MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plаintiff Barbara Wahl (“Wahl”) filed a putative class action suit against Midland Credit Management, Incorporated (“MCM”), Midland Funding NCC-2 Corporation (“NCC-2”), and Encore Capital Group, Incorporated (“Encore”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (R. 36, Pl.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Class Cert. (“PL’s Mem”) at 1.) Currently before the Court is Wahl’s motion for class certification. (R. 34-1, PL’s Mot. for Class Cert.)
BACKGROUND
Wahl brings this action against three affiliated companies. Defendant Encore is the parent corporation of Defendant NCC-2, and MCM is an affiliate of Encore. (R. 59, Defs.’ Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Class Cert. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 1.) Defendants purchase defaulted consumer debts (also known as “charged off debt”) from different corporations for a few cents on the dollar and attempt to collect the debt from the consumer. (R. 34, PL’s Mot. for Class Cert, at 2.) NCC-2 takes title to the charged off debts, most of which are credit card debts. (Id.) MCM is a collection agency and collects the bad debts purchased by NCC-2. (Id.)
Prior to February 2005, Wahl maintained a credit card account with British Petroleum (“BP”). (Id. at 3.) On February 3, 2005, MCM sent Wahl a letter informing her that NCC-2 had purchased her debt from BP and that MCM would be attempting to collect the debt. (Id., Ex.D, Feb. 3rd Letter.) The February 3rd letter indicated that the current balance of Wahl’s BP debt was $1,149, but MCM offered her a 25% discount off of the balance if she mailed the payment by
On August 27, 2005, MCM sent Wahl another letter indicating that the debt was still outstanding, the accrued interest up to that date was $32.40, and the current balance of the debt was now $1,181.49. (R. 1, Compl., Ex. B, Aug. 27th Letter.) In late 2005, MCM and NCC-2 transferred the debt to a third, nonaffiliated debt collector, Zwieker and Associates (“Zwieker”). (R. 59, Def.’s Mem. at 5.) On November 15, 2005, Lamet notified Zwieker in writing that Wahl disputed the debt, acknowledged MCM’s right to pursue legal аction against Wahl, but offered to provide sworn affidavits and bank statements proving Wahl’s insolvency if this would avoid suit. (Id., Ex. C, Nov. 15th Letter.) Lamet also stated that Zwieker should cease contacting Wahl about the debt. (Id.)
Zwieker, however, sent Wahl a letter on December 14, 2005, indicating that the bal-anee of her account was $1,154.91, due immediately, or in the alternative, she could contact their offices to make arrangements to pay her debt. (R. 1, Compl., Ex. C, Dec. 14th Letter.) In response, Wahl, now represented by Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin (“Edelman Combs”), sent Zwieker a letter on February 5, 2006, indicating that the debt was disputed, requesting information that would support Zwicker’s claim against Wahl, and demanding that Zwieker provided documentation of how they arrived at the amount owed. (Id., Ex. D, Feb. 5th Letter.) On March 3, 2006, MCM sent Wahl a letter requesting any documentation that supported her dispute. (Id., Ex. E, Mar. 6 Letter.) Wahl did not respond and instead filed suit against Encore, MCM, and NCC-2 on March 28, 2006. (Id., Compl. at 1, 7.)
Wahl claims that in the April 15th and August 27th letters, MCM presented the “principal balance” as the total amount of Wahl’s purchases and cash advances as well as interest accrued while the debt was held by BP, and the “interest accrued” as amounts that had been added after Defendants purchased the charged off debt. (R. 34, PL’s Mot. for Class Cert. 4, 6.) She alleges that Defendants’ representation did not disclose the interest and finance charges that had accrued prior to the charge off, and simply lists them as a part of the “principal balance.” (Id., 6.) Wahl alleges that by including the interest that accrued while BP held the debt as a part of the principal balance, MCM engaged in a false and misleading practice in violation of Section 1692e
(a) all individuals in Illinois, (b) to whom defendant MCM sent a letter, (c) seeking to collect a credit card debt, (d) describing as ‘principal’ an amount other than the outstanding purchases and cash advances on the card or describing as ‘interest’ an amount less than the outstanding finance charges on the account, or both, (e) which letter was sent on or after March 28, 2005 (one year prior to filing this action) and on or before April 17, 2006 (20 days after filing this action).
(R. 34, PL’s Mot. for Class Cert, at 1.) Class B is defined as:
(a) all individuals in Illinois, (b) who (according to the records of defendants and their collection agencies) disputed a debt defendants sought to collect, (c) following which collection communications continued by or on behalf of defendants, (d) where any of the subsequent communications occurred on or after March 28, 2005 and on or before April 17, 2006.
