*1 WADE, LAWRENCE Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF NORTH BOARD, CHICAGO Defendant-Appellee. POLICE PENSION Second District No. 2 — 04—0047

Opinion August 3, filed *2 BOWMAN, dissenting. J., Smith, appellant. Wysocki Waukegan, for Wysocki,

Bernard of & of Jr., Potthoff, Reimer, Radja, J. W all of Richard Thomas S. and Chris Associates, Puchalski, L.L.C., Hinsdale, Richard Richard J. Reimer & of and J. Puchalski, Chicago, appellee. of Law Office of Richard J. of for for amicus curiae. Stanley Jakala, Berwyn, H. of opinion JUSTICE the court: BYRNE delivered the of 2004, 3, opinion filed in the above- On December this court (2004). opinion, case. Ill. In that ad entitled See 353 3d 852 we defendant, Chicago dressed of Pension City whether North Police (the Wade, Board), wrongly plaintiff, Board a line-of- denied Lawrence (see (West 2002)), in duty disability part ILCS 40 5/3 — 114.1 because Dr. one the Board Milgrana, of the three doctors selected pursuant sec plaintiff, certify plaintiff examine did not as disabled (Pension Code) (40 tion 3—115 of Illinois Code Pension 5/3— (West (1) 2002)). a fair argued Plaintiff the Board denied him Milgram’s Dr. medi impartial hearing solely and it relied because (2) in him a decision report denying disability pension; cal Board’s (3) evidence; contrary manifest and the Board weight was to the that, a dis improperly to mandate before interpreted section 3—115 examining ability pension granted, can be all three certify the Board is disabled. We found must interpreted denied correctly properly the Board section 3—115 and benefits, and affirmed plaintiffs application disability pension for we Coyne this v. Milan Police only. Compare the Board’s decision on basis 713, (2004), Board, Ill. 727-30 v. Board Pension 3d Rizzo Fund, Trustees Village Evergreen Park Police Pension of of 490, Subsequently, plaintiff petitioned supreme our court for leave to appeal, supreme court denied. v. City Chicago Wade North 2005). Pension (May However, Police No. 99806 it entered a supervisory directing order this court our in judgment, light to vacate v. Turcol Pension Board Trustees Matteson Pension Police Fund, (2005), 214 Ill. 2d 521 resolve issue of whether proven Board’s determination had his was weight the manifest supreme evidence. Pursuant to the order, supervisory court’s we find that Board’s determination proven had not his disability contrary was to the manifest However, of the evidence. we further conclude because plaintiffs the Board did not disability, receive certificates he properly denied pension benefits under section 3—115.

FACTS Plaintiff as a was hired full-time officer North Chicago police department plaintiff injured June 1982. In his right playing Roger knee football. B. Collins examined him 1991 again problems August when his knee continued. right playing he twisted knee softball underwent arthro- *3 and, scopic surgery. problems His and knee continued late 2001 2002, early approximately eight he missed for weeks work because He in February them. returned to work 2002. 20, 2002, April injured right knee plaintiff

On his when he tumbled an escorting sought down embankment a Plaintiff im- prisoner. while reported medical at Lake Hospital, mediate attention Forest where he feeling “pop” pain swelling. a when fell and and experiencing he knee Pavlatos, Dr. orthopedic surgeon, performed orthoscopic Chris an 17, plaintiff May 2002, on an Dr. surgery on after MRI disclosed what believed new and Pavlatos was a tear the medial lateral meniscus. 29, 2002, May work” plaintiff “light duty On Dr. Pavlatos released for plaintiff permanent and that would a sit stated “need to switch to job running down with no activities.” This restriction reiterated again 8, plaintiff August Dr. Pavlatos after he examined on 2002, Levin, surgeon, September 4, orthopedic Dr. Mark On that plaintiff. report conducted an examination His indicated problems knee that plaintiff long-standing predated had chronic and 20, 2002, plaintiffs Dr. Levin noted that he examined April injury. 2002, April 24, changes which arthritic MRI scan showed a tear.” “findings as as consistent medial meniscal knee well with studies, medical reviewing plaintiffs history, radiographic and After examination, Dr. that opined performing physical Levin records and knee, right arthritis of the tri-compartment plaintiff appeared to have injury from long-standing predated and was chronic and did the abil- 20, opined not have plaintiff 2002. He further that April underlying patrol as a officer because ity to return work right knee. arthritis of no 2002, that there were plaintiff was advised September

