*1 [DCFS], comply with “must with cooperate they that the conditions and correct plans, of the service terms care, or risk termination child to be require (705 5(3), 21(1), rights” their parental 405/1 — 2— 22(6) 1998)). (West Moreover, for authorita the need 2— are no because there guidance is further diminished tive 2d at 365-66. 186 Ill. conflicting precedents. Walgreen, I the Chief Justice’s concern also share justify issue it uses to majority very fails address the mootness public exception interest invoking (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, at doctrine. J.). Freeman, Instead, majority employs joined by analysis, apply due purporting harmless error while voluntary analysis. Since T.F. surrendered his process longer exists, rights, process this due issue no parental grant making impossible party for this court to either relief. effectual
Accordingly, appeal this should be dismissed as moot. (No. 94073.
THAD v. THE DEPART- VUAGNIAUX, Appellee, al., OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION et
MENT Appellants. 20,
Opinion Rehearing November denied filed 2003. January 2004. *4 GARMAN, JJ., C.J., joined by FREEMAN McMORROW dissenting. General, Attorneys Madigan, and Lisa Ryan E. James *5 (Joel Springfield Gary of D. Bertocchi Feinerman, and Attorney General, Racette, Solicitors and Paul Assistant Chicago, counsel), appellants. General, of of for Vuagniaux, appellee. L. Edwardsville, Earl for opinion JUSTICE RARICKdelivered the of the court: Vuagniaux, chiropractic physi Dr. Thad a licensed reprimanded by Department cian, was the of Professional (the Regulation Department) $2,500 and fined sum of violating advertising provisions set forth in sec (225 tion 26 of the Medical Practice Act (West 1998)). On administrative review of the 60/26 Department’s decision, the circuit court of Madison County doing, reversed. In so found various sections including Act, the Medical Practice section 26’s advertis ing restrictions, to be The unconstitutional void. Department appealed. judg Because the circuit court’s invalid, ment held statutes of the State of Illinois to be appeal directly the 302(a). was taken 2d our court. 134 Ill. R. part, follow,
For affirm in reasons we part proceedings. in reverse and remand for further Although in voluminous, this record case necessary disposition straightforward. facts Vuagniaux graduated Logan Chiropractic Thad from Col- lege chiropractor by in 1993 and was licensed as a Vuagniaux times, State of Illinois in At all 1994. relevant practice County, Illinois, has maintained a in Madison metropolitan Missouri, located in the Louis, St. area. years receiving license, Two after his published practice a series of for his in advertisements Post-Dispatch. advertisements, the St. Louis which throughout appeared paper ran in of the editions ad ail- circulated Illinois. Each addressed different migraine headaches, ment. The ailments discussed were fibromyalgia, carpal syndrome, asthma, tunnel Crohn’s syndrome, learning disorders, bowel Disease/irritable and vertebral subluxa- whiplash Dysfunction,” “TMJ Disease/vertigo. tions, and Meniere’s symptoms the causes and ads described Vuagniaux’s each of them and linked foregoing conditions that a The ads stated with the brain stem. interference or corrects Chiropractic” procedure “Specific termed stem, enabling suffer- to the removes interference brain their “fullest normal function achieve ers to recover drugs surgery.” or health without use potential publicized employed “Specific ads that he Vuagniaux’s fact, In the first two ads practice. his Chiropractic” Brain only he one of two “Certified represented that area. metropolitan in the St. Louis Specialists” Stem *6 included, his the notation that photo, Those ads under and an of- Specialist” he is a “Kale Certified Brain Stem Vuag- Council.” ficer of the “Kale International Research certi- being third ad deleted the references to his niaux’s simply and indicated that he was one specialist fied or in only two the St. Louis “Specific Chiropractors” of ad, appeared area. The same claim the fourth but was the fifth ads. subsequent deleted from and all ads elicited Vuagniaux’s complaints Publication matter, investigating from other After chiropractors. disciplinary proceedings against initiated Practice Vuagniaux pursuant to section of the Medical (225 (West 1998)). The Depart- Act of 1987 ILCS 60/22 counts, three asked complaint, ment’s which contained revoked, or suspended, license be Vuagniaux’s that his ads violated disciplined grounds otherwise on the governing Practice Act provisions the Medical advertising. licensed under the Medical
