175 S.W.2d 570 | Ark. | 1943
This appeal presents for answer the inescapable question whether Act No. 2 of the Special Session of the legislature in April, 1934, impairs the obligation of the contractual rights of the appellant. The chancery court held the act to be valid, and appellant challenges the decree.
The Facts
D. A. Holland, appellee herein, purchased sixty acres of land in Miller county from D. J. Holland in 1923. There was a mistake in the section number in the deed, but we consider the mistake of no consequence since a correction deed was later obtained. The lands became vacant in 1926 and forfeited to the State for the taxes of 1928. The State confirmed its title by then existing statutory proceedings in the Miller chancery court in March, 1932; and on March 7, 1933, appellant, Waldon, paid the State $18 and received a donation certificate to the sixty acres. He immediately moved on the lands and has improved same, and is now, and has been ever since March, 1933, in full possession thereof.
The General Assembly of Arkansas, at the Special Session in April, 1934, passed Act No. 2, approved April 12, 1934 (see printed Acts of 1935, p. 1011); and under that act, D. A. Holland, as owner, redeemed the lands from the State on May 31, 1934, notwithstanding the intervening donation certificate to Waldon, as aforesaid. Holland demanded possession from Waldon, but never made any tender for improvements, and the State never returned the $18 to Waldon. In 1936, Waldon tendered final proof to the Land Commissioner and requested donation deed, but was informed of the redemption by Holland and was referred to the courts for redress.
In September, 1937, Waldon filed suit in the Miller chancery court against the State Land Commissioner and Holland, seeking to have the State Land Commissioner issue the donation deed and to cancel Holland's redemption as a cloud on Waldon's title. Holland answered and cross-complained, claiming Waldon's donation certificate void, and praying that Holland's title be quieted. Waldon then (dismissed his complaint in the Miller chancery *403 court, and through a proceeding in the Pulaski chancery court, forced the State Land Commissioner to accept Waldon's proof and issue him a donation deed. Then, on Holland's cross-complaint in the Miller chancery court, Waldon pleaded the donation deed and the Pulaski chancery decree and the invalidity of Act No. 2 of the April, 1934, Special Session, and also other defenses.
After the filing of a number of pleadings by both sides and a transfer to the circuit court and a re-transfer to the chancery court, the case was finally heard in Miller chancery court and a decree rendered on January 8, 1943, holding that Holland duly redeemed under the said 1934 act, and that the donation certificate and the donation deed held by Waldon should be canceled as a cloud on Holland's title.
A number of interesting and involved questions are argued in the briefs, but the decision of the one question stated in the first sentence of this opinion renders it unnecessary to state or discuss any other questions. Waldon claims that Act No. 2 of the April, 1934, Special Session of the Arkansas Assembly, impairs his contractual rights, and to that extent, is therefore violative of the state and federal constitutions. Art. 2, 17, of our state constitution provides: ". . . no . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed." The corresponding section of the federal constitution is art. 1, 10, which provides: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts." To determine whether the Act of 1934 impaired the obligation of the contract necessarily involves a discussion of: (1) Was the donation certificate a contract? (2) What was the law at the time the certificate was issued? (3) What was the said Act of 1934? (4) What effect did the Act of 1934 have on the previously existing law?
I. Was the donation certificate a contract. We have many times considered the rights of the holder of a donation certificate. A few of these cases are: McCauley v. Six,
But there is no need to pursue the analogy between the homestead law of the United States and our donation statutes, because Mr. Justice BAKER, speaking for this court in Young v. Pumphrey,
At the time of the issuance of the donation certificate to appellant, the law pertaining to donation was found in 6671 to 6695 of Crawford Moses' Digest, and these same sections are now found in 8636 to 8659 of Pope's Digest. The rights of the donee under his certificate are set forth in 8640 of Pope's Digest, which provides that the State Land Commissioner shall issue to the donee a certificate, "which certificate shall further state that *405
if within three years from the date of actual settlement, (the donee resided) in a house habitable at all seasons of the year upon said land, (and) the applicant shall present proof in the manner hereinafter provided to the commissioner, he shall execute, under his hand and seal, the deed of the State to the donee, conveying all the right, title and interest of the State in and to the lands described in said certificate." (In Ware v. Dazey,
II. What was the law at the time the certificate was issued? The appellant received his certificate on March 7, 1933, and the law then existing became a part of his contract. Smith v. Spillman,
III. What was the Act of 1934? The act under which the appellee claims the right to redeem was Act No. 2 of the April Special Session of 1934, approved April 12, 1934 (see printed Acts of 1935, p. 1011); and that act stated: "In the event donation of the land, or any part thereof, sought to be redeemed, has not been completed and a deed issued and delivered to the donee, then, upon payment to the Commissioner of State Lands, by the one seeking to redeem, of the donation certificate fee, in addition to the amount necessary to redeem such land from forfeiture, as provided herein, the Commissioner of State Lands shall permit said land to be redeemed and shall issue a certificate of redemption, as provided by law, and shall pay the donation certificate fee to the party entitled thereto. No pending donation or entry shall bar redemption, and it shall be mandatory upon the Commissioner of State Lands to issue a certificate of redemption to the one applying therefor, and if the donee or entryman has any rights as to property by way of betterments made by the donee, he shall be remitted to the courts for the enforcement of his rights in said matter."
This act has only been cited in two reported cases, and neither is decisive of the question here. They are: *407
Casey v. Johnson,
To summarize, we have never decided whether this act impaired the obligations of a contract, because the question has never been presented to us.
IV. What effect did the Act of 1934 have on the previously existing law? In Wood v. Lovett,
Our own court has many times recognized this principle. In the case of Smith v. Spillman,
The general statement of the law is admitted; the only difficulty is in the application of the general principle to the facts in the particular case. In the case at bar the impairment of the contract is both real and apparent. The State of Arkansas certified to appellant, Waldon, on March 7, 1933, when he received his donation certificate, that if he fulfilled the requirements of the law, then, upon proof thereof, the State would issue to him a deed to the lands. In other words, he was to receive both the land and all the improvements that he put on the land. He paid the State $18 for the donation certificate and went on the lands. Thereafter, by subsequent legislation (Act No. 2 of April, 1934, here involved) the State attempted to take from Waldon his right to receive the lands by merely returning the $18, and attempted to take from Waldon all of the actual improvements that he put on the land, and in lieu of said improvements, to remit him to a court to recover what might subsequently be found to be the value of his improvements. He was promised the right to obtain a home and a part of the earth's surface by the donation certificate; and then by the act of 1934, the previous promise was revoked, and in lieu thereof he was merely given the right to have a lawsuit. He bargained for a loaf of bread and the subsequent act of the legislature gave him only a stone. Certainly his rights were impaired by the subsequent legislation. The case of Walker v. Ferguson,
Equity regards that as done which ought to have been done. 30 C.J.S., 106, p. 513; 19 Am.Jur. 315, and West's Arkansas Digest "Equity," 57. When appellant, Waldon, completed the terms of his donation certificate and applied to the State Land Commissioner for a deed in *410 1936, his proof should have been accepted and the deed should have been issued. He later obtained that relief through some proceeding in the Pulaski chancery court. It is not necessary for us to consider the efficacy of that proceeding because Waldon obtained the merited relief, and we treat that as done which ought to have been done. Waldon received his donation deed from the Land Commissioner and has been in possession of the land continuously, since 1933, and his title is superior to that of the appellee herein, and should be quieted.
It, therefore, follows that the decree of the chancery court is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the chancery court to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion.
SMITH and McHANEY, JJ., dissent.