671 N.E.2d 630 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1996
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *721 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *722 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *723 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *724 Appellant, Andy Wagner, appeals from the order of the court of common pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Mayor Jeffrey Armbruster and the city of North Ridgeville, Ohio. We affirm.
Prior to accepting the position as assistant fire chief, Wagner was a member of the International Association of Firefighters Union, Local Number 2129. Before Wagner became assistant fire chief the union filed a grievance opposing overtime opportunities for the assistant fire chief position. However, overtime continued to be available to the assistant fire chief.
Some months after his promotion, Wagner became concerned that he might be prohibited from participating in the overtime shift lists, as the union still opposed overtime opportunities for the assistant fire chief. He met, on various occasions, with the city's Safety Service Director and the mayor regarding his concerns. Wagner claims that he was assured that his eligibility for overtime shifts would continue. Ultimately, after rejecting an offer to remain on two of the three overtime shift lists, Wagner was "removed from the overtime lists, * * * placed on a forty (40) hour per week status and [was] no longer * * * considered when providing minimum shift strength manpower." Wagner met with Mayor Armbruster to request that he override the directive removing Wagner from overtime eligibility. Mayor Armbruster declined, and told Wagner to appeal the decision to the City Civil Service Commission.
On March 26, 1990, the City Civil Service Commission determined that Wagner should remain on the overtime shift lists. However, in a letter to Wagner dated *725 May 18, 1990, the City Civil Service Commission stated that, pursuant to the North Ridgeville Charter and the Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations, it had no authority to hear a dispute concerning the reduction of overtime hours.1 On May 5, 1993, Wagner filed the present action against Jeffrey Armbruster as mayor of the city of North Ridgeville, and against the city of North Ridgeville. Wagner alleges that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to property without due process of law and in violation of his right to the equal protection. He also maintains that he relied, to his detriment, on Mayor Armbruster's assurances that he would remain eligible for overtime.
Mayor Armbruster and the city moved the trial court for summary judgment on April 15, 1994. Wagner responded to the motion in June 1994. On April 10, 1995, the court of common pleas granted summary judgment in favor of Mayor Armbruster and the city. From that decision Wagner timely appeals.
Although the nonmoving party does not have to try the case in response to a motion for summary judgment, the party must produce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his claims. Paul v. Uniroyal Plastics Co. (1988),
Wagner argues that he presented evidence sufficient to suggest that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Mayor Armbruster and the city were bound by the mayor's assurance that Wagner would remain eligible for overtime and as to whether Wagner was denied due process and equal protection of the law. We disagree.
Wagner further contends that Mayor Armbruster, "[h]aving specifically directed Plaintiff-Appellant Wagner to seek a ruling from the Civil Service Commission," bound himself and the city to the decision rendered by that body, despite the commission's later determination that it had no jurisdiction to hear Wagner's complaint. These assertions are without merit.
Wagner has admitted the following in his deposition:
"Q. Okay. Did any official of the City of North Ridgeville give you assurances regarding the overtime situation at any point in time before you became assistant chief?
"A. They didn't have to. It was a given. * * *
"* * * *727
"Q. So the answer to the question is no, no one specifically told you other than what your understanding was?
"A. No. Official, no."
Where there is no misrepresentation actually relied upon by the plaintiff, there can be no room for estoppel to arise. See, generally, Andres v. Perrysburg (1988),
"[W]hoever relies upon the conduct of public authorities * * * must take notice of the limits of their power." Id. at 96,
There is no evidence that Wagner accepted the promotion while relying on assurances that he would remain on overtime. Wagner even admits that that was not the case. As a matter of law, the mayor and the city cannot be bound to a possibly invalid decision by the Civil Service Commission merely because Mayor Armbruster suggested that Wagner appeal his decision to the commission. The court properly granted summary judgment as to Wagner's claims of promissory estoppel.
