62 Ala. 347 | Ala. | 1878
A court of equity has original jurisdiction to relieve against conveyances of real or personal estate obtained by fraud or undue influence, or an abuse of confidence; and it is no objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction, in the particular case, that there may also be a concurrent remedy at law. The cancellation of the conveyance, which a court of equity alone can decree, and an adjustment in the same suit of matters of account, which necessarily exist in nearly all cases of the kind, render the remedy in equity more adequate than any which can be pursued at law. Rumph v. Abercrombie, 12 Ala. 64. The jurisdiction must be invoked by a proper party, for no court of law or equity can grant relief against the conveyance, except’ at the suit of a party having an interest affected by it, or a title to complain of it. The personal assets of an estate, by operation of law, or the grant of administration, vest in the administrator, and if the conveyance is of personal property, he has the interest affected by it and title on which to seek relief against it. The statutes may not confer on him an estate or interest in the lands of the intestate, but they clothe him with an authority to rent and to obtain orders for the sale of them, to the
We are then to consider whether the present conveyance from the intestate to the appellee, Lanier, was executed under such circumstances as require a court of equity to pronounce a decree of cancellation. It being an undisputed fact,‘that the conveyance is not founded on an adequate consideration of value, but is purely voluntary; and that at, and prior to its execution, the relation of principal and agent existed between the intestate and the appellee — that under a power of attorney unlimited in its terms, subject to no limitation except such as the law would imply, she had delegated to him the custody of her estate and the management of her affairs, the principles to the test of which the validity of the conveyance must be subjected can not be matter of doubt or controversy. All transactions between trustee and cestui que tmst, guardian and ward, attorney and client, principal and agent, parent and child, are narrowly watched and jealously scrutinized in courts of equity. In all the variety of the relations of life, in which confidence is reposed ana accepted, and dominion may be exercised by one person over another, the court will interfere and relieve against contracts or conveyances, when they would abstain from granting relief, if no particular relation existed between the parties, in which trust and confidence was reposed and accepted, and there was not an opportunity for an abuse of the confidence and the exercise of undue influence. Though in this class of cases there are often marks and traces of direct and positive fraud, of artifice, imposition, overreaching and unconscionable advantage, the principle on which the court proceeds, in granting relief, does not depend on the existence of such facts. Belief is granted, not because there is actual fraud, but on a principle of public policy, to prevent fraud, and to remove all temptation for its commission.- — 1 Story’s Eq. § 307. The principle is thus stated by Judge Story: “ It is undoubtedly true, as has been said, that it is not upon the feelings which a delicate and honorable man must experience, nor upon any notion of discretion, to prevent a voluntary gift or other act of a man, whereby he strips himself of his
The relation of principal and agent, is affected by the same considerations which influence the court in dealing with transactions between persons standing in other fiduciary relations, and the same learned judge and author says : “ It is therefore for the common security of all mankind, that gifts procured by agents, and purchases made by them, from their principals, should be scrutinized with a close and vigilant suspicion. And, indeed, considering the abuses which may attend any dealings of this sort between principals and agents, a doubt has been expressed whether it would not have been wiser for the law in all cases to have prohibited them; since there must always be a conflict between duty and interest on such occasions. Be this as it may, it is very certain that agents are not permitted to become secret vendors or purchasers of property which they are authorized to buy or sell for their principals ; or, by abusing their confidence, to acquire unreasonable gifts or advantages ; or, indeed, to deal validly with their principals in any case, except when there is the most entire good faith, and a full disclosure of all facts and circumstances, and an absence of all undue influence, advantage, or imposition.” — 1 Story’s Eq. § 315. A principle applying in all this class of eases, is, that on the person claiming under the contract or gift, rests the burthen of
With this statement of the principles, to the test of which the validity of this conveyance must be subjected, we will inquire, if it is shown by the grantee, that it is just, fair and equitable — that he dealt with the principal, exactly as a stranger would have done, putting her on her guard, gaining no advantage from the relation, beyond the natural and unavoidable consequence of kindness.
