160 Ind. 329 | Ind. | 1903
This action was instituted by appellee to enjoin appellant railroad company from entering upon and enclosing with a fence a strip of land of about thirteen acres situated in Wabash county, Indiana, near to appellant’s right of way. The trial court upon the verified petition granted a temporary injunction restraining appellant, together with its servants and' employes, from trespassing upon or interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the described real estate. Issues were joined between the parties on the complaint and answer, and on the final hearing the court found in favor of the plaintiff, and awarded him a perpetual injunction, from which decree or judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The errors assigned and relied upon for a reversal relate to overruling the demurrer to the complaint, and in denying a motion for a new trial.
Counsel for appellant argue that the judgment below should be reversed upon the grounds: (1) Insufficiency of the complaint on demurrer; (2) that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding awarding a perpetual injunction, for the reason that it appears that appellant only threatened to commit a mere trespass upon the land in question, for which appellee would have an adequate remedy at law.
The complaint is in one paragraph, and therein it' is alleged that the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the described premises; that he and his grantors have been in the open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land in dispute, exercising acts of ownership thereover, for more than twenty years last past. The complaint then charges: “That said defendant company is threatening to and is about to enclose said tract of ground, commencing on the west line of said fractional quarter section, on the north line of the defendant’s land, six rods from its right of way, thence running eastwardly 1,300 feet with the right of way of said company, and thirty feet wide, in a northerly and
The complaint only professes to state a cause of action for an injunction, and if the facts therein averred are not sufficient to entitle plaintiff to'such relief, it is certainly insufficient for any other purpose. It is a well settled proposition that not every trespass will entitle the injured party to relief by the extraordinary remedy of injunction, for the rule is elementary and where there is a complete or ade>quate remedy at law for the wrong complained of, a court of equity will not interpose, but will leave the complainant to seek relief through the proper or appropriate legal remedy. Therefore, by virtue of this rule, an action for an injunction can not be successfully maintained to.restrain or prevent the commission of a mere trespass, unless it is made to appear that the injury apprehended therefrom will be great or irreparable, and consequently can not be adequately compensated in an action for damages against the tres
Section 1162 Burns 1901 of our statutory law pertaining to injunctions authorizes the granting of an injunction where it is made to appear that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and that such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission of some act, the commission or continuance of which would produce great injury to the plaintiff. The construction placed upon this statute by the decisions of this court is that it does not warrant an injunction in cases, where the commission of the act' can be readily and fully compensated in damages, and where there are no reasons to apprehend a multiplicity of suits on account of the wrong as threatened. Clark v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co., 44 Ind. 248; Indianapolis Rolling Mill Co. v. City of Indianapolis, supra; Whitlock v. Consumers Gas Trust Co., 127 Ind. 62.
Of course, the right to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity must depend upon the peculiar or particular facts in each case, and one of the questions to be decided is whether the legal remedy under the particular circumstances of the case is adequate, or, in other words, is such remedy as practicable and efficient to promote the interests of justice and its prompt administration as is the remedy in equity ? Denny v. Denny, 113 Ind. 22; Champ v. Kendrick, 130 Ind. 549; Allen v. Winstandly, 135 Ind. 105; Xenia Real Estate Co. v. Macy, 147 Ind. 568.
The authorities affirm that the inadequacy of the legal remedy is the very foundation or indispensable prerequisite for the interposition of a court of equity, for the plain or evident reason that' inasmuch as the law has provided a com; píete or adequate remedy for the redress of the particular
By the principles to which we have referred, so far as they are applicable, the sufficiency of the facts in this case may be tested, in order to determine whether appellee is entitled to the extraordinary remedy which he seeks. The complaint, as previously shown, discloses that the threat
In the construction of a pleading the rule is well settled that no facts will be presumed to exist in favor of the pleader which have not been averred or alleged, as it may be presumed that a party’s pleading is as strong in his favor as the facts will warrant. The complaint, when accorded the full force and effect of the facts therein properly alleged, certainly shows that nothing beyond a mere trespass is threatened to be committed upon the premises in controversy. The mere charge is made that if such trespass is not prevented by the court appellee will suffer irreparable damage; but, aside from this general or bare aver
There is no averment in the complaint of the insolvency of the defendant, nor is such fact established by the evidence. While it is true that the insolvency of a trespasser is not, alone, sufficient to give a court of chancery jurisdiction to enjoin his tortious acts in a case where there is an absence of other necessary facts, still insolvency is an important element or factor in determining the question of the inadequacy of the relief afforded hy an action at law, or, in other words it affords an additional reason to justify a court of equity to interfere, as the inability of the wrongdoer to
As appellee, in his prayer for relief, among other things, asks that his title he quieted against the defendant, it would seem, therefore, that the purpose of this action is to settle a disputed question of title between the parties. If appellant is asserting or claiming any unfounded title to the premises in question, adverse to appellee, the law furnishes an appropriate and adequate remedy to settle and determine such controversy. On the trial it was, by agreement between the parties, admitted that the predecessor of appellant became the legal owner of the strip of ground in dispute in 1854, and that appellant is still the legal owner thereof, unless its title has been devested by adverse possession on the part of appellee. The greater portion of the evidence introduced by appellee upon the trial was to establish a title to the land in him, as against appellant, by twenty years of adverse possession. The evidence shows that, a portion of the ground in controversy had formerly been covered by a gravel-pit which appellant had used for the purpose of obtaining gravel, but this gravel-pit, as it appears, had not been used for a number of years prior to the beginning of this action. The evidence of appellee further discloses that' the land is of little value for any purpose whatever; that all that appellant did previous to the beginning of this action was to cause a survey to be made of the land, and to put down some small stakes, the latter being placed from 100 to 300 feet apart, marking the boundaries of the strip of land. The most of these stakes had been plowed up by appellee. Some of appellant’s employes said they were going to build a fence, and did construct one on another piece of ground, not the property, however, of appellee. This fence was constructed to a point within 200 feet of the strip of land in question. Ho fence posts were placed on the ground in dispute; nor did
We conclude that the complaint is not sufficient on demurrer, and that the court erred in awarding a perpetual injunction upon the evidence given in the case. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded to the lower court, with instructions to grant appellant a new trial, and to sustain the demurrer to the complaint.