*1 120
thоrough
questions
pre
of several
here
discussion
281;
Harrington
Harrington,
sented.
v.
189
See also
Mass.
;
464;
(1905)
Watts,
It is so Ordered. Delano Franklin Wade Corpus Petitioner for Writ of Habeas vs. Prison
Warden Opinion, April Cumberland. *2 petitioner. Chapman, S.
Richard McDonald,
Daniel C. for State. J., Thaxter, C. Sitting: Murchie, Fellows, Merrill, J., dissenting; JJ. C. William:son, (Murchie, Nulty, concurring J., majority specially; with Merrill, Wil- majority reservations; J., concurring with with liamson, J., dissenting.) further C. Murchie, petition corpus for writ habeas This is a Fellows, J. Portland, brings Maine who Delano Wade of of Franklin petition by Wade, A. his Catherine mother. Franklin age years. Delano Wade is a child under the of seventeen petition report upon comes to the Law Court on facts agreed, Statutes, (1944), 91, Chapter Revised 14, Section decision, by agreement and certified for immediate of coun- 451, Sheriff, sel. Welch Petr. v. 95 Me. 454. The Law to determine whether or not writ shall issue. The facts are these: Franklin Delano Wade was born Portland, years July Maine on 1933. He was 16 old alleged committed, when the offense was to have been upon complaint when he was arrested and warrant issued Municipal November 1949 from the Court. He Portland manslaughter. The record of the Mu- nicipal hearing Court shows “Date —November — — reading hearing. guilty Judg- Plea Not waived *3 — — ment of Court Probable cause. Result in Full Bound January Superior Court, over to the Term of the A. D. 1950 — —Bail $5000.” stipulation says Judge The made counsel Municipal “refused Court to exercise over charged, the offense with which the Defendant was and ” judgment rendered of ‘Probable Cause.’ manslaughter January was indicted for Wade at Term, Superior County, 1950 of Court Cumberland рleaded guilty. placed which indictment he not He was jury guilty. trial and a verdict of He returned was sen- Presiding tenced Justice to term of not less than years years more than seven nor fourteen in the State Prison, he held where is now under warrant of commitment Superior Court. issued petition alleges corpus for the writ habeas
The unlawfully imprisoned by Wade now Warden because, petition, Prison the words of “the of- charged, being punish- fense for which he was one may imprisonment any be for which for life or for ment Superior was without years, Court term was re- upon which indictment him try and sentence original jurisdic- against him, the exclusive but turned charged in said he was the offense with tion over returned in the Indictment Complaint and Warrant Portland Mu- Court, is in the Superior and now was nicipal as a Court.” Juvenile are Revised Statutes consideration
The statutes under Chapter 133, as amended (1944), Section Section pertinent by Chapter 334, of 1947. of the Public Laws amended, sections, as follows: parts of these are Judges Municipal within “Section Courts respective jurisdictions have exclusive their shall offenses, except original jurisdiction all imprison- punishment may crime the for which be any years, ment for life or for by term of committed ag'e years, children under the of 17 and when so exercising juve- said shall be known Any adjudication judgment nile courts. or under provisions 7, inclusive, the be that of sections 4 to shall guilty delin- child quency, adjudication judgment and no such shall be deemed to constitute conviction for crime. Section place 6. A chil- age years dren super- under the of 17 under the vision, probation health care and control of a officer or an agent department welfare or may ily placed order the child in a suitable fam- subject home supervision probation to the of a department officer or the of health and welfare or *4 may department commit such child to the of health and welfare or disposition may make such other seem best for the interests of the child and for the protection of community including the holding such jury child for the or commitment of such child to Pownal upon State School certifica- physicians tion of two graduates who are of some organized
legally ticed three college medical prac- and have years state, that such child is mentally defective and that age his or her mental is greater age % subject’s than life nor under years, boys or to the state school for or state girls; boy school for but no shall to be committed boys age the state school for who under the years girl 9 school for and no and no shall be committed to the state girls age years, who is under the of 9 shall sentence child under age years jail, reformatory prison; the any peal of 17 to or guardian may ap- child or his next friend or superior county the court in the same the appeals, same manner as criminal and the court may accept personal recognizance the of such child, court guardian, superior next friend or and said may either affirm such sentence or order of disposition commitment or make such other may case be for the best interests of such child peace for community. and and welfare of the Where, however, appeal an is taken and the prosecuted by offense is one that must be indict- county ment, attorney shall evi- submit relating grand jury dence to such crime to the con- vening to be ment appeal at the criminal term at which the heard, if return indict- may, for such offense the accused in the dis- court, indictment, cretion be tried on such may placed file, or the court such other including order it or make disposition determine, may thereof as it thereof, proceed the dismissal appeal, hear order of affirm either such sentence or commitment, disposition or make other of ing case in provisions accordance relat- appeal provided.” hereinbefore every The above statute makes court a exercising court when its exclusive by over age offenses committed a child under the seven- years. teen It has such all com- offenses “except mitted punishment children for a crime imprisonment any for which life term years.” year petitioner The sixteen old stands com- Superior mitted State Prison Court for the manslaughter. offense of He was so committed without prior Municipal acting action aas Juvenile
125 not man or whether determine therefore We must Court. may be punishment which “the slaughter is a crime for * ** phrase is used years,” any term of for original jurisdiction of foregoing exception the exclusive court. treason, kidnapping, murder, and for punishment for clearly ex- imprisonment are for life. Such offenses is court. What cepted from the of punishment excepted by phrase for are “the crimes * * * it, may any years?” Does term which be may pun- by State, be except crimes claimed all which being years years years, two term ished term except only Or those crimes more? does it years, length punished term is of which term judge imposing limited sen- the discretion of the words, foregoing phrase In ex- tence? other in the does meaning ception have in the the same as when used statutes punishment robbery, fix many like serious offenses (1944), 117, 16; rape, Chap. Chap. (1944), R. S. Sec. R. S. 117, 10; corrupting Chap. 124, water, (1944), Sec. R. S. 1; burglаry, 8; Chap. 118, perjury, (1944), Sec. R. S. Sec. (1944), 322, 1; burning buildings Chap. R. S. Sec.
night time, 118, 2; (1944), Chap. counterfeiting, R. S. Sec. (1944), Chap. 120, 5; depositing R. S. bomb to Sec. cause injury, (1944), Chap. 117, 22; R. S. Sec. conviction of felony prior sentence, (1944), after conviction and R. S. Chap. 136, foregoing in all Sec. of which offenses the punishment “any years?” Fraizer, term State v. 383; (2nd)
Me. 64 Atl. manslaughter, (3944), For some Chap. felonies like R. S. punishment is restricted not more than many years, so and in a multitude of other offenses the punishment restricted, amount of and varies from months years, depending made a whether misdemeanor or a felony. very felonies, any, punish- There are if few where *6 felony
ment for period has been ato of less restricted years. than two purpose juvenile courts,
The relating of and laws to juvenile delinquency, carry tois out a modern method of dealing youthful offenders, so that there be no against youth criminal record immature to cause detri- gossip mental local handicaps and future because of child- indiscretions, hood errors and and also that child iswho legal patterns, may guided not inclined to follow or moral become, or years, reformed to his mature a in useful citizen. judge municipal court, sitting The work of a of as the judge juvenile court, vitally important is to the welfare pass upon of our state. He does not the crimes and misde- wholly legal standpoint. meanors childhood from the The primary legislature salvation, basic and idea punishment. philan- The nature of is more work thropic jurist. legis- than the work the common The law placed authority lature Maine has therefore humanity inspire hands of men who and know can the child desire, instances, with confidence and awith in most to be- upright come an citizen. history
The law in that there Maine shows growing tendency legislation enlarge is now juvenile courts, authority possible and if and every age The to save child from a criminal record. years, jurisdic- has been child increased from to 17 and been tion has extended from misdemeanors some felonies. enlarged The has been from concurrent ex- original. clusive early common treated alike the crimes of the law those minors had reached the
adult and offenses of who age responsibility. The administration of the of criminal only ac- criminal law with relation to children differed old paternal cording possession of attri- to the and benevolent judges presided There in the courts. are butes of who long days past, humane instances, where many charges understanding filed the judge dismissed or has created, child, offending has without against minor a first system juvenile probation of his own authority, statute fit the circumstances. pun- been past idea of the law has
In fundamental recog- legislation reformation, but modern ishment and not be correctional a child should the treatment of nizes that today punitive. The child of than and rehabilitative rather be removed from the adult citizen of tomorrow should into improper and directed environments the influence of means, by preventative paths and corrective of rectitude *7 generation peaceful and abid- law if the next is to live in given ing community. the chance must be The immature necessary good citizen, forced to if be to become the or give up the It is the welfare of an immoral or criminal life. by protect, State, and is aimed to child that the statute exercising parental control, the scar of so- without necessary Unfortunately, called criminal it will be record. depraved, punishment at times to inflict on the vicious or recognizes. and this the statute jurisdiс- special are courts of limited
Juvenile courts authority. in a are be dealt diction and Children offending different manner are adults. The child is than guilty by a criminal but not found be juvenile delinquency. heard times The cases are at such may determine, places and the at such as the court general public open are to in- is excluded. The records by spection public except by permission of the court. (1944), probation Chap. Special R. S. Sec. 4. officers age may appointed be to care for offenders under may (1944), Chap. seventeen. R. 5. A child S. placed agent probation under the care of a officer or an department welfare, placed of health and in a or suit- School, disposition able home or in the other or “such may as seem best interests of the child and for the
protection community including holding such child * * * for the and no court shall sen- age tence a under years jail, reformatory child of 17 prison.” (1944), or Chap. 133, R. S. by Sec. 6 as amended Chapter 334 of the Public Laws of 1947. This statute also provides appeal Superior to the the child or guardian his or next friend from the decision or order made juvenile court, appeal Superior and on Court has jurisdiction to affirm the sentence or order of the disposition court or to make such other be for the best peace interests of the child and for the and welfare of community. 1947, Chapter Public Laws of 334.
