4 Me. 102 | Me. | 1826
This case presents two questions for consideration. I. Were certain members of the society of shakers properly admitted as witnesses? and 2. Were the instructions of the Judge to the jury correct ?
1. The objection to the admission of the witnesses seems to have been effectually removed by the releases given at the trial. A question of the same nature was settled by this court in the case of Anderson & al. v. Brock 3 Greenl. 243; the only difference is, in that case the witnesses were introduced by the plaintiffs ; and they and the witnesses executed mutual releases. This objection, therefore, is overruled.
2. The second deserves more consideration. Under the instructions which the jury received, they have found that the plaintiffknowingly signed the covenant ; and by the report it appears that he was a man of common natural abilities and understanding; and sometimes taught and exhorted in the religious meetings of the society ; and that he was more than twenty one
It is said that it is void, because it deprived the plaintiff of the constitutional power of acquiring, possessing and protecting property. The answer to this objection is, that the covenant only changed the mode in which he chose to exercise and enjoy this right or power ; he preferred that the avails of his industry should be placed in the common fund or bank of the society, and to derive his maintenance from the daily dividends which he was sure to receive. If this is a valid objection, it certainly furnishes a new argument against banks, and is applicable also to partnerships of one description as well as another.
It is said the covenant is void because it is in derrogation of the inalienable right of liberty of conscience. To this objection
Again it is urged that the covenant, is void, because its consideration is illegal, that it is against good morals and the policy of the law. We apprehend that these objections cannot have any foundation in the covenant itself; for that is silent as to many particulars and peculiarities which the counsel for the plaintiff deems objectionable. The covenant only settles certain principles as to the admission of members; community of interest ; mode of management and support; acquisition and use of the property ; stipulations in respect to services and claims ; professions of a general nature as to the faith of the society, and a solemn renewal of a former covenant ‘and appointment of certain officers. This is the essence of the covenant signed by the plaintiff ; and on this the defendants rely ; as a written contract of the plaintiff; under his hand and seal, never to make the present claim ; and also as a complete bar to it. Now, what is there illegal in its consideration, or wherein is it against good morals or the policy of the law. It does not contain a fact or a principle which an honest man ought to condemn; but it does contain some provisions which all men ought to approve; it distinctly inculcates the duty of honest industry, contentment with competency, and charity to the poor and suffering. In this view of the subject, these objections vanish in a moment. But if we consider them as founded on the covenant, and all the evidence in the cause together, the result of the examination will not in a legal
But, for the sake of the argument, let us suppose that the covenant or contract is illegal and void for the reasons which have been urged by the plaintiff’s counsel ; what then will be the legal consequence ? will the action then stand on any firmer ground ? Though in the present case, the plaintiff does not demand of the defendants the repayment of a sum of money paid to them, on the ground that they have no legal right to retain it yet his demand is in principle, the same thing ; it is a demand of
So, an action will not lie to recover back money deposited for the purpose of being paid to one for his interest in soliciting a pardon for a person under sentence of death. 3 Esp. 253. No implied promise arises out of an illegal transaction. Robertson v. Tyler 2 H. Bl. 379. See also Aubert v. Moor 2 Bos. & Pull. 371; and Mr. Dane, in his Abr. 1 Vol. 194, says,—“ And on the “ whole, the sound principle is, the law will not raise or imply “ any promise in aid of a transaction forbidden by the law of the “land.” With these authorities before us, it would seem impossible to sustain the present action, even allowing the covenant and the society, by whom and for whose use it was formed, to be of the reprehensible and illegal character which has been given them. On the whole, we are all of opinion that there is a total failure on the part of the plaintiff, and there must be
Judgment on the verdict„