Wе granted appellant Lorain C. WahnschafFs application for interlоcutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in dismissing her рersonal injury action against appellee Jennifer Erdman based upon the insufficiency of service of process.
On April 4, 1990, Wahnschaff commenced the underlying action against Erdman and her father as a result of injuries that Wahnsсhaff allegedly received when the vehicle that she had been driving was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Erdman on August 12, 1988. The next day, service was attempted on Erdman and her father by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with Erdman’s mоther. At that time, Erdman was on active duty in the United States Coast Guard and stationed in Nеw Jersey, having enlisted in the military on January 16, 1990. By affidavit in support of her motion to dismiss, Erdmаn averred that, at the time service was attempted, she intended to make a career in the Coast Guard for the foreseeable future and did not intend to return to her parents’ home to reside. It is undisputed that she has not been personally served with process in this action.
“OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (7) requires that the complaint аnd summons be served on ‘the defendant personally, or
by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or by delivering a copy оf the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by lаw to receive service of process.’ . . . The emphasized languagе is known as ‘substituted’ or ‘notorious’ service.” (Citation and footnote omitted.)
Tolbert v. Murrell,
The Geоrgia Supreme Court has enunciated the requirement for *356 service of process when substituted service has been made upon a military serviceperson. “ ‘Where a party maintains a residence with a member of his family, but travels about or lives at various other places, the permanent residence may, on the facts, be his usual place of abode. This leads to a consideration of the situation where the party is in military service. Here a distinction is often made between one temporarily in service, with the intention of rеturning home after discharge, and one who is a career serviceman, рarticularly where the serviceman has set up a private home wherе he is stationed. Thus, in the first situation service by leaving process at defendant’s family home is valid, although defendant is in military service and is stationed elsewhere. ... In the second situation, service at defendant’s former home, or by leaving process with defendant’s parents, [is] invalid.’ ” Tolbert, supra at 567-568.
In the present case, unlike in
Tolbert,
the undisputed evidence showed that at thе time service was attempted, Erdman was a career servicepеrson with no intention of returning to her parents’ home to reside. The trial court found as fact that Erdman was not a resident of her parents’ home at the time thаt service was attempted on her mother at said residence, and this finding is supported by evidence of record. “Where, as in this case, the trial court sаt as the trier of jurisdictional issues of fact, absent legal error an appellate court is without jurisdiction to overturn factual findings supported by some еvidence. . . .”
Ga. Power Co. v. Harrison,
Judgment affirmed.