The prominent facts are that the husband of the intestate, in 1867, of which the appellee had knowledge, conveyed to her by deed all his real and personal estate, of the value of not less than eight thousand dollars. They were without descendants, and their only known relation was a -niece of the intestate, residing from her a distance of about thirty miles. The husband died in 1870, and twelve days thereafter, the intestate gave the appellee the power of attorney to which we have referred. There is no evidence that the intestate had ever seen the appellee more than once before the execution of the power of attorney is suggested, and that was during the life of the husband, when he visited him, the only time he was ever at the husband’s residence. The appellee was indebted to the husband, (and the indebtedness was transferred to the intestate,) in a sum exceeding thirty-one hundred dollars. The intestate was near, if not full ninety years of age, partially paralyzed, her mind enfeebled, and her body diseased. Théqpower was executed at the suggestion of the appellee, and after his representation that her business, which seems to have been entrusted to Hill, was not in safe hands. It is drawn with care and skill, but by whom, or where, or who gave the instructions for its drawing, is not shown. After its execution, the appellee and his family were assiduous in their attentions to the intestate; and at their residence, some seven or eight miles from her place of residence for near thirty-five years, away from her old acquaintances, with comparative strangers, she is induced to spend the greater part of her time. A single visit is made
The only explanation of the motives of the deceased for the execution of the conveyance, is affection for the appellee, inspired by his kindness to her in her last years. The same explanation has been attempted in nearly all the cases in which conveyances of this character have been assailed. Affection to the appellee was not the only motive with the intestate for the execution of the conveyance. Security to herself of a comfortable support was also a motive. The appellee must have promised to afford her such security, otherwise he would not have caused the attorney who drew the deed under his supervision and instruction, to draw a
The decree of the Chancellor must be reversed, and this court, proceeding to render the proper decree, doth order, adjudge and decree, that the conveyance executed by Ann Campbell to the appellee, Lanier, of date July 20, 1872, attested by Gr. W. Moore and T. J. Kennedy, ancl acknowledged before T. J. Kennedy as notary public of Chambers county, is null and void. And within ten days after notice of this decree, to him or his solicitor of record, the appellee Lanier will surrender said deed • to the register of the Court of Chancery, who will cancel the same.
It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that within ten days after this decree, the said .appellee Lanier surrender to the appellant possession of the lands described in said conveyance, and on his failure or refusal so to do, the register, on the request of the appellant, will issue a writ of assistance, directed to the sheriff of Chambers county, commanding him to place the appellant in possession of said lands. If the appellee, or any tenant of his, has a crop growing on said premises, the execution of said writ of possession may be stayed, on the execution of a bond payable to the appellee, with two good and sufficient sureties, for the payment of the rent of the present year.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that it be referred to the register to take and state an account against the appellee, Lanier, of the rents and profits of said lands, annually, from the 5th day of April, 1870, to the time possession may be surrendered to the appellant, computing interest on such rents from the expiration of each year, first crediting the appellee with all taxes on said lands he may have paid, and with the value of all necessary repairs and
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that said register take and state an account of all personal property and its value, of all choses in action, and of all moneys the appellee may have received under said conveyance, or as agent for the intestate, or from, or as the agent of James Campbell, in his life. That said appellee be charged with the value of all such property, other than choses in action and money, at the time it was received by him; and with all such of the choses in action as he may have collected, or which he may have failed to collect from a want of diligence, and with all moneys owing by him to the intestate, or to said James Campbell in his life, and that interest be computed on the value of said personal property, from the time it was received, and on such choses in action from the time of their collection, and on the moneys from the time they may have been received; and will allow him a credit for all moneys necessarily expended for said Ann Campbell, with interest from the time they may have been paid out; then ascertaining the balance. In executing the reference the register may use the evidence on file and may receive such other legal evidence as the parties may introduce. And the register will report his action, under this decree, to the Chancellor for confirmation. The appellee, Lanier, must pay the costs of this appeal in this court, and the costs of the Court of Chancery.
I agree fully with the Chief Justice in all he has said of the legal principles which govern this case. Both the original and amended bills are very full, and each has attached to it interrogatories that are full and exhaustive, and cover every phase of the transaction, as charged. Each calls for an answer from Lanier under oath, both as to the charging parts of the bills and to the interrogatories. The answers are very full, responding to every material averment and inquiry, and emphatically negative every charge or semblance of fraud, circumvention, and undue influence. If the answers be true, there is no ground on which the deed should be set aside. According to them, a more complete case of voluntary conveyance was never presented in a court of justice. The complainant had the option of making Lanier a witness, by calling for a sworn answer, and he chose to exercise it. Doing so, he has expressed confidence in him, and has thus placed himself at the disadvantage of being required to overcome the denials in the answer by the testimony of two witnesses, or one with corroboration. — 1
It is objected, however, that Mrs. Campbell first appointed Hill to be her agent, and very soon afterwards displaced him, when she appointed Lanier in his stead. There is much proof in the record of Mr. Campbell’s distrust of Hill’s solvency and trustworthiness, although there is some the other way. The record contains proof that Hill was embarrassed, and there is no attempt to prove the contrary. If it be objected that Lanier betrayed indecent haste in accepting the agency of Mrs. Campbell’s business so soon after the death of her husband, the answer is that Hill exhibited still greater haste; for he was appointed several days before Lanier was. I do not think there is any thing in this objection ; for Mrs. Campbell needed the services of an agent immediately.
It is objected that the record fails to show that Lanier executed the agreement, binding himself to support Mrs. Campbell during her life. If this question was mooted in the court below, the record does not inform us of it. But there are other answers to this objection. I do not understand it to be denied by the Chief Justice that Mrs. Campbell was of sound mind, capable of making a binding contract, and it follows that this contract can not be annulled on the ground of her mental imbecility. The only subject of inquiry is, did Lanier abuse the trust and confidence she reposed in him ? And did he execute his part of the mutual agreement? The first branch of this inquiry is answered above. In