(Id. at 1-2.) For the following reasons, Wahl’s motion for class certification is granted in part and denied in part.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A plaintiff seeking class certification has the burden of proving that the proposed class meets the requirеments of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc.,
ANALYSIS
Wahl argues that the proposed classes meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3). Defendants contend, however, that Wahl has failed to satisfy her burden because she is an inadequate representative, her claims are atypical, and the proposed classes cannot satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). We will consider these arguments as we analyze the proposed classes under both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).
A. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity
In order prove numerosity, Wahl must establish that the class is so large that “joinder of all members is impractical.” Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 23(a)(1); Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co.,
Wahl claims that the numerosity requirement is satisfied because Encore’s 2005 Securities and Exchange Commission filings show that it acquired over 5 million accounts in 2005, and the letters she received were “clearly form letter[s] sent via bulk mail.” (R. 1, Compl. at 8.) Defendants do not specifically contest numerosity in their brief opposing class certification, (R. 59, Defs.’ Mem.), but elsewhere have denied that this requirement is met. {See R. 18, Defs.’ Answer to Compl. 57.) Courts in this Circuit have held that alleged FDCPA violations via a form letter sent by a large commercial defendant is sufficient to satisfy numerosity. See Lucas v. GC Services L.P.,
Furthermore, given the small amount of damages potentially suffered by each individual class member and the impracticality of relitigating the issues in this case, separate suits involving members of either class would be an inefficient use of judicial resources. Therefore, this Court concludes that Wahl has met the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), the proposed class members’ claims must generally arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, and there must be “at least one question of law or fact common to the class.” In re VMS Sec. Litigation,
This Court has previously held that the requisite common nucleus of operative fact exists in FDCPA cases when the controversy arises from standard form debt collection letters. Jackson,
With respect to Class B, Defendants do not deny that they keep records of those individuals who disputed the validity of their debt, and if Defendants continued their collection efforts despite valid notification of a dispute, the legality of this practice is a common question of law that exists as to each putative class member. See Halperin v. Nichols, Safina, Lemer & Co., 94 C 6960,
C. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality
In order to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), the claims and defenses of the class representative must be typical of the claims and defenses of the putаtive class members. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). “ ‘A plaintiffs claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.’ ” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n,
In arguing that Wаhl’s claim is barred by a unique defense, Defendants rely on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assoc., Inc.,
Defendants alsо argue that Wahl is atypical of the class she seeks to represent because in her deposition testimony she stated that she was not confused by the followup letters sent by MCM. (R. 59, Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A, Wahl Dep. at 100.) The test, however, is not whether the individual who received the letter was misled, but whether an unsophisticated consumer would be misled by the representations made by the debt collector. Avila v. Rubin,
Additionally, Wahl’s claims are typical of the putative members of Class B. Her claim arises from the same alleged course of conduct as that of the putative class members— Defendants continued collection efforts through third party collectors despite the presence of a valid dispute. Further, her claim is premised upon the same legal theory — that this conduct violates the FDCPA. Accordingly, this Court finds that the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) has been satisfied.
D. Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representative fairly and adequately represent the interests of the absent class members. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). To determine if the plaintiff has met the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), the Court must ask whether the named Plaintiff: (1) has “antagonistic or conflicting claims with other members of the class;” (2) has “a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure vigorous advocacy;” and (3) has counsel that is “competent, qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the litigation.” Sebo v. Rubenstein,
Defendants argue that Wahl is an inadequate class representative because she is uninformed about the subject matter of the litigation. However, an adequate class representative must maintain only an “‘understanding of the basic facts underlying the claims, some general knowledge, and a willingness and ability to participate in discovery.’” Murray,
In her deposition testimony, Wahl demonstrated a basic understanding of the claims against Defendants. She stated that her main complaint was that the “principal balance” shown was too high, when she knew that the purchases she made were of an amount less than $200. (R. 59, Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A, Wahl Dep. at 6.) Wahl alsо has participated in discovery and otherwise assisted her counsel in preparation of this case. (Id.) Similarly, Wahl understands that she has a duty as a class representative. She stated that she would not be satisfied if her debt with Defendants was extinguished because she has “promised to be the representative of a class of people who are fighting the same thing.” (Id. at 83, 85.)
