30 S.E.2d 896 | Ga. | 1944
While criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, and their unambiguous words are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within the reach of such a statute, this rule does not mean that the natural, reasonable, and accepted meanings of words are to be disregarded. So construing the Code, § 67-9902, punishing as for a misdemeanor "any mortgagor, giver of purchase-money lien," who shall remove, hide, or dispose of personal property covered thereby, so as to hinder, delay, or prevent a levy, the quoted words must be held to include a holder of property under a conditional-sale contract, retaining title in the vendor until the purchase-money is paid. Therefore the question certified by the Court of Appeals must be answered in the affirmative.
The question will be answered as presented, which does not call for an answer to other questions considered in the brief of counsel, relating to whether a construction of the contract in question when taken in connection with other provisions of the contract would be inconsistent with the reservation of title or qualify its effect as a retention of title to the extent of giving it the effect of a mortgage or other lien to secure the purchase-price.
It is recognized that criminal statutes must be construed strictly, and that, as was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Viereck v. United States,
Accordingly, it seems to us that if the phrase in the criminal statute under review, "any mortgagor, giver of purchase-money lien," did not have in mind a contract of conditional sale with reservation of title whereby the vendor and vendee each agrees that the vendor is to hold the legal title of the property bought until the purchase-money is paid, it had no meaning at all. It can not have had reference to a mortgage, for mortgages are mentioned for themselves. The rule which requires a strict construction of criminal statutes does not mean that the natural, reasonable, and, as has been shown, the accepted meanings of the words, are not to be given effect, or that they shall be disregarded, even though in order to do so it be necessary to treat the rational language employed as meaningless.
In addition to all that has been said, since the language "giver of purchase-money lien," embodied in the criminal statute, can manifestly refer only to contracts of conditional sale with reservation of title, we do not think, even if the legislature, in following our repeated lead, has employed what could be called a misnomer in the use of the word "lien," that, even then, the use of such a misnomer would destroy the plain and express meaning and purpose of the statute in prohibiting the vendee of personal property from running off, removing, hiding, or disposing of the same where the vendor is protected under a conditional-sale agreement. After having penalized such conduct, to the detriment of anyone holding various other forms of liens of lesser dignity, and then having also included what can refer only to a conditional-sale agreement, *150 it would be stretching strictness of construction beyond all the bounds of reason to strike down the provision itself, even though the statute could be said to have erroneously followed our lead in referring to such a designated security as a lien, when it is of an even higher form of security than the designation implied. The thing itself which the legislature prohibits being perfectly plain and clear, why nullify the plain and expressed intent, even if a misnomer was used in characterizing the security, which nevertheless remained plainly specified? We answer the question in the affirmative. All the Justices concur, except Duckworth and Atkinson, JJ.,who dissent.