On op officer and police available for sedentary positions permanent Thereafter, on disability pension. for apply to retire or to tions were a dis the Board for plaintiff application filed an October line-of- seeking he was ability specify did not whether pension. He (see (West 2002)) (see not-on-duty or a duty 40 ILCS 5/3 — 114.1 (West 2002)) disability pension under the Pension ILCS 5/3 — 114.2 Code. (West (see statutory

Pursuant 40 ILCS mandate 5/3 — 115 Dr. 2002)), Dwyer, Dr. John Reger, Dr. Drs. Christopher Milgrana, plaintiff. James W examined Dwyer Reger plaintiff disabled from a “work-related” found Milgrana Dr. that injury disability. and issued certificates of found knees had plaintiff degenerative both of his bilateral arthritis any Milgrana did preexisted duty-related incident. not believe degree right plaintiff in his from work arthritis knee “disabled” motivated[,] he as a officer and felt that if “so plaintiff were present could return to as a at the time without work officer Dr. Milgrana restriction.” did not to be from a find disabled injury and did not certificate of work-related issue a 19, 2003, hearing plaintiffs At the evidentiary June counsel ap- indicated wanted Board to consider his plication only seeking as a claim and that he was not duty-related not-on-duty hearing, disability pension. During reports the medical examining physicians of the Board’s and the medical records from were into Plaintiff plaintiffs treating physicians admitted evidence. exhibits, including Dr. Mil- object did not to the admission these gram’s report. medical plaintiffs line-of-duty

The Board for a dis- application denied preexisting disease ability pension, had a 20, 2002, April analysis, to the incident. its the Board unrelated *4 Milgram Dr. credible the other and as- physicians found more than greater signed weight opinion. to his The Board also relied on report prior injuries, Levin’s and the extensive medical treatment and right which indicated to the Board knee condition plaintiff’s Rizzo, prior existed Citing the work-related incident. interpreted require section 3—115 of the Pension Code to a board 228 disability pension

issue a only if it receives certificates of an officer’s disability from three practicing physicians board, selected the Board denied a disability pension because it did not receive Rizzo, certificates of disability. See Ill. App. 3d at

Plaintiff complaint filed a for administrative review. Following a hearing, the trial court decision, affirmed the Board’s because the doctors’ reports medical part were admitted as administrative objection, record without any objec- waived tions to the sworn requirements certification of section 3—115. The trial court did not rule on the issues of whether the Board’s decision against weight manifest of the evidence legally erroneous. Rather, the trial court believed that it was bound to follow the deci- sion in Rizzo because it only appellate was the court case in Illinois specifically deciding the section 3—115 issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Board’s decision because the Board did not receive three certificates of examining from the Board pursuant to section 3—115. Plaintiff timely appeals.

