211 Pa. 435 | Pa. | 1905
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The purpose of the bill filed in this case is to annul and set aside a contract for the conveyance of real estate and to compel a reconveyance of the property. The bill avers that the defendants and certain other parties procured a charter for a
The defendant Seidel demurred to the bill on the grounds (1) that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief claimed, and (2) that he has a full, complete and adequate remedy at law. The court below sustained the demurrer and the plaintiff has appealed.
The constitution of 1874 provides that the courts of common pleas shall have and exercise “ such chancery powers as are now vested by law in the several courts of common pleas of this commonwealth, or as may hereafter be conferred upon them by law.” By the 39th section of the Act of June 13, 1840, P. L. 666, 1 Purd. 777, it was enacted that “ the equity jurisdiction .... of the court of common pleas for said county (of Philadelphia) shall be extended to all cases arising in said city and county, over which courts of chancery entertain jurisdiction on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or account.” By the subsequent Act of February 14, 1857, P. L. 39, 1 Purd. 777, the equity jurisdiction exercised by the common pleas of Philadelphia was extended to the courts of common pleas throughout the commonwealth. It will be observed, therefore, that in cases of fraud the legislature has conferred on the courts of common pleas of the state the powers and jurisdiction of courts of chancery. Of course, the constitutional provision above alluded to and the statutes conferring equity jurisdiction do not contravene or conflict with the 7th section of the bill of rights which declares that “ trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate: ” North Penna. Coal Co. v. Snowden, 42 Pa. 488; Haines’s Appeal, 73 Pa. 169. As early as 1849, however, in Wesley Church v. Moore, 10 Pa. 273, Chief Justice Gibson, speaking for this court, said: “The equitable jurisdiction conferred by these statutes is a valuable —indeed, an indispensable one ; and it ought to be extended by every interpretation of which the words are susceptible.” In many subsequent cases, including Mortland v. Mortland, 151 Pa. 593, decided in 1892, this court has manifested a disposition towards a liberal exercise of the equity powers conferred by the statutes. In cases of fraud, where the remedy at law is inefficient and inadequate to do complete justice between the
A bill for rescission is not necessarily demurrable because the defendant has sold and conveyed the land to another and thereby put it out of his power to reconvey. If it contain proper averments conferring jurisdiction, compensation in damages may be awarded the plaintiff. “ It is well established,” says Sharswood, J., in Mason’s Appeal, 70 Pa. 26, “that wherever a court of equity has jurisdiction, if the relief prayed for cannot for some reason be granted, a compensation in damages may be awarded in lieu thereof.” In Reeder v. Trullinger & Co., 151 Pa. 287, it is said: “ The defendants having sold and conveyed the lands to another, the plaintiff is not for that reason without remedy in this action (bill for reconveyance) .... Where a defendant has put it out of his power to make a conveyance which otherwise the court would have decreed, by conveying the premises to another, the plaintiff may elect to treat the purchase money received by him as the measure of damages.”
Applying these principles to the case in hand, we think it is clear that the court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s bill. The bill avers actual fraud by Fehr in procuring the contract and deed from Wagner and that the property was purchased for Seidel who had full knowledge of all the facts. The de
The plaintiff has the right to require the defendants to accept the retransfer of the stock of The American Match Company. An action at law would, of course, be totally inadequate to give him such relief. We must assume the averments of the bill to be true, and hence the stock of this illegally organized corporation, transferred to the plaintiff, is not only practically worthless, but may subject him to responsibilities from which he should be relieved. Any remedy which fails to give such redress will be inadequate as well as incomplete.
This is a triangular contest in which the plaintiff alleges, and of course expects to prove, actual fraud against both defendants. He must sustain his allegations against Fehr, with whom the contract for the sale of the premises was made and to whom the property was conveyed. Seidel, however, was not known to the plaintiff to be interested in the transaction during the negotiations between the parties, but the bill avers that he was cognizant of all the facts and participated in the fraud, and is now the holder of the legal title to the property. Seidel’s connection with the transaction and his assistance in committing the fraud must be ascertained and disclosed in order to give the plaintiff effective and adequate relief. This will doubtless require discovery and the exercise of some other equitable remedies unknown to, and unavailable in, an action at common law. Under such circumstances, the injured party may have redress in equity. In Independent B. & L. Assn. v. Real Estate Title Co., 156 Pa. 181, a bill for cancellation of the satisfaction of a mortgage on the ground that it was procured by fraud of the appellant’s agent, the present chief justice in delivering the opinion, said: “ Although an action of assumpsit might have been brought on the agent’s promise or for money had and received for plaintiff’s use, yet relief in a clear subject of equity jurisdiction is not barred by the existence of a remedy at law, even if, in view of the triangular nature of the contest here .... that remedy could be considered adequate.” And in Bierbower’s Appeal, 107 Pa. 14, a bill alleging fraud against two defendants to which a demurrer was sustained, this court reversed the decree, holding that al
Should the plaintiff fail to sustain his allegation of fraud against Seidel and thereby be unable to compel a reconveyance of the property, he would not be entirely remediless in this proceeding, but could still secure relief by a decree against Fehr for the damages he has sustained: Reeder v. Trullinger & Co., 151 Pa. 287. This, however, would be the full extent of his relief at law, the inadequacy of which compels him to invoke the aid of a chancellor. ■
The learned trial judge in the latter part of his opinion, anticipating the plaintiff’s evidence in the case, says: “ He (plaintiff) has planted his case upon the allegation of conscious fraud, not of unconscious mistake. He could not, under his bill, be permitted to prove to the latter as a ground of relief, nor could any decree be founded upon evidence of it.” In this stage of the proceeding we need not concern ourselves about the evidence which either party may produce at the hearing. The case, as now presented, requires us to determine the rights of the parties upon the pleadings. It is conceded that the bill avers actual fraud by defendants in procuring the conveyance to Fehr of the plaintiff’s property, and the demurrer admits the allegation to be true. If, therefore, the plaintiff’s right to equitable relief on the ground of actual fraud is sustained, as we think it must be, the demurrer should have been overruled. Whether the averments of the bill are broad enough to sustain an allegation of constructive fraud and to permit proof of it, we need not now determine.
The fraud averred in the bill is of the worst type, and Seidel by his demurrer admits the truth of the averments. Fehr and his confederates obtained a charter for The American Match Company by fraudulent practices, and he has used the corporation and its stock to further his fraudulent schemes. As disclosed by the pleadings, the plaintiff, without any fault or laches on his part, became Fehr’s victim, and the scheme of
We are of opinion that under the averments of the bill, a court of equity has jurisdiction and that the demurrer should have been overruled.
The assignment of error is sustained and the decree is reversed with a procedendo.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting :
The appellant in my opinion has a full, complete and adequate remedy at law. The court below so decided, and in this I see no error. The most that can be said in favor of the plaintiff here is that equitjr provides a more convenient procedure under the facts of this case. It is conceded that the word “ convenient ” has been sometimes used with approval by the courts in sustaining equitable jurisdiction. It has not always been aptly used and may be misleading. It was never intended as a definition of equity jurisdiction in the sense of saying an action of law is less convenient and a bill in equity more convenient. It is the convenience of the court, and not of the pleader, to which the term applies. In such cases, however, it is a matter of grace by the court and not of right to the pleader. It may be that equity jurisdiction should be enlarged, but in the absence of legislative authority the wisdom of opening the door just a little wider from time to time by judicial rule so as to unsettle professionally understood rules of practice may be seriously doubted.
I would affirm this case on the opinion of the learned court below.