Dеfendant appeals as of right from an order modifying a judgment of divorce as to support.
The parties were divorced on April 30, 1974. At that time they had twin sons born June 7, 1967. Prior to entry of judgment, the parties expressly stipulated that child support "shall be * * * payable weekly, until said children attain the full age of eighteen years, or complete high school, whichever is the last to occur”. The judgment of divorce awarded custody of the minor children to the mother and provided for support for each child until the "age of eighteen years, or completion of] high school, whichever is the last to occur,” or until the further order of the court.
On April 4, 1979, plaintiff filed a petition seeking modification of the child support order. The parties expressly agreed as to the amount of the increasеd child support. Consistent with the parties’ stipulation and the judgment of divorce, the court ordered defendant to pay the increаsed amount of support until the children attain "the age of eighteen years or graduate from high school, whichever shall occur last,” or until further order of the court.
A precise statement of the question raised on appeal is whether a trial court may order payment of child support beyond the age of majority on the basis of the parties’ voluntary stipulation to that effect. Clearly, the most recent order was consistent in that regard with the predivorce stipulation and the judgment of divorce.
Appellate review of divorce decree modifications is
de novo. Eigner v
Eigner,
Defendant argues in support of his appeal that
McNames v McNames,
"It should also be noted that in Price [v Price,395 Mich 6 ;232 NW2d 630 (1975)] the Supreme Court made specific reference to a prior voluntary agreement to continue support betweеn the parties. We deem this to be of significance because, in our review of those reported cases where suppоrt was allowed to be continued, we have noted that in each there was either a prior agreement (Price, supra), or some form of rеservation for future support in the original judgment of divorce, Barbier v Barbier,45 Mich App 402 ;206 NW2d 464 (1973), Milbrand v Milbrand,66 Mich App 730 ;239 NW2d 730 (1976). See also Anno: Statutory Change of Age of Majority as Affecting Pre-Existing Status or Rights, 75 ALR3d 228, especially § 7, pp 256-259.
"Here, there was neither an agreement nor any reservation for future support beyond age 18. Further, •as in Allen v Allen,63 Mich App 475 ;235 NW2d 22 (1975), the instant petition was filed well beyond the *392 effective date of the Age of Majоrity Act. We therefore conclude that the trial court was without authority to extend support in this case. We deem this result not necessarily desirable, but required.” McNames, supra, 481.
McNames is not on all fours with the case at bar. Here, the within defendant voluntarily stipulated that he would pay support until his sons reached the age of 18 or completed high school, whichever last occurred. This fact is crucial to the case.
In
Ovaitt v Ovaitt,
After reviewing Miсhigan authority which clearly held that a trial court has no jurisdiction to order the payment of any benefits or child support after thе child reaches the age of majority absent a specific agreement by the parties to such effect, this Court considered whether a prior agreement between the parties should alter this rule. *393 The conclusion reached by this Court provided in pertinеnt part as follows:
"As we read MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1), we believe that the court has jurisdiction to make an order or judgment for support and college expenses for the children of the parties who are minors at the time of entry of such order or judgment. We find no statutory prohibition against continuing such order or judgment provisiоns for support and other benefits beyond minority. Further, we believe in the present technological age in which we live that it is not unreаsonable to extend support to include provisions for a college education for the minor children of the parties even though such requirement would extend beyond the children’s minority. Having reached that conclusion, we believe that the provisions of thе judgment of divorce as originally entered by the court providing for support and college expenses to a completion of the college education, even though it would extend beyond the children’s minority, was a valid exercise of the court’s discretion and within its power under the statutory authority allowing such provision for minor children.
"Under the facts of this case, where the parties entered into an agreement that was incorporated by the court in its judgment, and the parties concede they knew at the time that thе terms were not subject to performance fully within the minority of the children, it would be an invitation to chaos to hold that such provision was not enforceable. It would permit parties to divorce actions to play fast and loose with the court and with the other рarties to the action by entering into agreements which they had no intention of performing.
"Plaintiff’s conduct indicates a deliberate and willful misrepresentation to the court and opposing party at time of agreement and entry of judgment with respect to pоst-minority expenses of the children. As a matter of public policy, this should not be permitted and the parties should be required to live uр to the terms of their voluntary agreement. The judgment entered here pursuant to the agreement of the parties did not violate *394 the statute in that, at the time of its entry, the children were minors.” Ovaitt, supra, 638-639.
We find the reasoning in Ovaitt to be quite persuasive and, on the basis thereof, affirm the order from which defendant appeals.
Affirmed.