ANALYSIS 1. Manifest Weight of the Evidence court, As directed by supreme we now first address the Board’s determination had not proven

On appeal, we review decision of the agency, administrative not that of the trial court. Stec v. Board Trustees the Oak Park of of (2005). Fund, Police 974, Pension 355 Ill. 3d 978-79 An agency’s findings administrative of prima fact are deemed true facie may correct and be set aside if only they against are the manifest (West weight of the evidence. 2002); 735 ILCS Daily v. Board 5/3 — 110 (1993). Fund, Trustees 119, Police Pension 251 Ill. App. 3d findings “Factual weight are the manifest only the evidence where all reasonable and persons agree unbiased would it clearly agency evident the administrative erred and should have reached the opposite Comm’n, conclusion.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce (2004). 3d The mere fact that an opposite conclu sion reviewing is reasonable or that the might court have ruled differ ently justify will not findings. reversal of the administrative Rhoads v. Board City Trustees Calumet City Policemen’s (1997). Fund, Moreover, Pension 293 Ill. App. 3d “because of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses are province [agency], only competent within there need be some support findings.” evidence the record to its Iwanski v. Streamwood Thus, Police Pension if the decision, any agency’s record contains it should support evidence to *5 Regu Department v. Illinois Abrahamson be affirmed. of Professional lation, line-of-duty to a he was entitled claims that Plaintiff (40 ILCS Code of the Pension section 3—114.1 pursuant to 2002)). (West line-of-duty dis to a to be entitled In order 5/3 — 114.1 (1) as he was disabled part that prove must ability pension, plaintiff performance from the resulting incurred or injury a result of an (3) (2) disabling disabled; and physically he is duty; act of service. police suspension his necessary condition renders 2002). (West ILCS 5/3 —114.1 arthritis of preexisting has plaintiff that undisputed It is 20, 2002, ac April focuses on whether right dispute knee. The tear knee whether plaintiff’s tear cident caused a new who examined Four of the five the accident. preexisted the ac of the date of disabled as plaintiff that plaintiff concluded Dr. a new tear. the accident caused believed that cident. Dr. Pavlatos hand the other Milgram Dr. in this conclusion. Levin concurred accident, the Board found any preexisted tears believed that credible, weight opinion. to his assigning more Milgram Dr. more any evidence Thus, the record contains this case turns on whether tear did not suffer new Milgram’s finding plaintiff that support Dr. that argues Plaintiff the embankment. knee he fell down to his when Milgram’s finding was baseless that Dr. the evidence reveals assigning so much the Board erred unreliable and that therefore agree. Milgram’s opinion. to Dr. We into evidence contains report medical submitted Milgram’s Dr. following portion: relevant in no is there a records and area

“I have reviewed the medical knee treating physicians that his patient to his history given patient [sic]. with the he fell down the embankment popped when giving to me. Therefore, history patient is a new this diagnosed injury. He was type not of an The records do show knees and arthritis of both having doctor as bilateral his own he cartilage. Indeed might have tears of the doctor felt that he operative in the cartilage, but as described did have tears and chronic. degenerative type of tears note, they appear to be just oc- like a new tear that certainly appear to be They do not likelihood that significant is a I think that there curred and and not pre-existing disease by Dr. Pavlatos are tears treated patient injury. I think that new tears caused traumatic disabling from which is degree of arthritis does not have also he he so motivated I feel that were officer and work as without present at the time officer could return to work as restrictions.”

It is clear Milgram’s report from Dr. that he concluded that the ac- cident did not cause a plaintiffs knee, new tear to because did report symptom his doctor the that his knee popped when he tumbled Rather, down the embankment. Milgram felt that the tears appeared to be of a degenerative type and chronic from preexist- ing However, disease. the record indicates did in fact report to Dr. Pavlatos that he felt pop his knee when he fell down the embankment. This misstatement of the evidence shows that Dr. Mil- gram either selectively disregarded, recall, failed to or never reviewed portions plaintiffs Thus, medical disregarded records. he evidence that supports suffered a tear. new We find it particularly troubling although he stated that he reviewed plaintiffs records,” “medical nowhere in his report Milgram did Dr. *6 indicate that he specifically examined by the MRI taken Dr. Pavlatos following plaintiffs Furthermore, accident. Milgram based his plaintiff is not disabled plaintiff on his beliefs that “does degree not have a of arthritis disabling which is from work as a officer” and that he lacks motivation. This “lack of motivation analysis” vague and has no scientific basis in fact report because the consider, does not as examining did, the other plaintiffs symptoms current regarding knee, i.e., the use of his that his knee locks occasionally, experiences that he pain some in his knee when he up stairs, climbs and down and that his knee swells and feels tender any when he does Milgram’s strenuous activities. Dr. opinion also fails to account for symptoms might how these plaintiffs affect work as a full-duty police officer. Dr. Milgram credible, was not because his conclusions were inconsistent with the facts available to him. findWe the Board erred in assigning greater weight Dr. Milgram’s opinion, because he failed to consider opinion or to base his relevant, material evidence key that was under the circumstances of Accordingly, this case. we find that the Board’s decision is manifest of the evidence.

