53 F. 429 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Nevada | 1892
This is a bill in equity. Sarah C. Watson, wife of A. R. Watson, died after the commencement of this suit, and proper substitution has been made. Reference need only be made to the defendant A. R. Watson. Complainant lives in California. Defendant resides in White Pine county, Yev. Complainant claims to be the owner of the undivided one half of certain mining claims and water rights in Robinson and Osceola mining districts, situate in White Pine county, Yev. She avers that a mining copartnership was formed between her and the defendant, A. R. Watson, in said claims and water rights, and prays for an accounting of the rents, issues, and profits which have been derived therefrom, for a dissolution of the copartnership, and for a decree compelling defendant to convey to her the undivided one-half interest in the properties described in the bill.
The contention of complainant is that in February, 1888, complainant and defendant were respectively the owners of certain mining claims, and also owned certain other mining claims as tenants in common; that, prior to that time, the complainant owned certain mining claims in the mining districts aforesaid, in common with defendant, Watson, and Cox and Dodge; that they had been engaged for several years prior to February, 1888, in developing the property, and in an endeavor to sell the same; that the complainant had advanced large sums of money for such purposes to Cox, Dodge, and defendant, and that she had succeeded, by regular deeds of conveyance, to the interests of said Cox and Dodge in certain of said claims; that defendant Was a poor man, with limited means, and that complainant had advanced all the money which had been raised or used in or about the development of the various mining properties mentioned in the bill, prior to February, 1888; that in the month of February, 1888, (should be March,) the complainant and defendant entered into a mining co-partnership, the terms of which were that complainant was to contribute to the partnership all of her interests in the mining claims in both of said mining districts, whether her interests stood in her name alone or in common with defendant or other persons; that defendant was to contribute all his interests in the mining claims in both of said districts, whether standing in his own name or in common with the complainant; that the complainant agreed to advance money for the improvement and development of the mining properties, and to sell or dispose of the same; that defendant agreed to give his skill, experience, and knowledge as a practical miner in opening up, developing, and working said claims; that the complainant and defendant were to be equal owners in the mining properties, and in the rents, issues, and profits thereof. Complainant claims that in pursuance of this agreement, and at the time it was entered into, in White Pine county, she paid defendant $200 for the purpose of carrying out the terms of said contract and agreement of copartnership, and particularly for the purpose of an expenditure upon the Joanna mine,— which claim is the principal bone of contention in this suit; that at
The bill of complaint was verified, and a verified answer was not waived. The answer denies each and every allegation of the complaint, except as therein admitted. The admissions necessary to be noticed are “that complainant, as the agent and for and on behalf of one Mrs. Ashley, and not otherwise, as complainant informed him, loaned said defendant §4,000 at the time and place alleged in complainant’s hill. * * That lie told complainant that if she could sell any mine or mines of defendant in said Robinson and Osceola mining districts he would give her half the money realized from said sales, provided the mine or mines were sold at a price fixed and approved by defendant; and in the year 1888 he had an understanding and agreement with complainant that she should have the privilege of selling any mine or mines ow ned by defendant in said districts, or either of them, for one year, upon which she would put up the money to pay the annual assessment work, and have and receive one half of the sum realized from the sale of said mine or mines. That, in pursuance of said agreement, she advanced the sum of $100 to defendant to do the annual assessment work on the Joanna mine in the year 1888, and said money was expended in doing said work. That, in addition to the expenditure of said $100 on said Joanna mine, said defendant expended more than §200 addiiional in money and labor of his own. That in the month of August, 3888, defendant told complainant that he would give her one half of the Joanna mine if she would furnish a centrifugal mill that would crush 25 tons of ore per day, to work the ores of the said Joanna mine, Said mill was to he sent up by her to said district in September of the same year, hut to carry out said agreement said complainant wholly failed, neglected, and refused.” That in the month of February, 1888, complainant proposed to him to relocate about one dozen copper claims, which he declined to do, as the claims were “wild cats.” That at said time complainant was negotiating to bond and sell to one Bailey 13 copper mines, owmed by defendant. That upon his refusal to relocate the claims in the joint name of complainant and defendant she requested him to relocate the claims, which he did, and that she advanced to him $200 for that
The answer is verified, and is responsive to complainant’s bill. The denials in the answer must, therefore, under the equity rules of this court, be overcome by the satisfactory evidence of two witnesses, or of one witness corroborated by circumstances which are equivalent in weight to another, before complainant can be granted the relief she asks. Slessinger v. Buckingham, 8 Sawy. 469, 17 Fed. Rep. 454; Vigel v. Hopp, 104 U. S. 441; Morrison v. Durr, 122 U. S. 518, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1215. Judge'Sawyer, in Slessinger v. Buckingham, called the attention of counsel to this rule, and pointed out the great advantage to complainants of waiving an answer under oath.