“Delinquency,” as present juvenile the term is used law, was unknown delinquent to the common law. A child age is a under child limit who violates the criminal law incorrigible, or who is unmanageable, disobedient or or or immoral, growing up likely grow up or in idleness says delinquency crime. The crime, statute is not and a de- linquent child “Infants,” 228, is not a criminal. 43 C. J. S. “Delinquency, distinguished Section crime, from usually implies psychological judicial rather than a atti- tude toward the child offender.” Webster’s New Interna- Dictionary. tional law,
At the common the same court had offenders that had over those of mature *8 years. years age conclusively Children under seven were presumed capacity lack mental a In to commit crime. felonies, years, case of if child was over seven he could proceeded against by complaint be and warrant before a magistrate, magistrate and if the a crime found that had committed, probable been and that there was that the cause guilty, grand jury; infant was he could be held for the or prosecution be could before the instituted going magistrate without before the first instance. year Such was the law in Maine until the Richardson 1931. Dunn, 316; Knight Fairfield, v. Me. 128 v. Fort Me. 70
129
1931,
pro-
it was
Laws of
Chapter 241
Public
By
exclusive
municipal
judges
courts should
vided
by children
original
committed
all offenses
over
adjudication
years,
or
age
and that no
of fifteen
under
a conviction
deemed
constitute
judgment
be
should
grand jury if
of-
held for the
A child
be
crime.
could
By
aggravated.
Rand,
Me. 246.
State v.
fense was
made,
exception
1943, Chapter 322, an
Laws of
Public
2,
Chap.
(1944),
of R. S.
and after the enactment
acting
juvenile courts,
courts,
had ex-
when
offenses, except
for a
all
over
clusive
by
capital
children
crime committed
or otherwise infamous
wording
exception
age
years.
The
under the
of 17
suggested
probably
by the
the Statutes of 1944 was
Consti-
Maine,
person
tution of
Article
that “no
shall
Section
capital
held to answer for a
infamous crime unless on
be
presentment
jury.”
or indictment of a
Maine now
capital
punishable
death,
crime
all felonies
has no
but
Vashon,
are considered infamous.
v.
From 1943 to the of the amendment time 1947, municipal courts, of the Public Laws of courts, original jurisdiction any no exclusive over cases had felony, and the child over seven and accused of under 17 felony was dealt with as common law criminal and could grand jury. be held for action The amendment “capital of 1947 struck out of the law the words or other- place wise infamous crime” and inserted in thereof considering punish- words that we are now “a crime the imprisonment any ment for which for life or for years.” term of had,
The courts have from the establishment of juvenile courts, jurisdiction over all misdemeanors and authority juvenile delinquency to find when child of- fender punishment has broken a law where the was less year. than one had no exclusive any felony from 1943 to the amendment *9 original jurisdiction all
of 1947. It now has exclusive punishment may “except for for a crime the felonies any years.” imprisonment life for term of for or be largest felonies, likely and felonies to be of The number carry years, term child statute committed under Examples punishment than.” of “not more of of killing maliciously injuring ani- domestic or felonies are 127, 1; mals, Chap. intent to (1944), Sec. assault with R. S. 6; kill, Chap. intent to (1944), R. Sec. assault with S. Chap. 117, 12; rape, with intent (1944), assault R. S. Sec. breaking 17; Chap. and en- rob, (1944), to R. S. Sec. Chap. felony, (1944), tering commit a R. S. with intent to allowed is In felonies where the maximum all pun- years, years, it can be said that two two or more than punishment years.” for It is not “a term of is for ishment only crimes years” in those serious “any because term of imprisonment, such punishable formerly capital, life permit burglary, robbery the statute rape, does years.” “any term for court to sentence legislature plan broaden to manifest In view of the plainly apparent court, it is authority give years. any to To years term a term of enlarge term,” meaning does not “any term,” “a extent, appreciable court to any degree. where The felonies if it does interpretation, jurisdiction, under such court would year may punishment be for one only where those would be felonies, any, if are years, and such two less than for give jurisdiction legislature meant to very had If few. less than punishment where those felonies say simple so. matter years, have been it would two term com- contrary, has used legislature, punishment some fix monly in the statutes used very offenses. serious years de- have been where terms of cases There are some “a term right renew fined, a lease where as in
131 Norton, years. v. years,” less than two meant not Metcalf “any years” was 103, term of in Massachusetts 119 Me. and years particular a statute more where construed as two or Ex provided punishment in former conviction. cases of for Pickering 40; Dick, Picker- Seymour, Ex Parte 14 14 Parte ing a excluded have found no case where statute We years by “any” punishable term of a crime from term, “a” and cannot be- where the we construction many legislature very fe- lieve the intended to exclude the juvenile frequently lonious acts of which offenders are so guilty. limit, effect, of the It would juvenile provided only, to misdemeanors as was There statute before the last amendment of 1947. would be real, sufficient, no or for the amend- sensible reason 1947 “any years” ment term of if there was not intention extend the P. L. of the courts. See (1931), Chap. 241; L., 1933, Chap. of Maine and P. 18 Chap. 118; 1937, L., Chap. 238; L., 1941, Chap. 245; P. P. L., 1943, Chap. Chap. 322; P. (1944), Chap. 177 R. S. 334; 133 Chap. as amended the Public Laws of see 99; also 43 C. J. S. “Infants” Sections 98 31 Am. Jur. “Juvenile Courts” Sections 24-44.
Manslaughter punishable by imprisonment is not a crime any years, phrase term of as is used in our statutes. punishable yеars. It is a term of court has jurisdiction. crime, however, a may It is where the facts serious, every word, proper pro- sense if the juvenile court, cedure taken question there is no jury but hold the child for action. If in municipal court, acting determination of the juve- aas court, guilty nile delinquency child should be criminal, dealt with protection for the of the commu- nity as child, well as for the interests it can hold such grand jury. child for the (1944), Chap. 133, R. S. Sec. 6 as by Chapter amended 334 of the Public Laws of 1947. The adjudication judgment guilt making disposi- final judge tion of the case that court can guilty juvenile delinquency. By child make is that the express provision he cannot sentence Section prison jail. By pro- or even constitutional offender prison except vision no one can be sent to the state grand jury. an indictment returned conviction on dealing judge municipal court, in does the Neither and in the of his ex- with the offender exercise authority jurisdiction, to find crime clusive probable cause in the same manner as when committed and *11 dealing If child held the is with adult. jury an offense within the exclusive when only original municipal court, jurisdiction be- it is of juvenile delinquent the circum- it seems under cause as child and be for the best interest stances to community he protection that be so held. of the separate legislature provide and dis- fit has seen to The handling certain offenses when committed method tinct age years, and man- by juveniles of seventeen under slaughter jurisdiction The is one of these offenses. taken been law such offenses has of the common courts over jurisdiction away legislative The by enactment. municipal exclusively upon the courts conferred has been legal juvenile no acting The Law has as courts. Court opinion right express an рower determine or or ethical to legislative are enactments. We to the wisdom legislature by interpret enacted permitted the laws as require- are constitutional they determine if within and to applied before properly to the case then or have been ments us. recognized legislature under that has
It clear is that age juvenile seven- under the offenders certain conditions and made ame- with as criminals years be dealt teen should rigors criminal law. nable accountable juve- right state It is the there delinquent and until be unless nile be treated exercising court, by the judicial determination exercising discre- as a court and its its disposition and the with which tion as to of the case juvenile law, juve- by Section 6 of the that the it invested grand jury. requirement nile held that such be for the hold determination to be exercised that the grand jury for the as an act under the author- of discretion ity by jurisdictional and must conferred 6 are both Section complied Superior has with before the hear, sentence, an indict- a conviction or commit after being jurisdictional statutory requirements ment. These cannot be waived. by show, either
The record must express by necessary implication what from statement or necessary expressly therein, the aforesaid stated by municipal court. And action has been taken in and especially municipal court show must the record of the express necessary implication in hold- declaration or ing conferred for the it exercised the discretion making upon dis- Section 6 law 370; position Clifford, 144 Me. of the case. Brooks v. 825; 30; (2nd) O’Connell, Faloon Porell v.