Moreover, contrary argument, to the Board’s we believe that escorting prisoner a being duty” constitutes “on within the ambit of section 3—114.1 of the Pension Code. Section 5—113 of the Pension Code an duty,” pertinent defines “act of part, “[a]ny as act of duty inherently risk, involving special ordinarily by assumed a life, ordinary citizen walks of imposed policeman by on a statutes of this police regulations State or the ordinances or city in which special assignment.” this Article is effect or (West 2002). Escorting prisoner is not an act as 5/5 — 113 ordinary sumed an citizen.

Four out five doctors found to be disabled due to the April to the present condition injury to his knee and attributed preexisting condi plaintiffs stated that incident. Dr. Pavlatos that there was opined Dr. Levin aggravated by tion the accident. preventing plaintiff that is now aggravation from the accident debilitat states that the returning full-duty work. The Pension Code from the by or must have resulted ing injury must have been incurred Trustees the Vil duty. an act of Barber v. Board performance of Fund, Ill. Barrington Pension lage South Police requirement duty-related incident There is no injury, although a sufficient originating primary cause of the Barber, 256 duty must exist. injury nexus and the act between and Levin reports Ill. 3d at 818. The of Drs. Pavlatos establish Thus, did condi preexisting the nexus. even if suffer from tion, line-of-duty disability pen to a he would nevertheless be entitled inability to occurred injury sion because the that caused his work duty. while he was on Coyne, line-of-duty the board denied the Court, Appellate but failed to articulate its reasons. The Third

District, cause, explaining remanded standard review doubt, but, gives the no articulation of board benefit of determination, findings upon the board based its a review ing court could not extend that in an informed manner. The benefit appellate agency’s preroga “[a]n court concluded that administrative undoubtedly making tive includes credibility determinations between competing opinions. weighs doctors who render But when the evidence heavily against single doctor, agency adopt and the chooses opinion, agency findings underlying doctor’s must articulate the meaningful its choice to facilitate 3d at Coyne, review.” 724. Accordingly, appellate appropriate court believed that the *7 course would be to remand the cause with instructions for the board findings appellate to articulate its so that the court could effectuate meaningful Coyne, case, App. present review. 3d at 724. In the the findings meaningful Board did articulate its and we can effectuate apparent Milgram review it is that Dr. because from the record key formulating opinions overlooked medical evidence in as to the plaintiffs injury disability. cause of and to his lack of Our examination assigning weight leads us to that the in so much conclude Board erred Milgram’s opinion. Accordingly, to Dr. the Board’s line-of-duty disability pension was not entitled to a in accordance with manifest 3—114.1 of the Pension Code was of the evidence.

