Waldron v. WildWaldron v. Wild
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Plaintiff, Daniel J. Waldron, commenced this negligence action to recover money damages for personal injuries he sustained as the result of an accident which occurred on May 25,1980 when the automobile owned and operated by defendant, Michael P. Wild, in which he was a passenger, left the road and collided with a building and several parked cars. He was taken to the emergency room of the Community General Hospital in Syracuse where he was treated for his injuries and released.
After joinder of issue and pretrial discovery, defendant made a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 upon the ground that plaintiff’s action was barred because he did not sustain a “serious injury” within the meaning of subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law. In granting defendant’s motion dismissing plaintiff’s
Subdivision 1 of section 673 of the Insurance Law provides that “[notwithstanding any other law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state, there shall be no right of recovery for non-economic loss [i.e., pain and suffering], except in the case of a serious injury”. “Serious injury”, as defined in subdivision 4 of section 671 means, inter alia, a personal injury which results in “significant disfigurement”. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the accident caused a “serious injury” as defined in subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s facial injuries are superficial and minor and do not fall within the threshold requirements of the statute. Thus, the issue for our resolution is whether the medical evidence in the record before Special Term on the motion for summary judgment is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with regard to plaintiff’s claim of a “significant disfigurement”.
In responding to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff’s affidavit asserts that he sustained “multiple lacerations on my face” which “have resulted in permanent scar tissue * * * There is a scar on my forehead which is approximately one-half centimeter in length and distinctly lighter in color than the surrounding skin area. This scar is permanent * * * Furthermore, there is a slightly prominent punctate area of bony prominance on my nose. This disfigurement is also permanent.” The emergency room record from the Community General Hospital reveals that upon examination, plaintiff suffered “[mjultiple small facial abrasions and lacerations, the later of the gouge-type which do not require repairing”. Plaintiff’s doctor’s report verifies that he had abrasions of the face and forehead when initially seen by him on June 3,1980. A report submitted by defendant’s doctor notes injuries to plaintiff’s face as being “[o]n the nose, just at the bridge
Summary judgment might be warranted in an appropriate case where the responding papers to the motion contain an unsubstantiated statement that plaintiff’s injuries would constitute serious injury within the meaning of the Insurance Law (Matter of Perez v Pearl-Wick Corp.,
“ ‘[Significant’ as used in the statute pertaining to ‘limitation of use of a body function or system’ should be construed to mean something more than a minor limitation of use.” (Licari v Elliott,
Defendant’s doctor’s report acknowledges that plaintiff has a “punctate area of loss of pigmentation just medial to the right brow” and on his nose “a slightly prominent punctate area of bony prominence.” It classifies the cosmetic permanency as “minor”. However, what may be characterized as minor by a physician in examining a claimant on behalf of a party seeking to dismiss a claim or by a physician who regularly sees and treats more serious injuries, may well be evaluated as a “significant disfigurement” by the standards of a reasonable man.
Facial scarring requires close evaluation. It is the type of injury which should not be dismissed without viewing the injury. A residual imperfection may not be as significant on other portions of the anatomy as it may be upon the face or other exposed areas. A court, in evaluating the gravity
The threshold question of whether plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of serious injury should be decided by the court (Licari v Elliott, supra, p 238). Except in circumstances as hereinbefore stated, such determination should be made after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to present his proof for evaluation of the seriousness of the injury and the credibility of the witnesses. In Licari, plaintiff was afforded such an opportunity to testify and present medical evidence in a plenary trial whereas in the instant case the court has precluded the plaintiff that opportunity by relying solely upon papers submitted on the motion for summary judgment.
We adopt the language drafted by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions for guidance and use by Judges in instructing juries as to the meaning of “significant, disfigurement”. “A disfigurement is significant if a reasonable person viewing the plaintiff’s body in its altered state would regard the condition as unattractive, objectionable, or as the subject of pity or scorn.” (PJI 2:88B [Sept., 1982 Supp].)
In our view plaintiff has demonstrated by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a plenary trial on the issue of a “significant disfigurement”. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. If plaintiff fails to establish a significant disfigurement within the meaning of the no-fault insurance law at the trial, of course, a motion will lie to dismiss the complaint, during or at the conclusion of the trial (Sanders v Rickard,
Dissenting Opinion
Here, one picture is worth more than 10,000 words. In determining whether a plaintiff’s
Accordingly, the order should be affirmed.
Green and Schnepp, JJ., concur with Callahan, J. P.; Boomer and Denman, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm the order in an opinion by Boomer, J.
Order reversed, with costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment denied, in accordance with opinion by Callahan, J. P.