Atl. v. 113 Me. 232; Cousins, Hartwell, *12 129. 93 Me. State v. 35 Me. finding fixing probable
A of and the bail is not cause of purposes. Especially in and is of itself sufficient for such express it not in case there is an sufficient wherе stipulation plea guilty judge that after a “the of said of not court then to exercise over refused charged was and offense with which the defendant ” judgment rendered Such docket en- of ‘Probable Cause.’ try stipulation and fail to that the show mu- nicipal in this case did its exercise petitioner the offense with which the and that it held him for the in the exercise the discre- of disposition tion as to and of the case with law, which it was invested 6 Section but pro- establish that it did not do so. The sentence was 134 try lacked a court which to
nounced discharged. sentence and the must be Wallace v. 513; 589; White, Elbert, Me. v. 162 Conn. Atl. 769.
toWrit issue. Dissenting opinion. opinion in I am unable to concur C. J.
Murchie, provision Mr. It construes a in that sec- Justice Fellows. municipal court law which courts tion of our vests such or, power punish juvenile delinquency a child for alternative, jury, in the to hold him for a in a manner seems, me, entirely justification. S.,R. which without 133, stating, except 1944, Chap. It does so without Sec. statutory by implication, principle construction gives statutory language applies. implication The is that it meaning. ordinary It is undoubted that its usual language statutory construction declare that which rules of plain unequivocal no construction. It needs is ob- however, opinion single vious, pro- that the has dealt with a section, reference or the law which vision without whole,” part, “as a as a well established rule of con- it is a requires. struction unequivocal language
Reliance on the nature opinion implicit in manner which the casts full re- legislature sponsibility decision it carries on the for the provision into our law. That which was our wrote Legislature, L., I Eighty-fifth which was member. P. provision today, 1931, Chap. 4. The Sec. stands language S., 1944, Chap. in the exact R. change originally stated, punctu- it was without ation or context. grant express power place provision follows *13 juvenile delinquency probation guilty of
child found grant power express a to: carries further
135 for disposition seem best “make such other protection child and for interests of the including”, community That a institution. power him to correctional to commit 1931, L., in P. disposition” identified is the “other dispositions” since Chap. 241, 4. Additional “other Sec. grand jury and commit a him for identified are to hold L., 1931, Chap. P. School. When him to the Pownal State given municipal a limited were courts 241 became effective delinquency, power punish without a for child protection the commu- reference to his interests or the probationary con- nity, by subjecting him to some form An trol, they all since. so limited at times been paragraph of express carried in the second restriction was municipal Chap. 241, 4, prohibited a L., 1931, Sec. which P. holding grand jury except an from a child for 246; al., et Me. v. Rand 132 offense which this court jurisdiction. beyond cur- declared was its This 169 A. authority had would have under such tailed S., 1944, Chap. 134, 1930, Chap. 145, (now S., R. R. Sec. juvenile delinquency in- 13) if the over Sec. any indictable offenses. cluded record, get complete picture in the it historical
To L., 1943, Chap. 2 deleted noted that P. Sec. should be restricting authority paragraph courts age jury and declared to hold a child of grant, by writing power express such terms of “holding grand jury or” what words for the into child following S., 1944, Chap. 133, immediately is now R. Sec. “including” provision the word which closes construed. enlarge Simultaneously purported it by rewriting juvenile delinquency courts providing the definition of such when exercising they were such courts should be “known as L., 1943, Chap. courts.” P. That the enlarge jurisdiction, did not enactment because the language inept, importance. is of no used
136 that crim- to me that it can be doubted
It does seem guilt adjudicatiоn of inal involves both the L., 1931, appropriate punishment. imposition P. of original form, 241, Chap. and as amended from time in its time, always contemplated that has to S., 1944, paragraph (now R. the second of vested 1 Sec. adjudication 133, 2) an Chap. be exercised Sec. should section, guilt juvenile delinquency, that and the under of S., 1944, (now punishment R. imposition under Sec. regard if, power if, in that Chap. 6), but Sec. Otherwise, purpose. it has been adequate for the seemed recognizes, times, opinion contemplated, that: at all as the conditions) offenders “(under certain $* * and made as criminals be dealt with should rigors and accountable to the amenable criminal law.” regard in is carried that The clearest declaration municipal power already cited, of a 1943 law where grand jury stated terms of a hold a child for court to grant. express an grant times, purpose prior at all the law stood
As designed accomplish not have been accom- could was authority of a by repealing the plished restriction grand jury cases municipal hold a child for court to authority aggravated. involving All the that were offenses grand jury anyone for a municipal to hold court S., (now 1930, Chap. R. S., Sec. 13 R. then stated closing mandate which is Chap. 134, 13), the magistrate jurisdiction of a is within if an offense justices) including municipal : courts trial (a term thereon.” try and award sentence “he shall child to hold a Writing power of a grant express must have an terms of .in having legislative intention indicated offense, limited jurisdiction over exclusive punishing juvenile delinquency and guilty finding him jurisdic- might delinquent, terminate him aas by ex- punishment refusing impose a limited tion child, as dis- simultaneously, jurisdiction ercising, ordering him held offense, alleged tinguished from his grand jury, bail. under for a *15 by accomplished de- opinion is reached
The result jurisdictional imposes a claring provision construed the that grand jury, a child for power to hold requirement the rea- impose The course of power bail. to than its rather apparent. accomplished not made soning by is it is which juris- imposes provision no opinion indicates The power a child to commit requirement on the to dictional does, requirement institution, that, if it or correctional exercising power by necessary implication in is satisfied provision that when the cannot be doubted to commit. It nothing except the related to law it was written into our opinion power finds power to which the to commit. The granted exclusively as an alternative it relates jurisdiction, power, exercise of no and involves the to that meaning word, except ordinary of that within the power hold a child for a imposing bail. Whenever having any power grand jury by is exercised undoubtedly, action, effect, is to terminate all take such its exercising it. the court judicial knowledge digress it is I to note that within many years, if not at all that for times since of the court L., 1931, Chap. children enactment of P. committed provisions correctional institutions under its to our printed supplied the use of mittimuses committed been institutions, body gov- the administrative such supplied require The forms so erns them. courts to de- adjudication guilt juve- an that there has been clare delinquency, make reference nile but no to the interests of protection community the child or the as the basis probability every commitment. In all for the child now an under a held institution commitment of a munici-
pal court is held under that form of mittimus. It is obvious jurisdictional that if the requirement law establishes a ap- plicable powers to one of the express vested in an terms of grant following provision, equally applicable it must be every рower. each and" so, other such If that is a child disregard committed in thereof and now restrained of his liberty thereby unlawfully is restrained opinion as as the sought finds the possibility Petitioner be. This is to be opinion, it, by cleared in the as I read declaration that commitments, the limited requirement sup- field plied by “necessary implication” Why aof record. supplied effectively is not when a child is ordered held when he is committed is not stated. implication, perhaps, adju- is that it is satisfied guilty cation that child delinquency, but reference to the law will that this is not so cannot show only power be so. The pun- vested in a court to adjudication, ish child on the basis of such an without more, *16 place probation him in is to on some form. This has L., 1931, been at true all times since the enactment of P. Chap. 241. supported by any
The decision is not the citation of au- thority; jurists lawyers writing and Eminent have been on delinquency delinquency and courts for century. than half a more Juvenile courts been in operation many many years. states for There must be construing establishing a multitude of cases laws them. notwithstanding great writings Yet the undoubted bulk of writing decisions, declaring, no case or cited or ad- vocating, jurisdictional requirement terminating a an jurisdiction juvenile delinquency. exclusive over any construing Neither is there such citation for a requiring, permitting, delinquency law as or even a court jurisdiction vested with exclusive over guilt adjudicate delinquency and simultaneously to thereof higher that issue a on to court. The transfer language particular thing to the with reference is true same legal periodical is nor a a case Neither decided involved. heretofore, juris- suggested, a that or said have declared to imposed be found requirement should could or dictional what, limiting its requiremеnt action to any a sophistry kind to it, best. It the worst to seemed seems any empowered several say to take one of a court me to exercising may one it must in seem best to actions which best. does so because it seems make a record that it them implication of declaration or I accord with the am entire provision a opinion if the restricts among particular those authorized to take the action necessary it, taking carries seem best to of it disagree implication place I it does. The where necessarily clearly opinion I is that think is as holding implied a a child for as it is in com- mitting him to institution. correctional requirement, jurisdictional generally as that