2. Section 3—115 We turn to the issue of section 3—115 of the Pension now whether 232 pension deny disability

Code mandates that a board benefits unless all examining physicians by certify ap- board selected plicant is disabled. We allowed the Hoffman Estates Police Pension support plaintiff. Fund file an amicus curiae brief agree interpreta- Plaintiff and curiae do not Rizzo’s amicus that, pension tion of the statute and assert while a board must have doctors, three certificates from its selected all three certificates do not need to find the applicant disabled for board award amicus pension. Relying Coyne, plaintiff on the recent decision of and requires curiae contend that the statute three medical certificates ad- Therefore, assert, dressing they an even applicant’s disability status. disabled, plaintiff did though certify one doctor pension. could still obtain a statute, review, and the begin by citing

We our standard of guidelines. statutory relevant part: provides 3—115 of the Pension Code relevant

Section paid “Certificate of A shall not be filed with the certificates of the of unless there is board police officerif not disability, ficer’s subscribed and sworn to *** (if police surgeon there legal disability, under one) The practicing physicians and 3 the board. board (West disability.” may require other evidence of 40 ILCS 5/3 — 115 2002). reviewing

In a final decision under the Administrative Review (West (735 2002)), agency’s seq. et we review Law ILCS 5/3 — 101 Martino Police Pen decision and not the trial court’s determination. v. (2002). Board, the issue is one of sion 3d 979 When Martino, Ill. agency’s decision de novo. only, law we review Here, App. 3d at 980. review is de novo because this case involves statutory interpretation. Land v. Board Education question of (2002). However, give Ill. 2d we City Chicago, 202 agency’s interpretation of a weight and deference to substantial State Labor Park v. Illinois Village statute it enforces. Franklin Ill. 3d Relations legislature’s statute, ascertain the In the court must interpreting meaning ordinary intent, plain is found Land, 202 Ill. 2d at Where language used in the statute. effect clear, give language language is the court will statutory Martino, aids of construction. without resort to other at 980. examined Rizzo, doctors who two of the three board-selected unable to Rizzo was disabled and reports finding

Rizzo submitted physician third found job officer. The return to his as *8 return to he not disabled and could impaired, Rizzo was while physicians The first two submitted full, police duties. unrestricted submitted a certificate physician The third reports opinions. of their case, present disabled. Similar to the stating that Rizzo was not more disability pension, pension board afforded denying Rizzo a not disabled. The opinion that Rizzo was physician’s to the pursuant to section application Rizzo’s for benefits board also denied that Rizzo was not physician 3—115 because the third certified review, Rizzo, App. Ill. 3d at 491-93. On administrative disabled. doctors find the trial court reversed and remanded because one of the ing disability required had submitted a certificate as under sworn remand, it had received the section 3—115. On the board noted that certifying second doctor’s certificate Rizzo was disabled. Rizzo filed again, finding, The reversed complaint another for review. trial court alia, improperly interpreted inter that the board section 3—115. appeal, Appellate On the First District Court held that the board properly interpreted language section 3—115 because the clearly disability statute states that a officer cannot obtain a pension practicing unless board receives certificates from three physicians, by board, stating selected that the officer is disabled. The court may require noted that the board “other evidence” of the officer’s disability, or evidence addition to the three certified state physicians ments from the board’s selected Rizzo, disabled. 3d at 494. Because one of the physi three cians selected the board certify to examine Rizzo did not that he had a disability, disability pension. the board could not award Rizzo a Therefore, appellate properly court concluded that the board application Rizzo, denied Rizzo’s for benefits. 3d at 495. Daily, Ill. App. plaintiff argued that the case should be remanded to obtain proper certification because the three plaintiff certify board to examine the did not that he had a Appellate The Fourth District Court held statute, physicians’ based without the three certifications disability, give had a the board could not disability pension. Daily, 3d at 126. plaintiffs

The Daily Rizzo and both relied on Caauwe v. Police (1989), Pension 184 Ill. App. proposition 3d 482 for the physicians’ required certificates are from three doctors to establish Caauwe, either an applicant’s disability pen lack thereof. In sion board denied benefits based on unverified and unsworn medical evidence. The asserted certification doc tors that he mandatory deny was not disabled was benefits under the certifica reports and because the doctors’ lacked 3— for such certifica disability,

tion of his the cause should be remanded appellate agreed tion. The court and held that section 3—115 *9 practicing physicians mandated that the board select three to furnish disability applicant’s subscribed and sworn-to certifications of the Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the board to status. plaintiffs disability the or lack receive three doctors’ certifications of Caauwe, App. thereof. 184 Ill. 3d at 484-86. that,