Defendants further argue that Wahl is inadequate because she has “ced[ed] control of
Finally, Defendants stаte that Wahl is an inadequate representative because she is a “professional ‘class representative’ who has served as the plaintiff in at least three other putative class actions filed by Edelman, Combs, Latturner, & Goodwin.” (R. 59, Defs.’ Mem. at 2.) Other than establishing that three other courts have found Wahl to be an adequate class representative, it is wholly unclear how this fact affects Wahl’s ability to ensure vigorous advocacy. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[rjepeat litigants may be better able to monitor the conduct of counsel, who as a practical matter are the class’s real champions.” Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir.2006). Thus, Defendants’ characterization of Wahl as a professional class representative and their implication that this diminishes her status as an adequate representative in this action is unpersuasive.
In addition to having an adequate named plaintiff, the proposed class must have counsel that is “experienced, competent, qualified and able to conduct the litigation vigorously.” Cavin,
II. Rule 23(b)(3)
Under Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must show that “questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and ... a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). For the following reasons, we find that Class A meets Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirement, but Class B fails to meet the predominance requirement because individual issues predominate over common issues, rendering class certification inappropriate.
A. Predominance
1. Class A
The predominance inquiry is far more demanding than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Amchern Prods.,
Defendants argue that individual issues predominate in this action because, before liability could be assessed, a determination would have to be made as to how the principal balance was stated in letters to each class member. Defendаnts do not deny, however, that they present both the customer’s purchases and the interest accrued while the account was held by the original creditor as “the principle balance” in all of its collection letters. In fact, Defendants use a form collection letter and presenting the principle balance in this manner appears to be their common business practice. {See, e.g., R. 34, Pl.’s Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. D, Snyder Collection Letter.) Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that if the manner in which
Defendants further argue that Wahl has failed to establish predominance because it would be necessary to determine whether each class member was confused or mislead by the manner in which the principal balance was stated on the collection letter. As stated above, however, the relevant standard for assessing liability is whether an unsophisticated consumer would be misled. Sims,
Finally, Defendants argue that Wahl’s сlaims are meritless because of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Taylor v. Cavalry Inv., LLC,
2. Class B
With respect to Class B, however, we find that Wahl has not satisfied the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). In order to determine whether Defendants violated the FDCPA by continuing collection practices after receiving notification that the debt was disputed, we would have to look at the individual circumstances surrounding each putative class member’s claim to determine: (1) whether each class member properly disputed their debt pursuant to Section 1692g; and (2) if so, whether MCM hired a third-party debt collector to continue collection efforts despite having notification of a valid dispute. We cannot assume that because Defendants may have violated Wahl’s rights under Section 1692g, then they also must have violated the rights of the other putative class members.
Notably, Class B attacks Defendants’ alleged policy of continuing collection efforts through a third-party collector despite the existence of a valid dispute. Class B does not take issue with an undisputed and standardized practice or policy, or, like Class A, contest defendant’s debt collection practices as illustrated by standardized letters. See, e.g., Young v. County of Cook, 06 C 552,
B. Superiority
Finally, this Court must determine whether Class A meets Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement. “A class action is superior where potential damages may be too insignificant to provide class members with incentive to pursue a claim individually.” Jackson,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (R. 34-1) is granted as to Class A, but denied as to Class B. The Court will therefore allow Wahl to represent a class which consists of:
(a) all individuals in Illinois, (b) to whom defendаnt MCM sent a letter, (c) seeking to collect a credit card debt, (d) describing as ‘principal’ an amount other than the outstanding purchases and cash advances on the card or describing as ‘interest’ an amount less than the outstanding finance charges on the account, or both, (e) which letter was sent on or after March 28, 2005 (one year prior to filing this action) and on or before April 17, 2006 (20 days after filing this action).
A status hearing in this case will be held on July 5, 2007 at 9:45 a.m. to set a firm litigation schedule for this lawsuit. The parties are requested to fully exhaust all remaining settlement possibilities for this lawsuit prior to that date.
Notes
. Section 1692e reads, in pertinent part:
A debt сollector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:
... (2) The false representation of—
(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or ...
... (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.
15 U.S.C§ 1692e.
. Section 1692c provides in pertinent part that "a debt collector may not communicаte with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt ... if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt.” 15 USCS § 1692c(a)(2) (2007). The statute further states that:
If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate*295 further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except—
(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy. If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.
15 U.S.C § 1692c(c).
. Section 1692g provides that: "If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or thаt the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof ..." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.
. If the presence of an affirmative defense against Wahl later becomes a distraction away from the larger issues affecting the class as a whole, this issue can be resolved by having a new class representative take Wahl’s place. See, e.g., Nelson v. IPALCO Enters., No. IP02-477CHK,