A term is understood, exercising operates prohibit court from power person subject bail, sentence a him without compliance ap- I with it. have never known the term to be plied to a heretofore refusal to exercise over person higher and hold the accused of offense it for My point Hartwell, v. court. illustrated 35 Me. opinion, recog- validity cited where aof nizance inwas issue. An exercise of distinguished
person, alleged against from the offense involved, him, undoubtedly recognizance was nothing held ineffective. here has issue do with petitioner bail effectiveness of the was ordered to fur- nish. *17 opinion
I be certain cannot that the declares an additional jurisdictional requirement particular because the term is however, applied. apparent, not It seems that it declares hearing municipal a in a prelimi- formal court a necessary holding grand nary jury. a child a It makes no ref-
140 S., 1944, Chap. 133, part erence to R. which is a chapter carrying pro- section of law which the contained, vision is аnd has been at all times since our municipal L., 1933, Chap. court law was revised P. express provision The of that section is that in: * * prosecutions municipal *, “all before courts respondent may plead guilty
the hearing.” and a not waive Why applicable present this is not to the case is not stated. municipal It seems that a obvious court is authorized to find guilty juvenile delinquency, hearing, a child a without on plea guilty, his it commit a that correc- him hearing, institution, plea. tional a a The without negative opinion procedure. either I see does not no reason why may jury it hold a child not without hear- ing it, particularly when, if the child waives as the record shows, represented by before us he is counsel in the munici- pal apparent petitioner record makes it court. The that represented was there the same able counsel who is prosecuting petition. It cannot be doubted that waiver made a considered action in the was interests recognition petitioner, or that it carried that the inevi- hearing holding have been the table result of would one, on his waiver. No substantial was ordered without right prejudiced thereby. petitioner many opinion references to courts
The carries necessity municipal proper courts in and to the that our juvenile courts, act as as well as to cases should ignore delinquency It seems to the facts that Maine laws. has had a courts has no except part parcel delinquency of our law L., 1933, Chap. incorporated pro- P. court law since L., 1931, Chap. 241 into our P. visions of L., 1931, Legislature Chap. enacted P. law. system juvenile courts and rejected an establish act to Legislative Record gave in its stead. See law us *18 Legislative question, particularly act in and for 1931 legislative action thereon. 236, No. and Document Municipal Portland that the In case it is undoubted petitioner power for to vested with hold was It jury purported do so. could it to that placed petitioner effective bail under under done so 6, he 1944, Chap. 133, if with which S., the offense R. Sec. S., jurisdiction, and under R. its was within was Chap. if it not. The record before was clearly purport act lat- did not to under the us that it shows Hartwell, law, principle v. declared ter within the strong purported supra. it to act un- The inference is that judge to the refusal its “exercise der the former and that offense,” charged complaint on over the adjudicate acting, he to which it was was refusal guilty impose any punish- delinquency empowered impose, accom- court was to ment panied by the decision that it seemed best under the circum- person stances to exercise over the instead of petitioner and hold under offense Assuming provision jurisdic- established bail. requirement imposition bail, effective I can tional to the why reason decision of see the court to terminate its no recognized. jurisdiction should not be calling Before one attention to circumstance that should overlooked, casually not be I refer must construction placed phrase “any years.” on the term of It me seems to placed might proper the construction be under principle applicable of liberal construction such laws providing punishment as those limited delin- quency, principle ap- but has never been declared plicable, know, phrase any particular so far I in a applicable whole, statute. It is as a statutes and has recognized involving been in decided cases de- linquency applied my knowledge laws. has nevеr been It infringe in a manner that would on another well established principle statutory requiring construction that statutes derogation strictly common law should be construed. thing It would one to construe init a manner which *19 enlarge would exclusive a court to deal delinquency if such was one, as I always believe legis- it has been intended our be, lature that it should which was terminable action holding of a court in a child with a se- grand rious jury crime for action. sequence past
The entirely plain. peti- events is The feloniously tioner wilfully and committed a homicide on 20, November 1949. He was taken before the Portland Municipal Court, charged offense, with that on November court, having 1949. That authority to hold him grand jury, purported for a to take that action. He was tried and convicted in try court which can ever him for it as a liberty criminal. He is restrained of his - under a imposed in sentence that court. The current event discharged is that he is to be therefrom forthwith. For opinion nothing future events except complete offers uncertainty. contemplates, probably, It proceed- that new ings impose will be instituted to corrective treatment petitioner juvenile delinquency punish or him for man- slaughter, proceedings whichever he deserve. Such purported must be commenced in the court which hold to complaint him for the when was made to it power adjudicate guilt heretofore. That had his juvenile delinquency subject him to corrective treat- ment, grand jury, might or hold him for the be de- only proper termined whether he manner had com- punished mitted a crime which should be as such. It did guilty juvenile delinquency. imposed not find him It no opinion say corrective treatment. The does not what petitioner have hold court should done to for the jury effectively. except It does not construe the law declare what done was not effective. It furnishes guide prosecuting action for no to future our courts our attorneys. past have on effect, any, events of the if are the
What Kentucky say. The opinion does not future? 621, in set Commonwealth, 179 S. W. in Tabbutt v. had ting would aside a conviction child, pro charged against if jurisdiction of the offense original juris ceedings the court had been instituted court) appropriate action (which awas diction jurisdiction, de taken therein to terminate had been proceedings aside would expressly set clared proceedings in either the constitute bar to new higher court, jurisdiction of the court, if the or the case, in Ex Parte In that juvenile court was terminated. State, Tex. v. Parnell, (Okla.) 200 Pac. Fifer requirement jurisdictional 282; 234 R. S. W. Cr. might something what age, far different from involved was seem, held that cited it was be best. Yet in the last case *20 trying might age in a court requirement be waived even an advice was made on the as a criminal the waiver the child if petitioner. In each counsel, case with this as was the pro related to every cases the decision and one of the cited prior pro higher ceedings without in a court commenced jurisdiction. ceedings in the court of applicable principle offenses over a of law to Is there complete jurisdiction municipal similar have a which courts involving jeopardy? the future of is double What to that court, to a a criminal sentenced one convicted of crime in impose, punishment and the court has no corpus? municipal discharged habeas Is therefrom on guilty juve- chances to find a child court entitled to two single him for delinquency act? or to hold nile for grand jury? questions are that will confront These upon petitioner is called to answer to if and when the hearing jurisdictional require- complaint. If is a a new waived, and what is the situation to be ment cannot be right only his a child not waives one but insists on when ground participate vocally in of his not to one on con- might right give not to evidence incrimi- stitutional him? nate
Many questions may attempt more arise when a new prosecute petitioner. made The result can he be that subjected will pun- neither to corrective treatment nor result, comes, deny ished. For that if it I responsibility Eighty-fifth Legislature. particular pur- That is the pose of this dissent. responsibility judicial one, accomplished by is a statutory
unusual combination of liberal and strict con- separate parts single operates structions of of a law. Each position for the benefit of one who stands in the aof con- felon, proceedings victed after two courts prosecution pos- two courts where himof was or is sible. I believe the construction erroneous and that our law, whole, as a should be construed lib- erally give power authority the maximum to our punishment clear courts to children from offenses, declaring criminals, records them in all cases where it seems court that to the corrective treatment accomplish purpose, or, alternative, intended its permit grand jury, them to hold children fet- without any kind, ters of when it seems that that is not so.