Daily language and Rizzo found under the clear of section disability required only when applicant’s certification of an 3— a board will be benefits, going deny not it is to benefits. providing when Rizzo, 494-95; App. Daily, App. Ill. 3d at 251 Ill. 3d at 127. To the applicant’s disability that mandates certification of an extent Caauwe benefits, denying to both courts found it to be a contradiction of prior express language the of the statute and declined to follow Caauwe. 495; Rizzo, App. Ill. 251 Ill. 3d at 127. App. Daily, 3d at Ap Plaintiff and on the recent Third District rely amicus curiae the Coyne support argument Court decision in to their pellate furnished require disability three certificates of statute does grant a dis pension board for the board to doctors selected here, language interpreted the board ability pension. Coyne, as declaration from its three requiring 3—115 as a unanimous of section work, police and since Coyne was disabled for appointed doctors disabled, Coyne not so opined the board one doctor App. 3d at summarily Coyne, denied him benefits. the board interpretation of section judge disagreed with the board’s The trial ambiguous. The statutory language to be finding the relevant 3— three medical certificates judge requiring construed section 3—115 as all three of the disability status. Because addressing Coyne’s standard, judge concluded that the one certificates met this ipso disabled did not opinion Coyne doctor’s was not facto App. Ill. receiving pension Coyne, benefits. Coyne from disqualify 3d at 727-28. agreed judge’s with the conclu Appellate

The Third District Court meaning qualify of the analysis centered on the The focus of its sion. for the found 21 nuances word disability.” “of The court ing label ” ” “ “ to,’ ‘[c]entering respect “of,” on’ ranging ‘[fin language. pivotal statutory ambiguity into the injected felt court these various court believed that Ill. 3d at 728. The Coyne, 347 addressing ap easily encompass a certificate definitions could the doctor’s ultimate regardless of generally, status plicant’s police Coyne, work. perform can applicant about whether the opinion 3d at 728. expressed meaning The court also its concern over word “disability” says nothing degree because the statute about the person’s incapacity. pointed The court out that in section 3—114.2 of (40 (West 1996)), legislature the Pension Code 5/3 — 114.2 recognized varying degrees After a officer suf disability, fers a degree board decides whether the However, is sufficient trigger pension benefits. provision certificate legislature referenced “dis 3— ability” general elevating in a did fashion without the term as it Coyne fact, section 3—114.2. The court believed that this combined range “of,” with the ambiguity definitions for the word resulted in regarding required the content of the Coyne, certificates.

3d at 728-29.

The uphold court found that interpretation board’s of sec yield tion 3—115 would a result that would be both absurd and unconstitutional. The court asserted if the board’s interpretation conclusion, were carried logical then, to its as a threshold matter in all cases, the three required by section 3—115 would each have to certify work, was disabled for and the *10 opinion of a minority lone dissenter ipso would defeat a pension facto claim, rendering section 3—115 a summary provi virtual dismissal sion. Coyne, App. 347 Ill. pointed 3d at 729. The court out that the evidentiary hearing because, would be regardless rendered useless the weight evidence, of the applicant’s the outcome would be predetermined by the disagreement mere existence of a between wit Coyne, nesses. App. 3d at 729. pointed court further The out that due process requires adequate hearing, notice and a but interpretation board’s precluded hearing effectively turned the decision over to the three by the board rather than to the Coyne, trier of fact. App. 347 Ill. 3d at 729.

