SPENKELINK v. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION OF FLORIDA, ET AL.
No. A-1016
C. A. 5th Cir.
May 24, 1979
442 U.S. 901
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL would grant the application for a stay of execution. Furthermore, they object because the Court announces its action without first affording them an opportunity to preparе, circulate, and file a statement in support of their view.
FILARTIGA ET AL. v. PENA-IRALA ET AL.
No. A-1017
D. C. E. D. N. Y.
May 24, 1979
442 U.S. 901
Application for stay of deportation, presented to MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION OF FLORIDA v. SPENKELINK
No. A-1020
C. A. 5th Cir.
May 24, 1979
442 U.S. 901
Motion of the Attorney General of Florida to vacate the order entered by Honorable Elbert Parr Tuttle, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on May 22, 1979, denied. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST reserves the right to file a written statement at a future date. [See dissenting opinion, infra, filed May 25, 1979.]
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.*
I cannot join the Court‘s unexplained denial of the State‘s motion to vacate the stay order entered a few minutes before
Attorneys representing defendants under sentence of death have a difficult and arduous task to perform, but in seeking stays of execution they need devote little time to the oft-litigated issue of “irreparable injury.” “[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303-304 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). The irreversible nature of the penalty makes irreparable by definition any injury inflicted in violation of the United States Constitution. But because imposition of the death penalty is irreversible, I respectfully suggest that there mаy be a tendency on the part of individual judges or courts exercising the extraordinary-writ authority conferred upon them by
My understanding of the principal opinions in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976), Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976), is that a State whose citizens have exрressed through their elected representatives and their judges and juries a will to impose the death penalty for offenses such as murder may do so if the State conforms its trial and sentencing procedures to the requirements enunciated in this Court‘s cases. Considering, however, that there are several hundred federal judges in the United States who have authority to issue stays under the provisions of
Thus, it can hardly be said that a State will never be injured by issuance of such last-minute stays of execution. When a State has taken all steps required by our capital cases, its will, as represented by the legislature that authorized the imposition of the death sentence and by the juries and courts that
“This Court has the responsibility to supervise the administration of criminal justice by the federal judiciary. This includes the duty to see that the laws are not only enforcеd by fair proceedings, but also that the punishments prescribed by the laws are enforced with a reasonable degree of promptness and certainty. The stay which had been issued promisеd many more months of litigation in a case which had otherwise run its full course.” Id., at 287.
In the same case, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, joined by the CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, and MR. JUSTICE MINTON, stated:
“Our liberty is maintained only so long as justice is secure. To permit our judicial processes to be used to obstruct the course of justice destroys our freedom. Over two years ago the Rosenbergs were found guilty by a jury of a grave offense in time of war. Unlike other litigants they hаve had the attention of this Court seven times; each time their pleas have been denied. Though the penalty is great and our responsibility heavy, our duty is clear.” Id., at 296.
Under the present combination of statutes and rules by which stay authority is exercised, however, a result so at odds with a government of law is by no means foreordained. This Court has authority pursuant to
Here, respondent has nоt had an opportunity to file any response to the motion to vacate the stay. Given the gravity of the consequences of vacation of the stay, only the most demonstrable and self-evident error on the part of the judge or court issuing the stay would lead me to conclude that it should be vacated. Here, the circumstances surrounding issuance of the stay convince mе that such error is present.
Respondent‘s “Original Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody,” filed with Judge Tuttle six years after respondent‘s trial and less than nine hours before respondеnt was scheduled to die, alleged for the first time that respondent‘s trial attorney had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition further alleged that respondent‘s “pоst-conviction attorneys,” who are, incidentally, extraordinarily skilled and experienced in the area of capital punishment cases, rendered ineffective assistance in failing to claim that respondent‘s trial counsel had been ineffective. It strains credulity to suppose that six years and countless courthouses after his trial, respondent suddenly determined that his trial attоrney had been ineffective. Either he does not believe the claim himself or he had held the claim in reserve, an insurance policy of sorts, to spring on the federal judge of his choice if all else fails. This Court has disapproved of such tactics before:
“Thus, for example, if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the timе of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted
two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground. . . . Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entеrtain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 18 (1963).
See also Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9 (b).
Moreover, respondent, for unexplained but obvious reasons, presented his original petition not to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, the jurisdiction in which he is detained and which had twice denied him post-conviction relief, but to a Senior Circuit Judge residing several hundred miles away in Atlanta, Ga.
For the foregоing reasons, I am compelled to dissent from the Court‘s denial of the State‘s motion.
SPENKELINK v. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION OF FLORIDA, ET AL.
No. A-1025
C. A. 5th Cir.
May 25, 1979
442 U.S. 906
Application for stay of execution, presented to MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and by him referred to the Court, denied. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL would grant the stay. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision оf this application.