* * * * *
Concurring. heartily majority J. While I concur in the Merrill, opinion court, dissenting opinion, because of the I my length feel duty to set forth at certain funda- mental underlie reasons which some of the conclusions tersely correctly majority opinion, and I believe stated in the *21 require my and which concurrence therein.
, Important petitioner, as the result this case is to the importance it cannot be denied it is the utmost him, principles the the determination of fundamental upon application which it be decided and law must the important the case are even more same his the itself. may principle no accused of law that
It is fundamental does by a court that in, and committed be or sentenced tried he is jurisdiction the over offense Lacking charged person. such his try, authority power legal right, or the court is without Lacking jurisdiction, or commit the accused. sentence may proceedings impartially fairly the no matter how legal scrupulously require- conducted, matter how no safeguards applicable persons to trials of ments and other may have been com- of crime with the commission respondent’s guilt clearly plied with, no matter how may appear presented proceedings, in from the evidence may be, just the re- matter the sentence seem to no how spondent nor he been convicted has not had the trial has organic required by law of this State. case, every concern of this in this case, other is that thereof decision accord with petitioner, If law. as held and so declared majority opinion in, was tried sentenced and is imprisoned now under order of commitment issued from duty a court without such declare it is our to so corpus arriving and order the writ of habeas to issue. In question at our decision the ultimate for our consideration legality imprisonment petitioner. is the In ar- riving question concerned, at our decision of that we are not except court, as it affect the of the trial magnitude petitioner with the of the offense with which the charged. Supreme As well said Court of Ala- Seay State, (Ala.) bama v. 93 So. 403: prevail, any “But the law should without reference magnitude brutаlity to the offense charged. revolting accusation, No matter how proof, degraded, how clear the or how or even offender, Constitution, law, brutal very genius Anglo-American liberty demand a impartial fair and trial.” Although that declaration of the Alabama court was respect made with to the juris- conduct of a trial within the *22 court, equally applicable to the situ- diction of the trial is tried a court ation when an accused before which is he is over offense with which clothed charged person. man a fair and his No can have jurisdic- impartial in a court clothed with such trial save By undergoing this tion. Such is the law of State. jeopardy. not even been in As we trial accused has 313; 182, Boynton, (2nd) 143 Me. 62 Atl. in State v. said 187: previous jeopardy does not exist unless the
“Former
competent jurisdiction.
a court of
trial was before
Slorah,
4 A. L. R.
v.
118 Me.
106 A.
State
Elden,
1256;
Trial and con-
v.
Juvenile term is used in its broadest sense, including by juveniles, crimes committed is one of crying day presents challenge evils of the and as such which must be met.
One of the employed methods devised and to meet the challenge special evil treatment of of- treating fenders. Instead of criminals, them as the State parens patriae protective custody takes them into seeks cure their criminal tendencies and rehabilitate them, to they may the end good become citizens of it, tomorrow. possible, To enable so far as to reach this de- end, upon conferred sired exclusive over certain offenses courts this State age years. by juveniles under the seventeen committed By conferring upon original jurisdic- such courts exclusive offenses, own interest as tion of such the State assures in its offender, every well as the interest the ex- an offense which is within with brought of such court shall be clusive tribunal, and that such the first instance before ju- court, acting capacity juvenile court, as a shall its disposition that be made of diciously'determine shall respect judicial required such child. action Such *24 disposition child the determination the includes merely juvenile a is be treated as whether or not child subjected delinquent to criminal whether he is be ..to child prosecution. for of the best the interests If seems community, juvenile court protection of the and for the body may grand jury, may which hold the child for the offense. formally present for the commission of him S., Chap. 6. R. are the exclusive respect as within to such offenses
With acting juve- original jurisdiction court of the by acting it, preliminary determination court, nile such essential, until jurisdiction unless is such within try, jurisdiction to Superior no made, Court has it is prosecution juvenile therefor. A or commit sentence Superior without such to the an indictment returned by jurisdiction court preliminary exercise of Superior by acting juvenile the exercise as a сourt Elbert, 115 Conn. original jurisdiction. v. Court of Albiniano, Parte 6 Atl. Ex 589; See also 769. Atl. (R. I.) (2nd) public foregoing principles of recognition of the in
It is most, have been established juvenile courts policy that carry public policy into all, To our states. if necessary to recognized it is it has been effect full original jurisdiction exclusive juvenile court clothe the opinion juveniles as in the by committed over such offenses delinquency. juvenile legislature treated as separate court juvenile be a court is true whether This upon al- jurisdiction juvenile be conferred or whether the exclusive existing over which ready The offenses court. juvenile upon original jurisdiction conferred has been adopted have which different states varies in the courts including crimes, those even system. all In some states penalty, been death punishable infliction of the others, only those juvenile In court. committed to the so imprisonment life are punishable death or crimes are excluded, courts all states the in almost but original felonies. given over serious exclusive interprets majority opinion the extent of correctly upon municipal courts this State. conferred public policy Recognizing principles the broad weight great acts, of author- court underlie the upon ity jurisdiction conferred is that the exclusive distinguished jurisdiction, true juvenile. privilege That this from a mere extended to the which hold that failure to is so is established decisions proceedings within the ex- institute therein offenses is fatal clusive trial, criminal courts. conviction sentence *25 grave very many There are cases which convictions for appeal, offenses have been set aside on or the convicted discharged juvenile imprisonment corpus from on habeas juvenile juvenile before for failure to take court instance, many the first and included are cases where the age juvenile appeal of the was first raised either on corpus proceedings. Examples may in the habeas be found Commonwealth, (Ky.) (appeal, v. 256 Clark S. W. 398 murder). Commonwealth, (Ky.) Talbott v. 179 S. 621 W. wounding (appeal, cutting). malicious Watson v. Commonwealth, (2nd) (Ky.) (appeal, 57 S. W. 39 man- slaughter). State, Powell v. (Ala.) (appeal, 141 So. 201
150 rape). State, (Tenn.) (carrying Sams v. 180 S. W. 173 weapons judgment). concealed in arrest of Wil- —motion State, (2nd) (appeal, murder). son (Okl.) v. 82 Pac. 308 Powell, (Akl.) (habeas corpus). Ex Parte 120 Pac. 1022 Hightower, (habeas corpus, Ex (Okl.) Parte 165 Pac. 624 charge murder, manslaughter). conviction v. Alex- by ander, (Okl.) (appeal quashing 196 Pac. 969 State to charge murder). Parnell, (Okl.) Ex Parte 200 Pac. 456 (habeas corpus, Alton, larceny). (Okl.) Ex Parte Pac. 262 corpus, larceny). Humphries, (habeas 215 Ex Parte 237 corpus, (Okl.) (habeas burglary). Pac. In one of these appeal proceedings cases failure record to disclose ground sustaining juvenile court sufficient supra. appeal. Commonwealth, In Talbott Watson v. Commonwealth, supra, v. it was stated “the circuit court try juvenile jurisdiction has to indict and offenders they man- transferred to that court in the when been (Emphasis mine.) ner authorized statute.” Louisiana, juvenile In court has exclusive manslaughter murder, The but not over manslaughter Louisiana court held that the conviction of juvenile pre- with murder had not who viously could not be been before sustained guilty murder, only to a verdict of not and amounted subject proceedings before and that the child was still manslaughter upon juvenile de- court based Dabon, (La.) linquency. It is to be State v. So. contrary noted, however, result was reached State, (Tenn.) in Howland v. Tennеssee court 268 S. W. properly if a holds that indicted being murder, within the that crime not having juvenile court, of the criminal attached, purposes all and the could it attached for question minor included convicted of the offense. This expressed being us, opinion upon it is either before no calling these cases. attention to latter or intimated *26 states, instance, jurisdiction over In some Illinois upon specifically conferred certain criminal offenses is provision. held In states it is constitutional courts legislature power confer exclusive is without that juvenile upon jurisdiction courts. over offenses People Lattimore, (Ill.) In case of v. 199 N. E. 275. Jersey Mei, Ex Parte New 192 Atl. held jurisdiction prevented its exclusive constitution legislature being conferred over the of murder crime however, decision, upon juvenile courts. The effect of this respect has been crimes other than murder modified with (N. Goldberg, (2nd) J.) v. 11 Atl. the later case of State Goldberg, (2nd) 299 affirmed in v. 17 Atl. foregoing authority may question cases
