9 Tenn. App. 101 | Tenn. Ct. App. | 1928
The insistence is made that complainant Wade was not the owner or holder of the rent note sued on and had no right to institute this suit. It appears that on November 15, 1926, Wade borrowed of the Citizens Bank of Pulaski the sum of $1450 and pledged this rent note for $1700 as security therefor; that on February 18, 1927, the sum of $209.89 was paid by Long by check to Vaughn and two of his subtenants, delivered to the bank, and this amount was credited on each of these notes; that on March 11, 1927, when the original bill was filed, the Citizens Bank, the pledgee of the rent note had refused to bring suit thereon, but had delivered the rent note to the solicitor for Wade for the collection at the request of Wade in order that suit might be brought in his name; that the bank did not part with its rights in the rent note as pledged but expected Wade's attorney to collect the amount due on the note and apply it to the satisfaction of the note held by the bank. The weight of the evidence shows that the bank expressly authorized Wade or his attorney to bring suit upon the note, if necessary, to collect the amount due thereon.
This transaction, as a matter of law, enabled Wade to sue on the rent note as the holder within the meaning of section 51 of *103 chapter 94 of the Acts of 1899, Shannon's Code, sec. 3516a59, which is as follows:
"The holder of a negotiable instrument may sue thereon in his own name; and payment to him in due course discharges the instrument."
The bank, as pledgee, parted with possession of the note and constituted Wade its agent, or trustee, for the purpose of collection and to bring suit to that end, if necessary. The rule is that such an agent or trustee having possession may sue on the note in his own name. The duty to account for the proceeds is a matter between him and the beneficial owner. 3 R.C.L., 993; 31 Cyc., 829; 8 C.J., 820; Brannon's Negotiable Instruments Law (4 Ed.), page 352, and cases there cited; Lowell v. Bickford,
But complainant Wade had also a beneficial interest in the note sued on, not only to the extent of the amount above the bank's note, but also because of his liability as endorser upon the note sued on.
Faw, P.J., and Crownover, J., concur.