■ The testimony is very voluminous, conflicting, contradictory, and, in many respects, unsatisfactory. Complainant and defendant are the principal witnesses. Their correspondence continues over a period of five or six years, and numerous letters of both parties have been introduced in evidence. There are several letters, written by defendant, that of themselves tend to corroborate the testimony given by complainant; but, when all his letters are examined, it is found that both before and after the alleged agreement, claimed to have been made in February, 1888, the defendant indiscriminately used the words “I,” “we,” “our,” “your,” “us,” “mine.” Complainant’s letters to Tiim in relation to their interests in the mines in Osceola and Robinson mining districts do not make any special mention of any agreement or understanding such as she testifies to as having been made in February,. 1888, but constantly allude to the prospecte of making a sale of the properties. A large majority of her letters speak of the prospective sale of the copper mines, in regard to which there is no controversy in this suit. Her letters are not inconsistent with the claim of defendant that the agreement between them was to the effect that she should have the privilege of selling any mine he owned for the period of one year, upon which she would advance sufficient money to pay the annual as
The “Yount,” subsequently known as the “Paymaster,” was a silver mining claim, and was Jocaied in llie joint name of complainant and defendant. There is no controversy as to that claim. Complainant insists that the witnesses Derre and Peasley corroborated her testimony as to the agreement i hat she was an equal owner with defendant in all of the mining properties set out in her bill. The testimony of these witnesses is confined to their recollection of conversations had with the defendant wherein he made the general statement that complainant was lus partner in all of his mining property. Defendant admits that he told Peasley when he was at work on the Joanna mine, under a lease, that complainant had authority to sell the mine, and, if sold, that they would each have one half of the profits of the sale. He denies that he ever told Peasley or Derre that complainant was an equal partner of his in. all the mines he owned. These declarations of defendant, of whatever purport they may have been, were made to strangers to the transactions between complainant and defendant in general offhand conversations, which the witnesses could not he expected to recollect from any interest they might have in the matter, and may have been imperfectly heard or incorrectly remembered, and were for this reason, as well as others, insufficient to establish the contract between the complainant and defendant. Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 517. The complainant advanced to defendant during the year 1888 about §500. There is, in relation to this, as in other matters, a conflict as to i he purpose for which the money was advanced, and also some difference as to the amount advanced, the complainant’s testimony supporting' her bill and defendant’s is in favor of his answer. The theory upon which complainant principally relies for a decree in her favor is that the testimony given by defendant is absolutely false, and unworthy of belief.
The characters of complainant and defendant were vigorously attacked in the oral argument. The testimony shows that complainant is an educated woman of literary attainments and culture, having, or claiming to have, an extensive a nd friendly acquaintance with men of great wealth, who are seeking financial ventures of a speculative character, and Is exceedingly hopeful and somewhat visionary as to her ability to make a success of any enterprise which she attempts
Alter the correspondence between the parties ceased, the complainant sent an attorney and an agent to White Pine county, to investigate the matters involved in this controversy. At that time suit was brought by her agent in her name against the defendant to recover the said sum of $4,000, claimed to have been obtained by false pretenses. That suit was, before the commencement of this suit, dismissed, at the request of the complainant. There are many other facts and circumstances in tire testimony upon which the respective parties rely, hut enough has been referred to to illustrate the general character of all of the material evidence introduced. Complainant does not rely upon any written contract. The only writing upon which she relies is contained in the letters of defendant. These letters do not refer to a.ny oral contract. No statement is contained therein as to what the terms of any parol contract or agreement were. The most that is claimed for (hem is that defendant recognized that complainant had an equal interest with him in the Joanna and other claims. There is no pretense that the letters state the terms of any contract whereby such an interest was acquired, or was to he acquired, kept up, or maintained.
After a careful and thorough examination of all the testimony, I am unable i.o say that it satisfactorily proves a mining copartnership, as claimed by complainant. The case, does not come within the rule announced in Settembre v. Putnam, 30 Cal. 495, or Lawrence v. Robinson, 4 Colo. 577. The testimony is insufficient to create any trust by operation of la,w. Ducie v. Ford, 138 U. S. 592, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417; 10 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 12, a nd authorities there cited. The testimony of complainant is at best uncertain and indefinite as to the lapse of time during which the alleged copartnership was to continue; as to the length of time that defendant was to devote his skill, energy, and attention to the exploration and development of the mining properties; as to the amount of money complainant was to advance; and as to the time that complainant was to continue to devote her efforts to make a sale of any or of all of said properly. The testimony as to any contract is so vague, uncertain, and contradictory that a court of equity would not be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to decree a specific performance.
Whether a contract he such as is provable by parol, or is required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, it must be certain and unequivocal in all its essential bums, either within itself or by reference io some other agreement or matter, or it cannot he specifically enforced. 1 Story Eq. Jur. §§ 704, 707; Colson v. Thompson, 2 Wheat. 336; Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 513, 519; Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 456; Hennessey v. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 109; Minturn v. Baylis, 33 Cal. 133; Agard v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 301; Evans v. Lee, 12 Nev. 399.
Let judgment he rendered in favor of defendant for his costs.