Some ground rendered that the statutes the states where materially may objected differ It that in from our own. be some, states, jurisdiction juve- if not all of those over separate juvenile niles is committed to distinct courts. It objected juvenile be further that in these cases had prior been taken not before the to the institu- proceedings in- tion of criminal either indictment or formation filed in the criminal courts. All so-called of these may exist, reasoning upon differences but the fundamental merely juve- are these cases decided juvenile court, had nile not been taken before the but that there been no exercise had of the exclusive possessed by juve- court to determine that the prosecuted nile should be as a criminal. As will be herеin- forth, jurisdiction by juve- after set is the exercise of taking court, nile not the mere before it required. just which is This is as essential in the case of single possesses juve- court which dual adults, separate juvenile niles and as it is the case of a Also, shown, court. as will hereinafter be if the taken before a court of dual and held for the grand jury, it is essential the record show that original jurisdiction court exercised its exclusive and that *27 152 disposed the of it so exercise thereof was in the
juvenile. special treatment juvenile and the courts creation of law has common juveniles a manner unknown to the in
of development. in the Twelfth gradual stated As been of 1932, published in Vol. Law Criminal Edition of Wharton’s Page 1, 485: quietly into existence not come
“These courts have criminally in- strong opposition from both without class, juveniles of ‘conserva- and from that clined entirely guided lawyers footsteps are whose tive’ -- glimmer light past, by the of by guided Ages, are dying Dark who torch of the by principle, and are ever ‘precedent’ rather than pathway civic advance- planted in found main, up- have, in the been these laws ment. But in upheld, defect ; it was due to where not held and prin- act, drafting ciple fact that the and not to the disapproved.” upon courts rest is which such gradually courts has towards The attitude February 1950 issue of the Journal changed. said in the As Society: of the American Judicature revolutionary preventive ago device “Fifty years crime the establish- field of created juvenile delinquents. to deal ment of courts flowering been at slow of this device has The full at last arrived when the pace, has but the hour beginning are to know profession leaders of sighted They heading. only have we are where actively promote preparing target but are the what statutes, necessary revisions оf appears be practice.” procedures preventive principle treatment adopted the Maine has yet doing juveniles, in so it has also respect to of crime with juveniles must be are cases where recognized that there sys- juvenile court prosecution. Our subjected criminal administration, including the its method and the tem acting juvenile courts to hold municipal courts power of S., Chap. is found in R. prosecution, for criminal juveniles inclusive, amendments em- and the both Secs. L., Chap. 334. L., 1945, Chap. 63 and P. in P. bodied provisions this duty to see that It is the de- must our given To we this end are full effect. law provisions scrupulously enforce cisions can be tried as require that before law which original juris- within exclusive offense criminal court, capacity as a its diction of court, proceedings had in said court, required man- that court has determined *28 and then after by proceedings be such criminal provided law that ner the disagrees any justice this court had. I do not feel opinion ob- The difference of which this conclusion. with among the so the court is not much tains members requires by respect principle action the which to the basic precedent the indictment a condition court as original juvenile within for an offense its exclusive respect jurisdiction, action the but with what juvenile jury, the must take it holds the court if required took the action case. and whether not it legal policy jurisdictional pre- public requirements If juvenile prosecution the of a an in the vent offense courts, proceedings and until in- criminal unless been juvenile possessed original court stituted exclusive offense, jurisdiction principles the same of law public policy require juvenile same the the court jurisdiction possesses. exercise the which It is not the taking juvenile juvenile before mere court which important. judicial juvenile is A determination disposition juvenile court of the made of the delin- being quent, such determination made in the exercise of its jurisdiction such, required. juvenile what is is If when a brought juvenile before with an offense jurisdiction, its within exclusive such court be al- jurisdiction take lowed refuse to of the offense and be proceed allowed to in the same manner as the case of adult, spirit, purpose juvenile and letter of the law are legal violated and defeated. There is no difference in taking juvenile effect juvenile between before a wrongfully refuses to exercise and an juvenile omission to take the before such court. Neither Superior course is sufficient to enable the Court to exercise juvenile over the and the offense with which he charged. original jurisdiction by It is the exercise of exclusive juvenile court not its refusal to exercise it that confers jurisdiction upon Superior try juvenile Court to of- original jurisdic- fender for an offense within the exclusive juvenile tion of the court. juvenile Superior
Neither
court nor in the
Court
waive
exercise
court of
jurisdiction.
its exclusive
To allow such waiver
against public
in either court would be
policy
respecting jurisdiction.
stated,
and the law
As above
compliance
requirements
with the
law is
jurisdictional
in the strict sense of that
term. Until such
requirements
complied with,
Superior
are
has
juvenile.
no
over the offense or the
Jurisdic-
acquired by express
tion cannot be
consent and a waiver
*29
Bonney,
can
to more.
amount
no
State v.
“The state also
that
waived
right
validity
may
he
have had to attack the
ground
age,
indictments on the
of his
because he
arraigned
permitted
perior
pleaded
to be
himself
before the su-
voluntarily
said indictments and
raising
thereto,
any
question
then
without
regarding
age.
his
The state’s
contention
rests,
authority
by
supported
connection is
that,
theory
substance,
while one under
on the
legal right
proceeded
age may
to be
certain
crime,
against
in a
court when accused
proper
right may
waived,
yet
circumstances, by
under the
such
ac-
and acts of the
the conduct
;
may
and he
to stand trial and take
cused
sentence
Fifer v.
consent
manner as
adult. See
the same
State,
90 Tex.
R.
the law in certain other we find our- holding adopt selves unable to because of our meaning view of the and intent of the statute we now have under consideration. We construe our providing statute courts the care and delinquent establishing of jurisdictional not children as certain requirements, limitations merely personal rights privileges in favor juvenile, which the latter waive or not as he proceedings desires. Jurisdiction in such as are involved herein cannot be conferred on the superior but by minor, the conduct accused depends upon proper construction of the applied statute as to the facts then before the find, therefore, court. We this contention by advanced conduct state, petitioner his rights, waived certain application has no present in the case.” contrary cases to the in Texas and California are upon statutory based requirements which set forth the manner raising and time for the issue. Because of these requirements the courts in these prelimi- states held that nary proceedings personal court were a privilege strictly jurisdictional were not requirements they and that could be waived failure to raise the issue at the time and in provided manner statute. Notwithstanding the fact S., Chap. 133, R. Sec. 24
provides, *30 prosecutions
“In all municipal before courts or trial justices respondent the may plead guilty not hearing, whereupon proceedings
waive the same appeal shall sentence and if there to had hearing.”, had been a full my provision opinion this of the statute in does not relieve municipal duty the court from its exercise the exclusive to original jurisdiction juvenile which it has over offender. stipulated the It to be noted that this case it judge municipal plea guilty of not “re- court after with which fused exercise over the offense” to judgment of the Defendant was and rendered respondent and bound the over to “Probable Cause” Court, permitting Superior etc. Even if above statute applies juve- hearing municipal waiver of before courts municipal offenders, permit nile does not such waiver original jurisdiction exercise its exclusive court to refuse to determine whether or not over the offense and refuse to only, juvenile delinquent juvenile is to be treated as prosecution. hold would held- for criminal To otherwise hearing permit juvenile but to to waive juvenile provisions waive the law. although particular in mind that
It must be borne age charged years sixteen case involves manslaughter, principles herein decide law which we may apply juveniles all between applicable his case are apply years, all ages and will and seventeen of seven seventeen, age and to all years and under over twelve jurisdiction of the the exclusive offenses within can take refuse to If the court. jurisdiction in case its to exercise or refuse thing the case of a seven boy, same it can do the of this ages, in any intermediate year of those or a child of old many delinquents are age group so possibility so at of such action eliminate found. It is to clearly purposes the act that it must variance with the grand jury, holding that, for the appear actually its exclusive exercised *31 by imposed can sustain sentence jurisdiction we before Superior the Court. manslaughter opinion agree majority
I the with original jurisdiction the exclusive the within one of offenses agree I also municipal as a court. court of the Superior was opinion the Court majority with convict, try, or commit jurisdiction sentence without to petitioner proceedings proper hold the petitioner because prosecution the crime jury enable his for the manslaughter Superior had were not Court are this latter conclusion municipal reasons for court. The as follows: statutory Superior It court. has
The Court is juris- by jurisdiction upon The it statute. as conferred by Superior offenses is conferred Court over diction Chap. 5, S., 132, R. which is follows: Sec. jurisdiction superior original
