.241; MSA 4.1801(11), provides in pertinent part:
(1) A state agency shall publish and make available to the public all of the following:
(а) Final orders or decisions in contested cases and the records on which they were made.
(б) As used in this section, "state agency”, "contested case”, and "rules” shall have the same meanings as ascribed to those terms in Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 24.201 to 24.315 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
The provision of the Administrative Procedures Act to which the foia refers, MCL 24.203(3); MSA 3.560(103)(3), defines a "contested case” in relevant part as "a proceeding ... in which a determination of the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a named party is required by law to be made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.” There is no question that a prison disciplinary case falls within the definition of a "contested case.” However, such proceedings are specifically exempted from contested case procedures under the apa. See MCL 24.315; MSA 3.560(215). The trial court inferred from this procedural ex
I further find that MCL 791.252(k); MSA 28.2320 (52)(k), cited by the trial court as an alternative basis for precluding application of the foia, is not controlling here. Section 52 sets forth the procedures for prison disciplinary hearings. Subsection k merely requires immediate delivery of a decision or order to the prisoner involved in the case, as well as posting to the reporting officer, to ensure protection of the affected prisoner’s due process rights. Subsection k has no bearing on the question whether the decision and supporting records in such a case may or may not be subject to the foia and public disclosure. Subsection k simply does not address the issue and cannot be construed as limiting publication to only the affected prisoner and reporting officer.
Having found that the foia does apply to prison disciplinary decisions and the records on which they are based, the question then becomes whether those documents are nonetheless specifically exempted from disclosure as public records by the foia itself. Because the foia is a disclosure statute, Kestenbaum v Michigan State University, 414 Mich 510, 521; 327 NW2d 783 (1982), the public agency denying a request for disclosure bears a heavy burden of showing that the requested information falls within one of the act’s exemptions. MCL 15.240(1); MSA 4.1801(10X1); Kincaid v Dep’t of Corrections, 180 Mich App 176, 182; 446 NW2d
Defendant cites two exemptions it claims preclude disclosure of the documents at issue. They are set forth in MCL 15.243(l)(a), (c); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(a), (c):
(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record under this act:
(a) Information of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.
(c) A public record which if disclosed would prejudice a public body’s ability to maintain the physical security of custodial or penal institutions occupied by persons arrested or convicted of a crime or admitted because of a mental disability, unless the public interest in disclosure under this act outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure.
The last subsection would be redundant if the foia did not apply to a prison case. Why would the Legislature need to write in such flexibility in cases involving prisons and mental institutions if there were a legislative intent to totally exempt these institutions from the reach of the statute?
Because the trial court found the foia inapplicable, it did not reach the question whether disclosure is nonetheless exempted under these provisions. Remand is therefore necessary for a determination of the issue. I note, however, that striking out the parties’ and witnesses’ names would seem to eliminate any concerns over an invasion of the individuals’ privacy. See Booth Newspapers, Inc v Kalamazoo School Dist, 181 Mich App 752, 756; 450 NW2d 286 (1989). With the elimination of
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this dissenting opinion and would reserve jurisdiction.
