59 Md. 313 | Md. | 1883
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In these seventeen cases appeals have been taken by Harrison Wagner, from the same number of decrees of the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting in equity, perpetually enjoining the execution of a large number of magistrates’ judgments, rendered in his favor against the several appellees. They present, as a whole, a case without precedent in judicial annals. They show the rendition of one thousand two hundred and ninety-six magistrates’ judgments, amounting in the aggregate, to one hundred, and twenty-seven thousand, eight hundred and thirty-six dollars debt, and two thousand three hundred and forty-eight dollars and ten cents costs, in favor of the appellant. They were all rendered by John A. Wilson and John H. Loche, two justices of the peace, in Frederick County, seven hundred and ninety-one of them by the -former, and five hundred and five by the latter. Eight hundred and sixty-two are for the exact sum of ninety-eight dollars each, four hundred and thirty-two for one hundred dollars' each, and two for eighty dollars each. The hills in these cases were .filed by the twenty-seven defendants in these judgments, praying for injunctions to restrain the enforcement of them, and that the same may he cancelled or otherwise dealt with as right and justice may require.
1st. With respect to the judgments rendered by Wilson, the bills charge, in substance, that Wagner, maliciously and wickedly designing and intending to cheat, defraud and swindle the complainants out of large amounts of money, procured these judgments to be entered up by Wilson, who was falsely and unlawfully pretending to he a justice of the peace, but who in fact, at the time, had no authority to act as such; that neither at the time of the
The gross iniquity of this whole transaction, manifest enough upon its face, is abundantly established by the proof. Wilson lived in a different district of the county and at a place remote from that in which the parties sued resided, and these seven hundred and ninety-one judgments, were rendered by him on fourteen different days from the 30th of September, to the 26th of December, 1878, all of them, save sixty, in the month of October, and as many as two hundred and forty-two on one day in that month. The inference is irresistible that he merely wrote them out on his docket, without examining witnesses, and without the semblance even of an ex parte trial. The claims on which they are founded do not appear in the records, but it is impossible to conceive that
In regard to this testimony it is enough to say that it clearly shows there was no real foundation for the judgments in this particular case. In none of the others was any attempt made to contradict the positive and direct testimony of the complainants to the same effect. But the appellant by his counsel insists, that all this proof is
When these complainants were summoned they promptly employed counsel to attend to the suits. Mr. Nelson, the counsel so employed, testifies that shortly after his employment he went to Wilson's residence, and after some conversation with him, Wilson concluded to dismiss the cases, and then signed, sealed and delivered to witness a paper in which he states that “ Having become perfectly satisfied that the
In the two cases of Shank and wife, and Holbrunner and wife, there were twenty judgments, amounting to $2000 against the former, and ten, amounting to $1000 against the latter. Shank and Holbrunner both testify in clear and positive terms, not only that they were never indebted to Wagner, but that neither they nor their wives were ever summoned to appear before Wilson in these suits. Under the peculiar circumstances of these cases we are convinced that their testimony on this point must be taken as true.
These views dispose of all the judgments rendered by Wilson, and dispense with the necessity of deciding the further question whether his term of office had then expired, so that he was not authorized to act as a justice of the peace.
2nd. As to the judgments rendered by Locke, the bills contain similar averments of fraud, and the answers the same general denials. There is here, however, no question as to the facts that Locke was, at the time, duly commissioned, and had duly qualified by taking the requisite oath at the proper time. The case of greatest importance is that of Adams Express Company, and a most remarkable one it is. In the first place, Wagner, on the 31st of March, 1877, instituted one hundred and nineteen suits against this company before this magistrate for $100 each. On the 14th of April, the trial day, Mr. Nelson, as counsel, and an agent of the company appeared at the magistrate’s office
What would be the effect of a failure to appeal from such judgments, need not now be decided, for there is another fact in the case, which makes them void. The proof' shows that this company was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, that it transacts business in Maryland, and in Frederick County, and that it has- a principal office in this State, which is located in the city of' Baltimore. It is, therefore, a corporation not incorporated under the laws of this State, but holding and exercising its franchises therein, and the suits against it are by a. resident of this State. In such cases the law expressly provides, that “in case of service of process on an agent, notice of such process shall be left at the principal office of' said corporation, if there be such office in this State.” Act of 1868, ch. 471, secs. 209, 211. Now assuming that the summonses in these suits were duly served upon Renner, the agent of the company, in New Midway, in Frederick County, and that he was a proper party to receive and accept such service, as well as the agent in Frederick City, still the proof is clear and undisputed, that no notice of' such process was ever left at or sent to the principal office.