“The shall have concurrent, except those exclusive or of all offenses jurisdiction is con- of which the ferred exclusive by jus- municipal and trial law on courts tices, jurisdiction appellate of these.” enlarged Superior jurisdiction Nor is this of the Court L., 1947, S., Chap. 94, by Chap. by R. Sec. as amended P. general grant jurisdiction, 16 which is its because the jurisdiction Supreme over offenses Judicial Court prior by January 1930 was limited a statute similar tо limiting Superior above quoted. being age petitioner years
The than less seventeen charged being manslaughter, court, act- ing juvenile court, capacity its had exclusive petitioner over the and the offense with which charged. Therefore, only way he was Superior that the acquire Court could over the offense with petitioner provisions was under especially so-called S., Chap. law R. Superior Under this section the only acquire Court could
jurisdiction by appeal an indictment returned grand jury pursuance subsequent of and hold- ing grand jury by for the author- under ity upon supra. conferred Section 6 holding *32 distinction between and a non- juvenile grand jury for felony the for and the thereof basis is as follows: non-juvenile charged
In the the case of felony, with a the municipal jurisdiction has court no whatever over the of- charged. respondent fense the S., Chap. with which is R. 133, 2, any Sec. 1. disposition Par. It cannot make final respect any judgment the to offense nor render either guilt. non-juvenile of of respondent, innocence or The if felony charged, a be is for before it not trial but for exami- Chap. S., nation. R. 9. It can find Sec. that the crime has been probable committed someone and that there is charge respondent so, cause to the with its commission. If recog- by requiring be him causes him to for trial held grand jury any nize to await action of the and answer to may S., Chap. 134, indictment be found. R. 13. Sec. If it either fails to find that the crime has been committed probable charge respondent, or that there is cause the discharged. respondent S., Chap. is R. 13. Sec. This, slightest degree however, is not to the a determina- magis- guilt tion or innocence of the accused. The municipal trate or court has no over the of- charged fense, respondent discharged and if the is or he has discharged, may jeopardy. never been in If he be arrested brought magistrate aon new warrant and before the same again, grand charged, jury. and held for the Even if indict, again he ar- should the fail to brought and before the an- rested on a same or warrant again grand magistrate jury. held other How- ever, jury magistrate because the he is held for final, and cannot make has no over the offense a disposition the case. with, a juvenile hand, when
On the other original jurisdiction of the mu- felony the exclusive within try hear court, nicipal it does case, sub- a final determination It can make case. guilty juvenile right find the ject appeal. It can to the juvenile in delinquency, can then deal with any prescribed in 6 of Section of the methods constitutionality S., Chap. The law. R. by juve-
grant authority committed over offenses of such offense, assured, though if committed even niles is adjudication felony. or non-juvenile, would be municipal guilt can make is judgment power delinquency. guilty All child imprisonment, either punish child as a criminal negatived. S., expressly reformatory prison, R. jail, delinquency Chap. 133, is not 2 and 6. Secs. Juvenile dispositions supra. that the crime. None of Section pun- amount to court can make of the However, ishment crime. when *33 any juvenile
deals with offense over which with jurisdiction, it has it has to determine exclusive juvenile de- ultimately whether he dealt with as is to If, however, municipal linquent court or a criminal. the juvenile and the that the best interests of the determines safety community prosecution require of the criminal grand jury. juvenile, may of the it him for the hold juris- If it so determines does so not because it had no it any offense, over it diction the not because could make disposition cause, final has of the but becausе it exercised judgment disposition the the discretion of as to of cause by with which it invested the was Section statute. holding grand juvenile jury, juvenile
In the for the the examining magistrate court does not act as a mere inas the non-juvenile. doing case a In so it as a acts court clothed juvenile over the offense the author- disposition Holding juvenile. ized to make of the him for grand dispositions may jury the is one of the it make juvenile. of the action the is no Such juris- disposition juvenile in less a the exercise of its contemplates diction it other and further because action grand jury Superior and the be taken the Court. grand the court holds the When the jury, it the with which it has unless exercises the an act of dis- been invested holds for legal action is cretion under Section 6 the effect of such just though juvenile had never been before the same as the court. ex- expressly
If ruled that it had no manslaughter original jurisdiction the crime clusive over grand jury, juvenile and committed held interpretation, would take action because under its discharge except It would take no other action. it could judgment entirely choice with which fail to exercise the cases, and it not' hold for it is invested in would jury seemed for because course of action community safety interests of the child and the best provided under Section 6 of the statute. statute, interpretation munici- such an Under just exactly and the pal record court would do what refuse stipulation did in this case. It would show that it do to exercise offense with charged, and hold for and find Probable Cause trial. knowledge profession it well
It common Superior those us who have served on known to L., 1947, Chap. subsequent enactment of P. to the *34 uniformity interpretation of there has been lack of may imprison- punishmеnt be phrase for which “the by municipal years” courts. Some any ment for term of erroneously that their exclusive municipal held courts have might original jurisdiction extend to offenses which did not 161 years more. punishable by imprisonment for two or re- municipal felt that the law therefore Such courts charged every juvenile quired with such them to hold grand jury only disposition which for the as the offense ordering charged they make a child other than could so discharged. nearly all include all if not him Such offenses January, question felonies. was to settle this It 383; reported Fraizer, Me. I case of State v. Superior (2nd) 179, the Law 64 Atl. from the Court to However, upon analysis indictment Court. careful of the charged therein this court it was found that the crime S., provision Chap. was within the of R. author- izing punishment by imprisonment any years” “for term of provision pro- and not within that of said section which imprisonment year vided for “for not less than one nor years.” question more than ten As the was issue any and as discussion thereof have been obiter dic- would tum, per disposed the case was curiam. majority opinion
The question in this case settles this interpretation. stipulation Under the record and in this Municipal case it well be that Court of Portland erroneously interpreted jurisdiction the extent of its petitioner held the for the because it felt that it was the legally course action it could take in the premises. The record alone is consistent with such action. stipulation The refused, established that either for that reason, jurisdiction some other to exercise over the of- petitioner charged. fense with which the deal- When ing offenders with offenses within exclusive municipal of the court, municipal both the Superior court and the Court are courts jurisdiction. of limited Superior depends upon precedent municipal exercise jurisdiction. court of its exclusive It is for reason record court must show by express either by necessary declaration or implication that the court has exercised its as a
162
juvenile court and that in the exercise and of the thereof Chap. S., it discretion with which is invested R. Sec. 6 of juvenile grand jury, juris- held the for the the before Superior diction the can attach. Court establishing interpret stipulation I record the and the as Municipal that never Court Portland this case jurisdiction peti- exercised its exclusive over charged. The tioner or offense he with which was criticism, though record, open and not to commended any purpose, if it is sufficient for is consistent with stipulation, however, together this action. The taken respect record The statute is conclusive with thereto. gives jurisdiction of- exclusive over the the court “Judge Municipal stipulation fense. The of said that the jurisdiction then the offense Court refused to exercise judg- with which the Defendant was and rendered ” my ment of mind cannot mean ‘Probable Cause.’ To this jurisdiction in- he with which he was exercised vested, ac- he treat that he considered whether would disposition a juvenile delinquent as make final cused a and against juvenile, course of the and the decided case disposal case an as to as exercise of the discretion grand for the him held the child vested in Section jury the child the best interests of because it seemed for my safety community. record To mind the stipulation show that he to exercise and the refused grand properly jurisdiction. child held for the was not up- Superior jury, tried and sentenced when exercising original indictment, offense, possess. it did not over the relating provisions hold- To оf Section construe grand conferring upon ing jury, as right juvenile for to hold a the unfettered my would the case adult It opinion destroy law. the effectiveness wrongfully municipal courts open the door would their construed the extent of covering any felonies to hold for the
court as not
jury
case.
of the case as
without consideration
*36
my
only
importance
mind
is of
utmost
To
it
the
juvenile
the
the
to the
itself that cases within
but
original
municipal
jurisdiction
as a
of the
exclusive
juvenile
juvenile
cases and
court be first considered
legal
by
made
that court whether
it will
determination
finally dispose
or,
of them as such
the discretion
within
by
law,
juvenile
with which it is vested
Section 6 of the
grand jury.
my opinion
them
In
for
such action
hold
upon
part
prerequisite
of the
court is a
grand
by
jury
cognizable by
indictment
which is
Superior
upon
and
to trial
sentence in that court
my opinion
an indictment.
