{¶ 2} This case involves a car accident that occurred on November 25, 2000. Richard Fletcher (Fletcher) was driving a truck owned by Joseрh Parr Sr. that had a trailer attached to it, carrying another vehicle. Joseph Parr Jr. (Parr) and Elizabeth Sikora were passengers in the truck. As Fletcher was driving, rain and heavy wind caused the trailer to fishtail. Fletcher lost control of the vehicle; it crossed the center line and came to a stop completely blocking the opposite northbound lane. Vicki Hartman (Hartman), driving northbound, collided with the truck.
{¶ 3} On August 17, 2001, Hartman filed suit against Fletcher for her injuries and damages she sustained. Western Reserve Group (WRG) insured the owner of the vehicle that Fletcher was driving, and under the terms of the insurance policy, WRG represented Fletcher in the law suit. WRG ended up settling Hartman's claims by paying her $53,500. WRG obtained a release from Hartman of all claims against itself, Fletcher and Parr. On December 26, 2001, Hartman's lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice.
{¶ 4} Subsequently, on November 2, 2002, WRG paid $23,500 to Parr for damages, and again obtained a release. On November 22, 2002, WRG filed a contribution/subrogation action against Hartman. WRG sought to recover some of the damages it had paid to Parr. WRG alleged that Hartman was jointly liable and asserted joint liability as an affirmative defense in Hartman's suit against Fletcher. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. By judgment entry dated January 26, 2004, the trial court granted Hartman's motion for summary judgment. It found that "[WRG's] claims [were] barred by the doctrine of res judicata and equitable estoppel." WRG appeals, asserting one assignment of error for our review.1
{¶ 5} In its first and only assignment of error, WRG claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hartman. Specifically, it claims that it is entitled to contribution under the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code and maintains that res judicata and equitable estoppel do not bar its claims. We agree.
{¶ 6} We begin by nоting that appellate courts consider an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of review.Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996),
{¶ 7} Summary judgment is proper under Civ.R. 56 when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can only rеach one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977),
{¶ 8} In this case, we find summary judgment was improperly granted. We do not find that Hartman is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Contribution
{¶ 9} In this action, WRG is trying tо collect contribution from Hartman for Parr's injuries. WRG alleges that Hartman was jointly liable for Parr's injuries, and thus is subject to a claim for contribution. R.C.
[a] liability insurer that by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tоrtfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's proportionate shаre of the common liability."
WRG, a liability insurer, paid Parr on behalf of Fletcher, and thus is subrogated to Fletcher's right to contribution from Hartman.
{¶ 10} The parties to this appeal agree that both Fletcher and Hartmаn contributed to Parr's injuries. R.C.
{¶ 11} Contrary to Hartman's assertions, a claim for contribution may be enforced against a joint tortfeasor in a separate action. R.C.
"`[I]t is clear from the provisions of [R.C.
Therefore, WRG is entitled to рursue its claim for contribution in a separate action after Parr released Hartman from further liability.
Claim/Issue Preclusion
{¶ 12} Having established that WRG is subrogated to Fletcher's right to pursue contribution from Hartman, that WRG is entitled to pursue сontribution since it paid Parr's claim in full and obtained a release, and that contribution may be enforced in a separate action, the issue becomes what effect Hartman's release and hеr previously settled case have on Fletcher's right to recover contribution from her.
{¶ 13} In order for WRG to collect in contribution from Hartman, it must be determined what percentage of Parr's damages she was responsible for. Hartman maintains that the liability issues between herself and Fletcher were already litigated, and thus, WRG is estopped from relitigating the same issues of liability. Hartman claims that the doctrines of res judiсata and collateral estoppel prevent WRG from pursuing claims against her for contribution. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is meant to bar the relitigation of claims. Ft. Frye Teachers Assn. v. StateEmp. Relations Bd. (1998),
"if an issue of fact or law actually is litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, such determination being essential to that judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977),
{¶ 14} "Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been `аctually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.'" Krahn v. Kinney (1989),
{¶ 15} In order to successfully assert collateral estoppel, Hartman would need to prove that the issue of her negligence was: "(1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action." Thompson v. Wing (1994),
{¶ 16} WRG is in privity with Fletcher, who was a party to the prior action. See Steigerwalt (1970),
{¶ 17} In Teagle v. Lint (Apr. 15, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 18425 at 6-7, this court found that collateral estoppel does not apply to bar the relitigation of an issue that was not resolved in the prior action. In Teagle, we held that if the issue was not actually and directly litigated in a prior action because the litigation was terminated by a settlement and "[t]he record does not contain any infоrmation concerning the settlement or what, if any, conclusion was reached[,]" that collateral estoppel would not apply to bar the issue from relitigation. Id. at 7.
{¶ 18} In this case, we have no evidence that the issue of Hartman's negligence was actually litigated or that any conclusion was reached on the issue of her negligence. Therefore, we find that Hartman has not presented enough еvidence to support collateral estoppel at this point, and thus, summary judgment was improperly granted.
{¶ 19} As stated above, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials that show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, reasonable minds could only conclude in favor of the moving party. Dresher v. Burt
(1996),
{¶ 20} In light of the issues raised above, it cannot be said that reаsonable minds could view the issues presented and come to one conclusion against the non-moving party. Therefore, summary judgment was not properly granted. WRG's assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 21} We sustain WRG's assignment of error, reverse the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandatе, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
Exceptions.
Carr, P.J. Boyle, J. concur