Justice agree Schmidt did not with the majority’s rationale in Coyne. In dissent, he asserted that the issue centered around what “ legislature meant when it referred to the term ‘certificates of ” the police disability.’ officer’s Coyne, 347 Ill. App. (Schmidt, 3d at 730 J., dissenting). He majority believed that the tortured the word “of” in “a ‘Clintonesque’ fashion” to make the term ambiguous. He found nothing ambiguous term, about the plainly that it refers to certificates stating police that the officer is Coyne, disabled one form or another. 347 Ill. (Schmidt, J., 3d at dissenting). Justice Schmidt pointed out that a reading of the statute under majority’s line of reasoning would render an absurd result because it would allow the board to pay disability pension police every to a officer where file, officer’s, certificate on including indicated that he was not disabled. Coyne, (Schmidt, J., 3d at dissenting). reasoning as the agree Justice Schmidt’s dissent as well

We to what it construed the statute Daily, in Rizzo and which have mean “certificates of the nothing equivocal find about term says. We “[a] defined as condition of disability.” “Disability” police officer’s assigned duty or duties incapacity perform any mental physical or (West 2002). Accordingly, we police in the service.” 40 ILCS 5/5 — 115 disability. Under the applicant’s of an certify degree see no need to by the board physicians selected meaning of section three clear 3— disability prevent applicant has a must furnish certification duty duties in the performing any assigned ing him from require very strong legislature’s intent This shows the service. disability pension. issues a proof before the board Furthermore, Coyne and relied contrary argument to the raised curiae, find the Board’s we do not by plaintiff on and amicus If three result. yields an absurd or unconstitutional interpretation issue then becomes establishing disability, certificates are filed a noncovered act or covered by was caused whether a covered by was caused If determines that the act. the Board pension type and amount act, Board must determine the then the (West 2002). Thus, 5/114.1, 114.2 applicant receives. See 40 may there why the statute states there is a rationale as to dis- if the certificates of presented point, especially other evidence to the cause of the ability are inconsistent as physi not certified although Coyne was We note board, psychiatrist who was physician, a fourth cians selected Coyne could not stated that physicians, of the selected referred one Thus, Schmidt’s dis consistent with Justice officer. work as preclude sent, nothing the statute seewe him in an to examine physician a fourth appoint a board to requesting disability. Coyne, three certificates of necessary secure the effort to (Schmidt, J., Finally, point we out dissenting). 3d at 732 Code are in the Pension requirements the medical examination goal of legitimate legislative they serve provisions, antifraud v. Police Pension fund. Trettenero ensuring integrity *11 792, Fund, 799 App. 333 Ill. 3d clear, no need to resort is language find the there

Because we Cancer & Anna Portes George v. aids. See Solich interpretive other (where (1994) Inc., Ill. 2d 81 Chicago, 158 Center Prevention of depart liberty at unambiguous, a court is not clear and is enactment it reading into statute meaning language plain from the did not legislature limitations, that or conditions exceptions, Paris enforced. See should be clearly as written The statute express). (1997) (if intent can be legislative Feder, Ill. 2d 177 v. language, prevail must plain ascertained a statute’s that intent from aids). interpretive without resort to other case, distinguishable that based Plaintiff believes Rizzo is from grounds. sought on a asserts that Rizzo a number of other Plaintiff disability pen- nonduty pension line-of-duty rather a disability than a a difference. plaintiff. sion like We find this to distinction without It under type disability pivotal is not the of that to the issue is Rather, physicians 3—115. it whether three board applicant have certified has

Plaintiff all three doctors filed further contends that Rizzo other, regarding way certificates Rizzo’s one or the while here, Milgram importance here, did not issue at a certificate all. Of Rizzo, only as in is that two of the three certified Furthermore, as regardless disabled. of the distinction between the facts, it interpretation applica- is the Board’s of section and its 3—115 tion disposition. to the facts that is relevant to our

