28 F. Cas. 1346 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island | 1827
(charging jury). The question, as to the first parcel of land in controversy, turns upon a mere point of boundary between the lots No. 17 and No. 18.—The question is, whether the land now possessed by the defendant, Ross, as the northern boundary of lot No. 18, includes any portion of the land belonging to lot No. 17. It ,s often matter of extreme doubt, how the exact boundaries run in cases of laying out lots or this nature. If the black-birch tree on the east side nl the lot, No. 17, was an ancient boundary, and was so deemed by the respective owners in former times, and the line ran from thence west in a straight line to the large rock, spoken of, then we have arrived at some certainty. The question in dispute will then be narrowed down to the running of the boundary from that rock to the west line of the lot.—There is evidence in the case that at the time when Samuel Eddy was owner of the part of lot No. 17, now owned by the plaintiff, and Bradley Greene was the owner of lot No. 18, a dispute arose between them as to the boundary line on this part of their lots; and it was then adjusted and settled between them by one of Eddy’s sons, and the fence put up accordingly; and that the possession has remained in the respective occupiers of the lots according to that line ever since. This was before the year 1801, when the defendant purchased from Bradley Greene. Now if this evidence is believed it is decisive of this part of the case. In the first place, as mere evidence of the true boundary, in a ease like the present what can be so satisfactory as such a settlement of boundaries made more than twenty years ago by the parties interested. and acquiesced in by themselves, and those, who claim under them, ever since. It would seem of itself almost conclusive as a presumption of right in the absence of all circumstances to rebut it. In the next place, if the parties have been ever since that period in exclusive possession and seizin of the lots according to this boundary, then the persons, under whom the plaintiff, Wakefield, claims title, were at the time of the conveyance to him dis-seized of the land now in controversy, even if they had a title to it; and consequently the deed conveyed nothing to him in the land, of which his grantors were then disseized. This is a plain principle of the common law. But what is quite conclusive is, that such an exclusive possession for twenty years is a clear bar to any recovery, and is of itself a good title, by the express provisions of the statute of Rhode Island. The jury will therefore consider, whether this evidence is overthrown by any counter evidence in the case; and if not, whether it establishes such an exclusive possession. If so, their verdict ought to be for the defendant on this part of the case.
Then as to the other parcel of land, the intermediate strip, as it is called, in lot No. 18. It is true, that the deed of Bradley Greene to Jacob Woodland conveys so much only of the east end of the lot No. 18, as would include forty acres. This conveyance was made in August, 1801; and under it Woodland, if the evidence is believed, occupied and possessed up to the "Ridge Hill,” so called, as his true boundary, without objection; and it has not been disputed. that his possession was then deemed rightful. William Ross, by mesne conveyances, held it as owner in 1824, and then conveyed it to the plaintiff, who has ever since his purchase continued to occupy and possess it up to the Ridge hill. In December. 1801. Bradley Greene conveyed a part of the same lot to the defendant, Ross, describing it in his deed as “a tract or parcel of land situate, &c., and contains thirty acres by measure, being the west part of the head lot called ‘No. 18;’ ” and then specified its boundaries. The question is, what part of the lot-is intended by this description V It is said, that thirty acres only was intended to be conveyed; but there is no evidence to show, that the parties at that time knew or supposed, that the whole lot No. 18 contained more than seventy acres. No boundaries are stated in the deed, which establish any reservation to Bradley Greene of any strip on the eastern side of this part of the lot. No claim was ever made by him to any such strip, until he executed the quitclaim to the plaintiff in August, 1S25. He never was assessed for it in the town taxes; he did not. when he was liberated from gaol on account of his insolvency, assert it to be his property; but swore generally, that he had no property to support himself in gaol. The defendant has always possessed and occupied the whole of that part of the lot to the Ridge hill without objection, and cut wood there, as a part of the land conveyed by his deed. I state these, as facts, only upon the supposition, that the evidence in the case is believed by the jury; and of that they will judge; but if these are the facts, then they establish an exclusive possession in the defendant for more than twenty years, and consequently the statute of Rhode Island, of twenty years’ possession, applies as a bar. Independently of that, the quitclaim of 1825 could not operate, because the defendant, Ross, was then in possession under a claim of right, and if he had no right, he was in under a disseizin. But I am by no means satisfied, that the deed from Bradley Greene to the defendant in December, 1801, requires such a construction, as the plaintiff seeks to give it. The grantor had already conveyed forty acres on the east end of
Verdict for the defendant on both pleas, and judgment accordingly.