28 F. Cas. 1353 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania | 1814
The question- which arises in this cause is, whether the bond given at Calcutta, constitutes a valid hy-pothecation of the vessel? To decide this, the consideration of the bond, and the circumstances under which it was given, must be inquired into. The legal principles which apply to maritime hypothecations, have been frequently stated in this court. It has been laid down, that to give validity to such a bond, the necessity of raising money in this way, should be clearly shown by the obligee; and it. should also appear to have been obtained, in order to enable the master to prosecute ins voyage. If the master has, or can, command other funds, he has no authority to subject his owners’ property to the payment of a premium, beyond the legal interest of money. It is also necessary, that the loan should be made upon the credit of the vessel, and not that of the master or owner; because in the latter case, the necessity for giving such an hypothecation, could not exist. Consequently, the master has no authority to hypothecate in this way, for antecedent advances made, not upon the faith of such a security. How do these principles apply to the consideration of the bond given to the libellants? That is composed of a bottom-ry bond, given by Captain Smith to Lord & Williams, at Port Jackson, which was discharged at Calcutta by the libellants; and of advances made by the libellants to Captain Smith, at Calcutta, for the purpose of enabling the Aurora to perform her voyage to the United States. No evidence has been offered to prove the consideration for which the Port Jackson bond was given, except a general statement made by Clark, in his deposition, that the brig was in want of necessaries at that place, and that she received repairs there. But no account is furnished, nor proof exhibited, to slio-w, whether the whole, or what part of the consideration of that bond, was required for the necessities of the vessel, or that they were such as might probably require such a sum to relieve them. This, however, is not the objection which we deem most fatal to this bond. It does not appear, that the loan was made on the credit of a hypothecation of the vessel; and unless it was. the master had no authority to bind his owners or their property, by giving such a security. It is contended, that this ought to be presumed, the bond itself being prima facie evidence of that fact. However this might be, in a case fairly open to presumption. the argument is inadmissible upon general principles, where the recitals in the bond contradict the presumption. Now, in this case, it is expressly stated in the bond, that the necessaries for the Aurora, had been furnished at various times and places, as well previous to her sailing from Port Jackson, in September, 1810, as at various times since; and, also, on the present voyage. Where the advances are made at one time, and the security is taken long afterwards, particularly after the vessel has been exposed to sea risks, by having performed an intermediate voyage, as happened in this ease, the presumption is, that the advances were made on the personal credit of the master or owners, or else the security would have been taken at or about the time w'hen
As to the advances said to have been made at Calcutta, to Captain Smith, for the necessities of the Aurora, to enable her to perform a voyage thence to the United States, many reasons have been assigned, why they cannot constitute a consideration for a maritime hypoth-ecation. One of them, we think, is conclusive; and consequently, the others need not be examined. No person is authorized to give such a bond, but the master of the vessel; and it is most obvious, that on the 23d of December, 1811, when this bond bears date, Lee, and not Smith, was the master. It is impossible to be so blind, as not to see that the bond and charter party, though dated on different days, were simultaneous, if not in their execution, at least in relation to the contract which formed the basis of those instruments. The circumstance which proves this fact incontestibly, is, that Captain Lee (the master appointed by the libellants, and not substituted by Smith), both by his affidavit, and by his account of the disbursements made for the vessel at Calcutta, proves, that he assumed the command on the 17th of December, six days before the bottomry bond bears date, and before any advances even were made for the necessities of the vessel. These advances, therefore, were made to a master appointed by the very persons who made them, and not to the one who hypothecated the vessel. The affectation of Smith, in giving sailing instructions to Lee, in January, 1812, is too thin to conceal the real nature of this transaction. If, then, this be not a valid hypothecation, under the general authority of Smith, as master, is it so in virtue of any powers given to him by the instruction of his owners? These instructions contemplate two objects—the employment of the vessel, and the means of accomplishing it. As to the first, the powers given to Smith were unlimited. The voyages marked out by the owners, seem to have been intended merely as hints, suggested in the way of advice; and lest he should be led to construe them otherwise, the writers add the following explanatory clause —“Finally,” &c. See ante. Seeming, however, to apprehend, that this sweeping sentence might be understood to extend to the means of accomplishing the objects of the trade, in which he was to engage, they express themselves immediately as follows:—"We will add, however,” &c. See ante. This latter clause, is to be considered rather as a limitation, than an extension of the authority which, as master, Smith would have possessed. As master, he would have had power to bind, not only the vessel and cargo by an hypothecation of them, but also the owners personally, which latter power is here denied him. The authority, therefore, of Smith, to hypothecate the vessel, remained precisely as it stood under his general authority as master; and not only so, but it was connected with his character as such. The moment he threw off that character, or bound himself to do so, and resigned the management of his vessel to another master, his power to bind his owners, or their property, in virtue of his instructions, as well as of his general authority as master, ceased; and although the libellants may have a very just claim for advances fairly made for the use of this vessel, and in order to enable her to return to the United States, yet it is not such a one, as a court of admiralty can enforce. Decree reversed, with costs, arid libel dismissed.