Wagner v. United States

104 F. 133 | 6th Cir. | 1900

DAY, Circuit Judge,

after stating the foregoing facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

There can he no question that, under the constitution and laws of the United States, exclusive power is given to the courts of the United States in matters of bankruptcy. By section 11 of the “act of 1898, to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,” it is provided that a suit which is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release, and which is pending against a person at the time of the filing of a petition against him, shall be stayed until after an adjudication or the dismissal of the petition. If such person is adjudged a bankrupt, then such action may be further stayed until 12 months after the date of such adjudication, or, if within that time such person applies for a discharge, then until the question of such discharge is determined. From the statement of this case it appears that Houston, having been adjudicated a bankrupt, filed an application for a restraining order against the.opposing party to restrain further proceedings for the collection of alimony under the decree awarding alimony to his wife. The district court, acting upon the belief and understanding that this claim was one for which a discharge, when granted, would be a release, exercised the power conferred by the statute, and granted the restraining order, which was duly served before the order punishing the bankrupt for contempt was made by the state court. After the service thereof, and acting with knowledge thereof, as appears in the record, the state court made the order recited in the statement of facts, committing the bankrupt to jail for nonpayment of the alimony theretofore decreed. It is said that this was a punishment in the state court for acts theretofore committed in violation of orders of the court, and for which the state court had the power and jurisdiction to punish the bankrupt notwithstanding the proceedings in bankruptcy and the restraining order which had been granted in the case. Upon examination, we are constrained to take a different view of this order. It does not purport to be a punishment for a criminal contempt, but a committal of the bankrupt for the nonpayment of the alimony in question. It is a punishment for civil contempt, the object of the order being to coerce payment of the sums of alimony theretofore ordered to be paid. The restraining order in the bankruptcy court had distinctly directed that no further proceedings be had for the collection of other sums of alimony pending the bankruptcy proceedings. In other words, it seems to us quite clear that the state court undertook to punish the bankrupt for nonperformance of the very things which the bankrupt court, exercising the power granted by law, had restrained the party in interest from compelling the bankrupt to do. The question therefore presented is whether the bankrupt, having been committed in violation of the restraining order theretofore made by the bankruptcy court, exercising its plenary power, can be released from imprisonment under proceedings in habeas corpus. The question elaborately argued, but which we deem unnecessary to decide, is whether a decree for alimony is a provable debt under the bankrupt law. The real issue to be determined here is as to the force and effect of the order made within the jurisdiction conferred by law upon the bankruptcy court. It seems to us it is immaterial whether the court’s view of the provability of the alimony claim in bankruptcy is sound or unsound. Jurisdiction is lawfully given to the bankruptcy court to stay proceedings pending bankruptcy upon claims which are provable. As jurisdiction is thus given to the bankruptcy court when an application is presented to it for a restraining order under this power to determine whether the claim is thus provable, an erroneous decision does not make void the judgment of the court. It is unnecessary to cite authorities to the proposition that an order within the jurisdiction of the court, until reversed, is binding and conclusive upon all parties. The question is not whether the discharge, when granted, will be a bar to an action for the recovery of alimony, but whether the orders of the court were within its jurisdiction under the power granted by law. The court, in passing upon applications under this section of the bankrupt law, is given the right to determine the question of the provability of debts. This is necessarily so in the execution of the power conferred by statute. This order, then, being within the jurisdiction of the court, is valid and binding upon all parties. There can be no question that the imprisonment and punishment of the bankrupt in violation of this order is such a deprivation of his liberty as justifies his release upon an order in habeas corpus. In thé administration of justice the courts of the United States, by all proper means, should endeavor to avoid conflict of jurisdiction with the state courts, and a similar obligation rests upon the latter in reference to matters committed by láw to the jurisdiction of the former. In tÉe enforcément of the powers conferred by the constitution and laws in bankruptcy matters, so long as the district court acts in the matter within its powers, its jurisdiction is exclusive and supreme. Finding that the bankruptcy court was acting within its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order, and that the bankrupt was committéd in violation thereof, we think the conclusion reached by the district court proper. The order of the court will be affirmed.