In the case of Calvin S. Burrier, there were three judgments against, him for $100 each, rendered on the 25th of September, 1880, by the same magistrate, with like absence of parties and proof, and in the. same manner, that those against the Express Company had been entered. At the same time that the summonses in these cases were issued, there were also issued three summonses in attachment at suit of Wagner, use of Erew against Burrier, as garnishee of Mary Murphy. Both sets were returnable on the same day, the 18th of September, and on the morning of that day, Burrier and Wagner both appeared before the magistrate, and the attachment cases were then tried. Upon the testimony of Burrier that he was not indebted to Mary Murphy, and had no credits belonging to her in his hands these cases were non-prossed. At this time, both parties being present, the other cases, those in which the judgments in controversy were rendered, stood for trial, hut not a word was then said to Burrier about them, either by Wagner or Locke, and the latter, in the afternoon of the same day, and after the parties had left, entered the cases continued until the 25th of September, when the judgments were entered up as before stated. In view of these facts, and of this conduct on the part of Wagner and the magistrate, we are quite ready to accept as true the positive testimony of Burrier, that no summonses were ever served upon him in these cases. Grimes is far from being clear in his recollection on this point, and it may well be, that
The case of Dr. Samuel E. Thomas is the last in the series, and in some respects differs from all the others. There were two judgments against him for $80 each, rendered on the 10th of September, 1811, in suits brought on the 1st of that month. The causes of action are in precisely the same form as those in the Express Company’s case, and Dr. Thomas is equally positive in his testimony, that he was never summoned, and was not indebted to Wagner, “one cent or any fraction of a cent.” He says, he was summoned before Locke in the spring of 1877, when he appeared and the case was tried, and a judgment rendered in his favor against Wagner. Locke was not a witness in the case, but Wagner was, and so far as his testimony can be relied on, makes a better showing of something actually due to him. But the distinguishing feature of the case is that the suits were brought, and the
This disposes of the judgments rendered by Locke, and we leave them with the remark, that here, as in the case of those rendered by Wilson, the parties affected had no knowledge of their existence, and no attempt was made to execute them, until long after the time for appeal had passed. On this point the testimony in all the cases is the same and is conclusive.
3rd. As to the jurisdiction of a Court of equity to pass the decrees appealed from we entertain no doubt. There are prayers in most of these bills, not only that these judgments may be perpetually enjoined,but that they may be cancelled. In discussing the question, how far Courts of equity ought to interfere in requiring void deeds and other instruments to be delivered up or cancelled Judge Story says: “Whatever may have been the doubts or difficulties formerly entertained upon this subject, they
4th. In the cases in which interlocutory decrees were obtained the appellant filed petitions asking that they be stricken out, and that he be permitted to demur to the bills. In these petitions he states that he instructed his solicitor, Wm. P. Maulsby, Jr., to prepare and file the appropriate pleadings, but finding delay in this he made inquiry on the subject, and Mr. Maulsby informed him that he had an agreement in writing with Mr. Nelson, the complainants’ solicitor, that no- interlocutory decrees should be taken and hence no harm would ensue from the delay; that he again urged him to file the proper pleadings and demand injunction bonds, which he failed to do, and finally, because of urgent demands upon him to take such action, he withdrew from the cases, so that the petitioner was compelled to employ another solicitor, which he immediately did, and the solicitor so employed advised him to demur to the bills. The petitions also contain other charges, to the effect that Mr. Maulsby had acted in collusion with Mr. Nelson to have the matter so fixed that his new counsel could do the petitioner no good. In reply, both these gentlemen filed affidavits in which they deny that any such agreement as is alleged in the petitions was ever made, denounce this and the other charges against them as wickedly and maliciously false, and oq motion the
The appellant insists there was-error in this order and that he was entitled as matter of right to demur to the hills, notwithstanding the interlocutory decrees. The ground taken by his counsel is that the term “answer” in sec. 117, Art. 16, of the Code, which allows a defendant, against whom an interlocutory decree has been passed, to appear at any time before final decree “ and file his answer on oath to the hill,” includes a demurrer, and that a demurrer is an answer within the purview of this section. He insists that this is a most important question of chancery practice, and that it is absolutely necessary that it should be decided in these cases. The importance of the question may he conceded, hut we do not agree with counsel as to the necessity of its being now decided, and for the plain reason that the appellant has suffered no injury, even if there was error in the Court’s refusal to allow him to demur. Such demurrers, if they had been filed, ought at once to have been overruled. The Court, as we have said, had jurisdiction, and each hill states a case entitling the complainant to the relief prayed. In our opinion an . answer to the merits was the only defence he could rightfully make. Why, then, should the decrees he reversed and the cases remanded in order to allow him to demur ? The only practical result of such a proceeding, besides delay, would he that he would he compelled to pay, by way of fine, the sum of ten dollars to the complainant in each of these cases upon the overruling of his demurrers. Code, Art. 16, sec. 102. It is true, he may, by reason of Iris fraudulent conduct, richly deserve to he mulcted in these sums, hut it cannot he said he would he benefited, in a legal sense, hy being required to pay them now, or
For the same reason it is wholly unnecessary to determine whether the charges made in these petitions against. Mr. Nelson and Mr. Maulsby were “impertinent and scandalous,” as these terms are defined in the books on Chancery Practice. The Court was clearly right in refusing, as it practically did, to regard these charges after they had been proved by the affidavits of the gentlemen against, whom they were made, to be utterly false and unfounded, as any ground for setting aside the interlocutory decrees, and this is all the notice that need be taken of this matter.
5th. He also filed petitions asking for injunction bonds, but the Court dismissed them, saying that upon the facts, set out in the bills and sworn to, the cases were not such as to require bonds. There is no statute which expressly directs that a bond shall he given before an injunction to stay execution of a judgment can be issued. The matter is left to the discretion of the Court, but the practice has. universally prevailed to require such bonds save in extreme and exceptional cases, and generally in double the amount of the judgment sought to be restrained, as was once provided by the old Act of 1723, ch. 8, sec. 5. We. cannot review the decisions of the Court below that these were exceptional cases in which the ends of justice authorized a departure from the general and salutary rule. The appellant, however, has suffered no harm from this action of the Court, for the proceedings have resulted in decrees, making the injunctions perpetual, which would have the effect to discharge the bonds if they had been given.
He also in one case demanded that the commission containing the testimony taken under the interlocutory decree should be opened, and the testimony submitted to his inspection, but the Court refused to allow this to be done until he had first obtained leave and had actually filed his answer. We cannot perceive how he has been pre
Decrees affirmed.