In
this is the intent
L,, 1943, Chap. 322,
amendment
in P.
which
struck out
prohibition against holding
for the
“unless the
aggravated
unruly
offense is
or the child
is of
vicious or
disposition,”
expressly
holding
and which
included
grand jury among
dispositions
that could be made as
seemed to the court for the best interests of the child and
protection
community.
prohibi-
of the
The deleted
tion had been in the law
its
since
enactment
It
interpreted
excepting
had been
this court as
cases within
original
its terms from the exclusive
of the
municipal
Henry,
court. State v. Rand and
In record of the grand jury for the be should it shows either ex- pressly by necessary implication taken that it has the re- quired action, has it held child for the jury upon in the exercise the discretion conferred it authority 6 of the law and not under the Section Chapter upon conferred Section 13 of 134 as non- in. juvenile cases. argued court, may either act-
It that as the Chap. ing S., Chap. S., 6 or R. under R. Sec. under grand jury, dif- for the it makes no hold case at ference route the takes to arrive the same distinction a differ- destination without argument misconception upon a is based ence. This its court and when functions of acting fact as a The confusion is due to the court. *37 single municipal a dual ca- in a court acts in that this State sep- jurisdiction. a pacity If we had and a dual exercises jurisdic- juvenile had exclusive arate court which perfectly by juveniles, clear would be over it tion offenses right to exercise exclusive that court would the that juvenile. jurisdiction If court were the such such authority juvenile juvenile a the as given the deal with provided in it would have manner Section offender disposition from those it made of the case choose the by have to be choice would that section. Such authorized judicial choice its discretion. Such in exercise of made the by necessarily the a involve consideration would dispositions and possible which could be made the various only be be carried out. It would the one to the selection of that the court of choice of this discretion in the exercise right the grand jury. the of both It is for the could hold this discretion juvenile the court exercise and the actually chosen from disposition made be and make. It is among dispositions it could various of choice that by its discretion only exercise of this upon it. jurisdiction conferred exercises its dual court with our This is also true of brought it for an juvenile before jurisdiction. When jurisdiction, it it exclusive offense over which has child jurisdiction. If it hold such would must exercise that grand jury, the discretion as to dis it must exercise for the by upon If position it 6. conferred Section which has been acting only jury within it can do so it holds for the by authority by conferred and its virtue of dispositions authorized to make it is Section 6 as one of the its ex delinquent. If it fail or refuse to exercise original jurisdiction necessarily fails refuses clusive it disposition upon conferred it exercise the discretion If over the 6. it refuses to exercise Section probable holds the and finds cause and offense only grand jury, case, in construction that as placed upon can action is that it assumed to do so legal provisions S., Chap. under the of R. though exactly there effect of such action is the same juvenile court, separate take were a failure to it, it that court refused before or if he were taken before juve premises, in action to act then without prosecution indictment. nile court was commenced herein, my opinion As the record heretofore shown only stipulation fail to this case not show that court did exercise its not, court but show that it did and that it held the that such for the in the belief was the premises. my opinion In action could take Municipal in this case exercised its never Portland *38 original jurisdiction exclusive over the offense nor petitioner. juvenile throughout though It treated the it had no exclusive over the offense or right juvenile delinquent. to treat as a It my opinion is this case the further that in was im- holding prоperly grand jury. held for the A for the jury precedent in accord with a condition Section is to Superior being true, in the This Court. the Su-
perior trying Court exercised in sentencing supra. juvenile. Elbert, State v. The See illegal commitment under such sentence is therefore justification petitioner there is no the detention corpus the writ of habeas should issue. contingencies I realize that there are and situations which may present arise in the administration of the law specifically implication provided which are not or even so, Legislature for therein. If it is for the not the Court necessary interpret a to make the revision the law. To of provisions in law such a manner as to either read into it which it does not contain or to read out of it those which legislate interpret. may be it does contain is to not to It possible, though probable, necessary either lack may improper action or action taken escape punishment. juveniles enable some well merited be, attempt result, may However in an to avoid such permit a this court construction of the law should not neglect municipal court, refusal or exercise its its original jurisdiction, purpose defeat exclusive my opinion that law itself. It is further the reasons which length my implicit at I have stated for conclusions are opinion majority and I of the court concur therefore therein. opinion in the Mr. J. concur Justice Williamson, I except susceptible interpretation insofar as is
Fellows it “guilty adjudication judgment de- that an required linquency” a child be held for the before grand jury. I concur result. dissenting. J., further C.
Murchie, having concurring opinion of Mr. Merrill Justice the fundamental set forth reasons under- been written to my recorded, lying opinion from dissent that, despite my proper me note entire accord seems my complete recog- important and issue is most having juris- principle that trial a court no nition of the
167 supplied meaningless, he has I see that cannot diction opinion That principal as I see them. the deficiencies Bonney, 34 by v. court State principle was declared controlling de all the in accord with Me. 223. It is having juvenile courts which cited from states cisions such taken before of children set aside convictions case, corpus. courts, own appeal habeas Our on an exclu Bonney, supra, presents a which vested statute v. appel final, except that was sive S., 1840, Chap. 2. Our court proceedings, R. Sec. late Legislature provided no had emphasized the fact that any another machinery case within it to the transfer of provide ma S., 1944, Chap. 6 does court. R. pur chinery. The of exclusive any ported the cases cannot be said of to use it. That Merrill. Mr. Justice cited
My controlled, quotation views as the from Whar- intimates, by over-conservatism, ton’s Criminal Law but recognition a conservatism which stems from of the limi- placed judicial tations intended power by to be our Con- dying stitution rather than from “the torch of the Dark Ages.” Only legislative power, my view, can establish a system separate juvenile courts. That the court is exer- cising legislative function, distinguished ju- from a one, dicial seems to be conceded in the statement made Mr. Justice Merrill near the paragraph close of the third opinion, from the end of his that: “The * * though :¡í legal effect of there were a such action is separate exactly the same emphasis Legislature is mine. Our give has refused to
us such courts. This court both supplies declares and deficiency. Mr. Justice Merrill refers tо what he calls the Municipal refusal of the Portland Court to juris- exercise it, diction petitioner. over the offense of the Undoubtedly refused to exercise its adjudicate *40 petitioner killing with which he was guilty juvenile delinquency. Rightly so, my view. Legislature Our has vested a considerable exclusive juvenile delinquency municipal in our courts, judges thereof, entirely clear, or the but has made it times, might at all that children be for a held Granting rehabilitating desirability such courts. strayed wayward paths, children whose feet have it has provided punished criminals, that children be as when action, require circumstances and has left to our mu- nicipal particular a courts the determination whether of- particular should, not, fense of a child or should be treated why juvenile delinquency. as an act of I can understand deprive has an interest sufficient to a child of right age, jurisdictional requirement such a as but to waive age, years why on a court would refuse one sixteen counsel, right recognize of able that advice charge municipal hearing a of a on inevitable result might juvenile delinquency crime involve either which grand jury. held that the child would be for the would be seeking salvage distinguishes children our law What any paths is the ex- crime from that of other state from chapter hear- provision carries it that a press which prosecutions ing may all before “in be waived Certainly 1944, Chap. when S., R. courts.” being grand jury, indicted, a held for after a child recognized prosecution in the mu- that his started must be jurisdiction of nicipal had exclusive court which hardly alleged a tenable view that It can be offense. his policy underly public principles “the broad Merrill) of other (quoting Mr. Justice juvenile court acts” recognized except assuming Maine have states, all legisla- imposed a limitation them, constitutional legislation providing prohibits power Maine which tive hearing of the issue whether may waive a child against killing charged him constitutes and wilful felonious delinquency. nothing, an act of than more made Merrill has me that Mr. Justice It does not seem to petitioner here- reference to either the clear with future courts, hereafter, charged, in our in or children they prosecuted crim- with crimes for which should petitioner no assur- inals. There intimation that the has municipal court, against prosecution ance and that a new guilty juvenile delinquency, adjudicating child is holding requirements supplies jurisdictional him all necessary jury by implication. the first for a On point statements seem conclusive because unlike do not having offense, one tried in a court of his no arraigned petitioner had. The has been in one which arraigned again can be can arise. issue to whether he *41 single thought controlling. On the second a It seems seems entirely require respondent inconsistent a find a court to constituting juvenile delinquency guilty of an offense holding preliminary grand that, jury him in- if dicted, jury may guilt a traverse determine his inno- hereafter, adjudi- If a cence. case arises child guilty juvenile delinquency cated and held for the jury acquitted adjudication crime to which re- lated, adjudication guilt juvenile delinquency will closing be In eliminated. this connection I note the statement of Mr. Justice Baker of the Rhode Island Court Albiniano, in Ex Parte (2nd) 62 A. 554 at 558: * * * “appropriate proceedings should had * * *." clear the record machinery This court has no which in case system juvenile record can be cleared. It be that a Legislature courts established provision make would contingency. legislate they for such a When courts have no power provide therefor.