In
Watts v. Watts,
In this case, Dale E. Bower and Donald Waage were nonmarital cohabitants for about eight years.
In 1981, Bower moved to Sheboygan, Wisconsin to live with Waage. The parties had the following arrangement. Waage paid for the apartment rent, utilities and groceries for the first two years of their cohabitation. 1 Bower bought groceries during the other years. For one year while Bower was unemployed, Waage paid for her health insurance premiums. Bower testified that she did all the laundry, ironing, mending and the cleaning of the apartment they shared and, at a cottage owned by Waage, that she cleaned, cooked for and entertained his children and weekend guests. Waage disagreed and testified that they evenly split the cooking and cleaning duties at the apartment and the cottage and that each was responsible for his or her own laundry and ironing.
Bower testified that throughout most of their relationship, she hoped and believed they would eventually get married and there was discussion between them regarding marriage. They were never engaged, but at one point Waage purchased a diamond engagement ring and wedding band.
In 1989, Bower obtained employment as an Assistant Vice Chancellor for the University of Wisconsin at Racine and consequently moved to Racine. They continued to see each other on weekends for about two more years until Bower broke off the relationship, taking the rings with her.
Waage sued Bower for conversion of the rings. Bower counterclaimed that Waage told her she would "share in the appreciation of [his] wealth, [and she therefore] provided, without just compensation, services and benefits . . .."At trial, Bower submitted a calculation of the value of her domestic services to Waage at the apartment at the rate of $6 per hour or $3000 per year for eight years, for a total amount of about $25,000.
The trial court dismissed Bower's counterclaim on implied and express contract theories, but submitted verdict questions to the jury as to whether Waage was unjustly enriched by Bower's efforts. 2 The jury found that Waage was unjustly enriched and that Bower's damages were $25,000.
In
Watts,
our supreme court considered the sufficiency of a complaint to state an unjust enrichment claim.
3
Watts
involved a dispute between Sue Ann Evans Watts and James Watts over their respective interests in property accumulated during their
As part of Sue Ann's unjust enrichment claim, she alleged that James accepted and retained the benefit of property and services she provided knowing that she expected to share equally in the wealth accumulated during their relationship and that under those circum-' stances it was unfair that he retain all the accumulated assets. The supreme court concluded that the facts alleged were sufficient to state a claim for recovery based upon unjust enrichment. It held "that unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon unjust enrichment following the termination of their relationships where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the property acquired through the efforts of both."
Id.
at 532-33,
Thus, the holding of
Watts
is that in a nonmarital cohabitation situation, to recover for unjust enrichment, three conditions must be present: (1) an
Instead, Bower's case to the jury was that Waage retained a benefit because of her uncompensated housekeeping efforts made in contemplation of marriage. Under
Watts,
her case must fail. Bower presented absolutely no evidence of assets accumulated during their relationship. Without such evidence, we read her case to be that any kind of "benefit" conferred is a fait accompli to an unjust enrichment claim. However, that is not the holding of
Watts.
While Waage no doubt "benefited" from Bower's housekeeping services, that is not the type of "benefit" contemplated by the
Watts
court.
Watts
does not recognize recompense for housekeeping or other services unless the services are linked to an accumulation of wealth or assets during the relationship.
4
See id.
at 532-33, 405 N.W.2d at
If we were to agree with Bower's theory in this case, we might functionally be recreating the former cause of action for breach of promise to marry. In 1959, our legislature abolished the cause of action for damages based on emotional harm caused by the breach.
See
§ 768.01,Stats.;
Brown v. Thomas,
Bower also argues that Waage was unjustly enriched because she gave up job opportunities to live in Sheboygan with him. We fail to see how any foregone opportunities are relevant to the standard set forth in
Watts
— whether Waage retained "an unreasonable amount of the property" because of their joint efforts.
See Watts,
By the Court. — Judgment reversed.
Notes
During that time, Bower was enrolled in a doctoral program and attending classes at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Until the completion of her degree in 1983, she spent part of the week in Madison where she rented a room and the remainder of the week in Sheboygan where she and Waage shared an apartment. After getting her degree, Bower lived in Sheboygan full-time and worked for the University of Wisconsin Center in Sheboygan.
On Waage's claim, the trial court submitted questions to the jury as to whether Bower converted the rings. The jury's verdict returned the rings to Waage; Bower does not appeal this determination.
Unjust enrichment is based upon proof of three elements: "(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances making it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit."
Watts v. Watts,
Additional issues before the
Watts
court were whether the plaintiff stated legally cognizable claims under four other legal theories.
Id.
at 510-11,
This appeal does not present the issue of whether Bower and Waage had an express or implied contract for provision of housekeeping services. The trial court, we think properly, dismissed Bower's counterclaim on implied and express contract theories. There was no evidence that Waage accepted Bower's services with the knowledge that she expected to share assets. In fact, the testimony was that Bower kept records of their finances and that the parties settled up from time to time. Further, Bower's testimony was that in exchange for Waage paying for rent and utilities, she would clean, cook and buy groceries — that the arrangement was a "trade-off." She also testified, "I think we both probably contributed and we both probably gained from that."
Bower also contends that the parties' personal income tax returns admitted into evidence demonstrate that Waage enjoyed more financial growth during the period they lived together than she enjoyed. However, without evidence that Bower's contributions enhanced this alleged financial growth, we hold that the tax returns are not germane to Bower's unjust enrichment claim.
