73 Wash. 222 | Wash. | 1913
The appellant, in the year 1910, owned and operated a sawmill located at Darrington, in this state. The respondent was employed therein as off-bearer at the cutoff saw, and was injured by coming in contact with such saw. This is an appeal from a judgment in his favor, entered in an action brought to recover damages for such injury.
The saw at which the respondent was injured was set in a swinging frame, hung in such manner that the saw could be used to trim and cut into proper lengths cants and other timbers brought to it from the head saw of the mill. The means used to bring the timbers to the saw were a series of rolls, made to revolve by being geared to the power shaft of the mill. After the timbers were properly trimmed at the cutoff saw, they were transferred either to the pony saw or to the edger at the end of the mill in the opposite direction from the head saw. Between the cut-off saw and edger was another series of rolls operated in a manner similar to these first described, by which the timbers designed for the edger could be carried from the saw to that machine. These rolls were controlled by a lever placed near the stand of the person operating the cut-off saw, and could be made to stand still, go forward or reverse, at the option of the person handling the lever.
The respondent commenced work at the appellant’s mill four days prior to the time he was injured. He commenced work at the cut-off saw on the morning preceding his injury. His duties in that position were to take care of the refuse matter from the saw, and assist the sawyer in handling the timbers brought to the saw for cutting. Some three or four hours after the work began on the morning of the accident, a piece of timber of considerable length was sent down to the cut-off saw from the head saw. The timber contained a
The grounds of negligence on which the respondent based his complaint were three: namely, (1) that the appellant suffered and permitted the rolls and the mechanism controlling the same to become and remain in a defective and dangerous condition, so that the rolls would, without any manipulation of the lever intended to control them, automatically reverse, thereby bringing material which had been carried to the edger back from that machine to the cut-off saw; (2) that it suffered and permitted the cut-off saw to become and remain in a defective condition in that there was no stop provided to prevent the saw from swinging beyond the rolls into the space provided for the persons working with the saw to stand, and that to allow it to so swing was both dangerous and unnecessary; and (3) that the appellant was guilty of negligence in directing the respondent to work in a position of special and unnecessary peril without giving him notice or warning of the danger to be encountered.
We think there was here sufficient evidence to carry the question of negligence to the jury. It is true that the respondent was unable to point out the specific defect that caused these rolls to reverse. But having shown that- they actually reversed automatically, and that properly constructed rolls do not so reverse, the jury were warranted in finding that the appellant was negligent in not having them properly constructed and adjusted before it put the respondent to work thereon. Donahue v. Brown, 154 Mass. 21, 27 N. E. 675; Mooney v. Connecticut River Lum. Co., 154 Mass.
The appellant has excepted to a number of the instructions given by the court, not, as we understand, because they do not state correct principles of law, but because there was no evidence before the jury on the subject-matter to which they relate. For example, the court gave the following instructions, to which exceptions were taken:
“If you should find under the evidence that said defendant was guilty of negligence in any one of the three particulars above mentioned, and that such negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, you are then instructed that your verdict would be for the defendant.
“I instruct you that if you should find from the evidence that any of the appliances mentioned in the complaint were defective in any particular as charged in the complaint, then if you should further find that such defects existed for such length of time that the employer, in the exercise of .ordinary care, could or should have discovered such defect or defects, then I instruct you that it is your duty to find that the defendant did, as a matter of law, know of such defective condition.
“You are instructed that if the employer, knowing the existence of any defect in any machine or appliance, places an employe to work upon or about such defective machine or appliance without notifying the employe of the existence of such defect, and if the employe while so employed, and without fault on his part, is injured as the proximate result of such defect, then the employer is liable to the employe for such injury.”
But it seems to us that these instructions were clearly pertinent, both to the issues and the facts shown by the evidence. The “three particulars” referred to in the first instruction quoted was a statement by the court of the grounds of negligence charged against the appellant in the complaint, an outline of which we have heretofore given, and, as we have
Certain proposed instructions on the question of contributory negligence were requested which the court refused to give. But in so far as they were pertinent, they were covered by the court’s-general instructions. This is a sufficient compliance with the rule, as in this jurisdiction it is not necessary to give a requested instruction in the language and form submitted, even though it may be pertinent and in other respects ■ unobj ectionable.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mount, Main, Ellis, and Morris, JJ., concur.