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Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. WaddellWachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Mar 18, 1953
101
Versions:
BaeNHill, J.

Whether this action was open for a motion for an account and settlement of testator’s estate under G.S. 28-165 is not presented for decision. There was no objection or exception to the procedure adoptеd by the court below and, in any event, the material questions at issue were presented by the appeal from the сlerk.

The objections and exceptions of appellant to the final account of plaintiff executоr before the clerk and in the court below challenge both the reasonableness of the amount of commissions allowed plaintiff and the basis upon which the commissions were allowed. These exceptions raise two material questions for the clerk, in the first instance, and the judge, on appeal, to decide, to wit: (1) What is the meaning of the wоrd “receipts” as used in Item Sixteen of the will limiting the amount of commissions to be paid the executor, and (2) what amount should be paid to plaintiff in compensation for its services in settling the estate of the testator ?

A testator may stipulate in his will the compensation to be paid the person appointed executor with power ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍to settle his estate. When this is done the provisions of the will are binding on all interested parties, Lightner v. Boone, 221 N.C. 78, 19 S.E. 2d 144. But an executor has no right to fix and determine the compensation to be received by him. In the absence of a provision in the will fixing the compensation of the executor, it is the prerogative of the clerk of the Superior Court, acting as probate judge, to make an allowance to an executor, by way of commissions, for services rendered in the settlement of the estate committed to his care, in no event, however, to exceed 5% of receipts and disbursements. And in determining the аmount to be allowed, the clerk must “consider the time, responsibility, trouble and skill involved in the management of the estate.” G.S. 28-170; Grant v. Reese, 94 N.C. 720; Bank v. Bank, 126 N.C. 531; In re Hege, 205 N.C. 625, 172 S.E. 345.

Here the will does not fix or purport to fix the compensation to be paid testator’s executor as cоmpensation for services in settling his estate. It merely fixes the maximum percentage on receipts and disbursements аt 2l/2%. It was, therefore, the duty of the clerk to make an allowance to plaintiff for services rendered as exеcutor, subject to the maximum limitation stipulated in the will rather than the maximum fixed by statute. G.S. 28-170; Lightner v. Boone, supra.

But in performing this duty it was necessary for the сlerk to consider, determine, and abide by the meaning of the word “receipts” as used by the testator in Item SixteeN of his will.

A will, as to its dispositive provisions, speaks as of the date of the death of the testator. But when the meaning of any pаrt of a will is the subject of controversy, it is the prerogative of the court to construe the contested provision and declare ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍the true meaning thereof. And in construing a will, or any part thereof, the discovery of the intent of the testator, as expressed in his will, is the dominant and controlling objective, for the intent of the testator, as so expressed, is his will. Woodard v. Clark, 234 N.C. 215, 66 S.E. 2d 888; Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E. 2d 578, and cases cited.

In ascertaining the intent of the testator, the will is to be considered in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time the will was made. Scales v. Barringer, 192 N.C. 94, 133 S.E. 410; Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N.C. 321, 186 S.E. 356; Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36 S.E. 2d 17; In re Will of Johnson, 233 N.C. 570, 65 S.E. 2d 12.

“. . . thе court should place itself as nearly as practicable in the position of the testator ... at the time of the éxecution of the will.” In re Will of Johnson, supra. And ordinarily, words used in a will are to be construed as having the ordinary, natural, and customary meaning given thеm at the time of their use, unless it clearly appears that they were used in some other sense. Williams v. McPherson, 216 N.C. 565, 5 S.E. 2d 830; Bank v. Phillips, 235 N.C. 494, 70 S.E. 2d 509; Sharpe v. Isley, 219 N.C. 753, 14 S.E. 2d 814; In re Will of Johnson, supra. If words at the time of thеir use had a well-known legal or technical meaning, they are ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍to be so construed unless the will itself discloses that anоther meaning was intended. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 225 N.C. 375, 35 S.E. 2d 231; Henry v. Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66 S.E. 2d 693. See also 2 Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators, 6th Ed., 984, 1094; 2 Page Wills, Lifetime Ed., 815-16, 894, 898.

Usually, nothing else appеaring, it is presumed that the judge found facts sufficient to support the judgment entered, but that rule has no application hеre, for it is apparent from an examination of the record before us that both the clerk and the judge allowed compensation to plaintiff upon the assumption the will fixes the rate of compensation and directs that 2%% bе allowed on the total value of all bonds, stocks, cash, and other personal property received by the executor. The compensation allowed is so estimated “as per will.” Thus they acted under an erroneous сonception of the applicable law.

The appellant is entitled to have the clerk in good faith fix the compensation to be allowed plaintiff as provided in G.S. 28-170. In so doing the clerk is limited to a maximum of 2%% of the total receipts ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍and disbursements. In determining this question he must of necessity construe the meaning of the word “receipts” as used in the will. Frоm his findings and conclusions any interested party may appeal. Bank v. Bank, supra.

“Why doesn’t this Court perforin this judicial function and be done with it ? Simрly because this Court possesses no original jurisdiction in sucb matters. Its duty is to review tbe decisions of tbe Superior Courts of thе State.” Woodard v. Clark, supra. Furthermore, the allowance of commissions, by way of compensation, to an executor requires tbе exercise of judicial discretion and judgment by tbe clerk of tbe-Superior Court. It is be wbo bas original jurisdiction. If any interested party conceives tbat tbe allowance made by bim is either inadequate or excessive, or is made under аn erroneous conception of tbe law, be may appeal. Bank v. Bank, supra.

For tbe reasons stated tbe judgment enterеd is vacated. Tbe court below is directed to remand tbe appeal from tbe clerk to tbe end tbat be may аllow plaintiff compensation for its services in accord with this opinion. In tbe meantime, this cause will remain on tbe dоcket for further proceedings after final judgment by tbe clerk fixing tbe compensation of plaintiff and approving its final account.

Error and remanded.

DevtN, 0. J., took no part in tbe consideration ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍or decision of this case.

Case Details

Case Name: Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Mar 18, 1953
Citations: 237 N.C. 342; 75 S.E.2d 151; 1953 N.C. LEXIS 648; 101
Docket Number: 101
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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    Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 237 N.C. 342