70 Mo. App. 161 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1897
Plaintiff’s counsel having so clearly and fairly stated the nature of this controversy, we shall, with some little addition and correction, adopt the same as our own:
We are not informed by the statement of facts as to the amount of the death benefit nor the manner of its collection; it seems this was not considered material by the parties, for the reason that the money had been in fact collected and paid to Egid Wagner, father of the-deceased member, who claimed it under his son’s will, the society talcing a bond to protect it against the claims of all other persons.
The society was organized under section 2823, Revised Statutes, 1889. The constitution defining the objects of the association, provides among other things for “material support in cases of sickness and death of the rightful members, their ividows and orphans.” The by-laws governing the payment of death benefits provide that a member can dispose of the death benefit, by testament, and if not so disposed of it shall be paid, first, to the widow; second, if there is no widow then to the children of the deceased member; third, if there be no widow nor children the money shall be paid in equal shares to the parents and brothers and sisters. The member attempted by will to dispose of the death benefit to his father, “in order to reimburse him for the expenses of my last sickness and
The only question presented to the trial court was whether August E. Wagner could dispose of this death benefit to his father for the purposes mentioned in the will, it being agreed that the father was not a dependent upon his deceased son. The court held he could not, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $287.50, being the amount which it appears from the agreed statement of facts was collected for the death benefit. From this judgment defendant appealed.
In Briggs v. Earl, supra, the question was as. to the validity of an assignment of the benefit fund made by the member to a creditor. The court held the assignment void, and in the course of the opinion used this language: “The purpose for which they (said associations) can be formed is strictly limited by statute to rendering assistance to the widow and orphans of deceased members or other persons dependent on them; that is to say, after the support and assistance of the member have been withdrawn by death, the corpo
The principle of that ease is applicable here. The elder Wagner was and is a creditor of his son, and nothing more so far as the law of this case goes. As already explained, and as admitted by the agreed facts, he was not a dependent of his son, and not therefore within the class of beneficiaries named in the statute. His attitude before the court is the same as any stranger in blood would be. He claims under an assignment by will, but in this his case is no stronger than if the transfer had taken effect during his son’s lifetime. Neither is the elder Wagner’s claim any the more effective because his son owed him for expenses incurred during the young man’s last illness. The claim of the father is one appealing strongly to one’s sense of justice, but yet we have no authority to measure the rights of the parties by any other rule than that applied in other cases.
That provision contained in the defendant’s by-laws authorizing a member to dispose of the death benefit by will must be construed as authority only to designate any of the parties named in the statute — that is, widow, orphan, or kindred dependent — for beyond that it would contravene the statute and could have no force or effect.
The o.nly question for determination was, and is' • what is the proper judgment on these conceded facts.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.