These national and state constitutional provisions provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or be denied the equal protection of the law. The requirements of due process and equal protection under the Ohio and United States Constitutions are substantially identical. See Andres,
Three types of claims may be brought pursuant to Section 1983 under the Due Process Clause of the
"The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity." Albright v.Oliver (1994),
Wagner's cause of action must lie, if at all, within the protections of procedural due process. Procedural due process will apply if Wagner has been deprived of life, liberty, or property. Wagner's claim is obviously one of property deprivation. Therefore, we must first ascertain whether his claimed right to overtime eligibility is a protected property interest.
Property interests are created by "`existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.'" Id. at 1348, quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth (1972),
However, neither the Revised Code nor the North Ridgeville City Charter and Civil Service Commission Rules address the deprivation of overtime eligibility. The Ohio Administrative Code defines "pay" as:
"(1) The annual, non-overtime compensation due an employee including, when applicable, the cost of the appointing authority's insurance or other contributions, longevity pay, supplemental pay and hazard pay, divided by the product of the number of regularly scheduled hours in a work-week times fifty-two; or
"(2) The annual compensation assigned to a position including, when applicable, the cost of the appointing authority's insurance, or other contributions, longevity pay, supplemental pay and hazard pay." Ohio Adm. Code
Because the definition of "pay" does not include overtime pay, we hold that for purposes of constitutional due process analysis the right to overtime hours is not a recognizable property interest. Thus, Wagner was not deprived of a protected property interest when he was declared ineligible for overtime shifts. He was therefore not entitled to the protections of procedural due process.
Assuming, arguendo, that eligibility for overtime hours is a protected property interest, Wagner would be entitled only to notice and an opportunity to respond. Wagner would be entitled to "oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. * * * To require more * * * would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest * * *." Loudermill,
In reviewing whether procedural due process has been furnished in the property interest context, it is necessary to examine postdeprivation process as well. "[I]t is clear that the required extent of post-termination procedures is *730
inextricably intertwined with the scope of pre-termination procedures." Carter v. W. Res. Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr.
(C.A.6, 1985),
In the case sub judice, postdeprivation remedies were available. After a hearing on the merits, the City Civil Service Commission made a postdeprivation ruling in Wagner's favor. The commission later determined that it had been without jurisdiction to make the ruling. Wagner, pursuant to R.C.
Assuming he was entitled to it, Wagner was afforded adequate postdeprivation remedy consistent with due process. That he chose to forgo this remedy does not constitute a denial of due process. "[A]ll the process that is due is provided by a pre[deprivation] opportunity to respond, coupled with post[deprivation] administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute." Loudermill,
Wagner asserts that for purposes of the instant case, he falls within the classification of the classified civil service. However, we fail to see how the law has been applied discriminatorily to this class of persons.
Whether basing our equal protection analysis on Wagner's classification as a classified civil servant or as an assistant fire chief, he does not fall within a recognized suspect class. Neither is the right he seeks to protect a fundamental *731 constitutional right. Therefore, the actions of the mayor and the city must survive only "rational-basis" scrutiny in order to endure constitutional attack.
Rational-basis scrutiny is the "most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."Dallas v. Stanglin (1989),
Mayor Armbruster and the city also have a legitimate governmental interest in assuring the public that only valid decisions of the City Civil Service Commission are enforced. After ruling in Wagner's favor, the commission ultimately determined that it did not have jurisdiction over a dispute involving overtime hours. Failing to reinstate Wagner to the overtime shift lists is a rational means of ensuring that only those determinations by the City Civil Service Commission that are legally enforceable will prevail. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mayor Armbruster and the city on Wagner's claim of equal protection violation.
Also as a matter of law, Wagner could not claim a violation of substantive due process. Wagner does not possess a constitutional right to overtime hours. Although not possessing a protected property interest in overtime hours, Wagner was given predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard. Assuming that he is entitled to procedural due process, Wagner presents no evidence that the postdeprivation appeal procedures provided in R.C.
Wagner's sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN, P.J., and DICKINSON, J., concur.