Both and amicus curiae believe that the First District Ap pellate Knight Bartlett, Court oí Village case v. 3d (2003), contradicts its analysis Knight decision and neither Rizzo. addresses the decision in does Rizzo nor it construe section 3—115. Rather, in Knight, two doctors selected the board concluded that Knight permanently officer, was duty disabled and unfit for as a “ and the third Knight doctor concluded had ‘lack of fitness for ” duty’ but was not disabled. psychologically Knight, 3d at 900. The appellate court noted that the record indicated that the phrase doctor used the “lack duty” Knight of fitness for to describe as no longer capable being performing police officer, duties of and the court synonymous concluded “lack fitness” was “unfit.” Knight, Ill. App. 3d at 900. Because examining all three physicians essentially Knight reached the same conclusion that disabled, the court reversed denying the board’s decision pension as the manifest The court evidence. never addressed issue here: whether the lack of a third certificate under precludes applicant section 3—115 receiving an a dis ability pension.

3. Fair and Impartial Hearing Plaintiff and amicus imply curiae that a board can physician select a practicing the board not certify whom knows will applicant disabled, as deny disability pen order to sion. presume persons We who serve administrative tribunals are fair and honest. See Jackson v. Retirement Board Policemen’s Annuity & Chicago, Fund the City Benefit *12 (1997). any bad faith In Plaintiff did not offer evidence of here. evidence, any

the such presume absence of we will not the Board However, presented in arbitrarily acted bad faith. if an a could proof, such then board’s decision be reversed the cause appoint remanded a fourth to examine the physician with directions to issue, applicant. deny We note that we have addressed this because we motion, case, plaintiffs argument the taken the to Board’s with strike regarding impartial hearing. whether he a fair and received summary, by plain, express language of section 3— clearly disability legislature requires by that certificates of filed physicians three is practicing selected board before officer Here, disability benefits. since the three chosen entitled to disability, plaintiff did not certificates of is not the Board file disability plaintiff, Before we rule for entitled to benefits. could we more flexibility would have to rewrite the statute to allow the Board However, with we cannot respect disability. to certificates Rather, interpret apply rewrite the statute. it is our task to it Schlenker, it In re manner which was written. Estate of (2004). pause As Cardozo “We do not Justice stated: differently and framed consider whether statute conceived would fairness We this yield results more consonant with and reason. take Frankfurter, F. the Reading find it.” Some statute as we Reflections Statutes, must take it as 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 Because we of we find it, clear, express compels af language the statute us to only meaning. one language plain firm. statute is and has The legislature If the Thus, duty interpretation does not arise. does, section 3—115 as it interpret intends the courts statutory changes. necessary should make the reasons, although we find the Board’s determi- preceding For the line-of-duty disability pen- not entitled to nation that against Pension Code sion in with section 3—114.1 accordance evidence, we affirm the Board’s decision weight the manifest of the disability denying plaintiff section 3—115 application based on the did not three certificates of pension benefits because the Board receive Affirmed. J.,

McLAREN, concurs. BOWMAN, dissenting:

JUSTICE I concur in the part part. I and concur in respectfully dissent in finding that that the Board’s analysis and decision majority’s disability proven line-of-duty for in ac grounds had (Code) (40 3—114.1 Illinois Pension Code cordance with section (West 2002)) ILCS the manifest 5/3 — 114.1 finding I However, disagree majority’s evidence. (40 (West 2002)) requires

3—115 of the Code 5/3 — 115 certify practicing physicians, of consequential affirming ficer’s and with its deny plaintiffs application Board’s decision to for benefits. I majority Coyne believe Milan Police Pen decision v. *13 Jones, (2004), analyzing sion Board ex rel. 727-30 correctly “Physicians’ Disability,” interprets Certificates (40 (West 2002)). section 3—115 of the Code Conse 5/3 — 115 deny I quently, would reverse Board’s decision to dis ability pension physi benefits because Board did not receive three cian certificates of CORPORATION, al., Dancers, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

XLP et v. THE d/b/a LAKE, OF Defendant-Appellee.

COUNTY Second District No. 2 — 04—0255

Opinion July filed