54 Mo. 481 | Mo. | 1874
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question in this case is the sufficiency of a sheriff’s deed. The deed was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and being excluded by the court, he took a non-suit with leave to move to set it aside. It is useless to set out the petition or the answers, as nothing was determined in regard to the merits of the case, and the plaintiff, having purchased from the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale, evidently had no case, if the deed of the sheriff to his grantor was invalid. The only matter therefore to.be decided is the validity of this deed, which is as follows:
“To all whom these presents shall come, I, Jacob A. Price, as sheriff of Lafayette county, send greeting : Know ye, that whereas Coleman Jeffries and Sarah A. Jeffries on the 9th day of November, 1860, recovered a judgment against Alfred Stevenson, William S. Renick and James S. Reeves, in the Circuit Court of Saline county, Missouri, for the sum of $956.04 for debt and damages and also for costs, and that whereas William H. Trigg, on the eighth day of November, 1860, recovered a judgment against W. S. Reniek, JohnD. Reeves, Alfred Stevenson and James T. Reeves in the Circuit Court of Saline county, Missouri, for the sum of $1,671.08, for debt and damages and also for costs, and whereas- heretofore certain writs of execution were issued from the Clerk’s office of said county aforesaid, one in favor of Coleman Jeffries and Sarah A. Jeffries, and against Alfred Stevenson, W. S. Renick-and
As no objection is made to the remaining portion of this deed, it is unnecessary to insert it.
There are the usual statements of the time and place of sale, the advertisement, notice etc.
There are no objections in this case to the description of the property, nor to the statement concerning the time, place and manner of the sale.
The two principal objections to the deed are: First, that the judgments, on which the original execution issued, are not stated, or rather that the orignal executions are not connected with any judgment at all, and second; that the dates of the original executions are not given, and therefore it cannot be seen whether they were valid, subsisting executions.
The first objection is literally sustained. The sheriff does not state that the executions he recites were on the judgments he recites; but it is very clear that he means this, for the names of the parties to-the judgments and executions are identical. It is not stated, that the executions were on these judgments in so many words, but it was clearly inferrable, and the judgments are set out and the parties to them and their date, and the amount of the judgments.
The omission to state, that the executions were on the judgments recited, could mislead no one, and is not therefore regarded as fatal to the deed.
The failure of the sheriff, to state in his deed the date of the executions recited, is a more serious objection. If the sale had been made under such executions, it would have been fatal. But in this case the sale was not made under the executions whose date is not given. The sale was under a venditioni ex-ponas.> the date of which is given; but if the executions, on which the venditioni exponas was based, might have expired, the sale of course would be void.
But the levies made on the original executions were made in November, 1860, and January, 1861, and the date of the judgments show, that such levies could not have been on executions that had expired. The judgments were obtained in
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.