Advertising by persons subject Act is to section 26 of statute Malpractice (West 1998)). (225 permits Section ILCS 60/26 availability professional of their licensees to advertise the where public premises in the media or on the services the services are rendered. however, The statute provides, any such advertising is limited to certain types information. may Information that published under the statute includes the “name, title, licensee’s office (225 hours, telephone address and number” ILCS 60/ 26(a) (West 1998)); his customary “usual and fees for (225 60/26(c) (West professional routine services” ILCS 1998)); specialization, his “areas of including appropriate board certification or limitation professional practice” (225 60/26(b) (West ILCS 1998)); announcement of the of, “opening change of, from, absence or return to busi- (225 60/26(d) (West ness” ILCS 1998)); announcement of (225 60/26(e) changes in professional licensed staff ILCS (West 1998)); and issuance of appointment business or (225 (West 60/26(1) 1998)). cards I III Counts of the Department’s complaint both charged violations of foregoing provisions. III Count made a general allegation that Vuagniaux’s ads all contravened the Medical Practice Act they because “not limited in the information provided to the informa- permitted tion I [section 26].” Count specifi- focused cally the ads representing Vuagniaux as a “Certified Brain Stem Specialist” and a “Kale Certified Brain Stem Specialist.” According to the Department, those ads violated the Act the specialties because identified in the ad were not In the legitimate. words of the complaint, “[t]here is no appropriate board certification as a Certi- fied Brain Stem Specialist or a Kale Certified Brain Stem *7 Specialist in Chiropractic medicine.”
In limiting addition to types information a may licensee in advertising, include his section 26 of the Medical Practice Act using also forbids a licensee from in advertising “false, statements his that contain *** fraudulent, or deceptive misleading material or state- ments which play upon vanity public.” or fears of the (West 1998). 225 ILCS II Department’s Count of the 60/26 alleged on that It complaint premised prohibition. treatment of Vuagniaux’s chiropractic that claims that asthma, disease, Meniere’s the brain stem will treat conditions mentioned in learning disorders and the other misleading play ads “are or and deceptive various of the upon public.” the fears the Department
After served with its sought declaratory administrative complaint, Vuagniaux injunctive and relief from the circuit court of Madison County to prevent disciplinary proceedings against him going from forward. Vuagniaux’s complaint, as amended, variety regarding raised a of issues the fair- and constitutionality process by ness which chiropractors subject discipline Illinois are to and the judged. standards which their conduct is Among (1) claims he made subjecting chiropractors were that to regulation by the Department’s Disciplinary Medical Board, which a single chiroprac- statute includes but tor among voting members, its seven denies chiroprac- (2) tors their rights process equal protection, due and advertising provisions in section 26 of the Medi- cal Practice Act are uncertain and and the vague, Depart- ment has failed to enact standards for assessing whether (3) provisions violated, those have been that the Depart- ment has failed to adopt meaningful discovery, rules of (4) the Department should not be allowed limit the location evidentiary hearings in disciplinary matters to Chicago Springfield. action,
At the same time he pursued Vuag- this civil vigorously niaux in the developments contested various Department’s disciplinary against Among action him.
actions he took of Dr. Lacy was move for exclusion Cook, the sole chiropractic member the Medical Board, Disciplinary participation from further his case. Vuagniaux based that motion on claims that Cook would him prejudiced against chiropractic and the theories *8 Although judge
he followed. the administrative law as- signed prejudice by to the Cook, case found no actual judge granted Vuagniaux’s administrative law motion appearance prejudice. and excluded Cook to avoid the Depart- case, Once Cook was excluded from the appointment “Special Chiropractor” ment moved for of a Disciplinary to the Medical Board so the Board chiropractic would include a member when considered Vuagniaux’s judge case. The administrative law referred the motion to the Board for its consideration. The Board granted Roger Pope, the motion and named Dr. a doctor chiropractic, place to serve in on the for Cook’s Board purposes proceedings. of these
Vuagniaux objections Pope’s appointment raised to disciplinary proceeding both the and the civil action. The principle Vuagniaux’s objection for basis was that the appointment Act, Board’s violated the Medical Practice specifies Disciplinary which that members of the Medical appointed by by Board are “to be the Governor and with 60/7(A) the advice and of the consent Senate.” 225 ILCS (West 1998).Vuagniaux appoint- further claimed that the infringe right ment would on his to confront and cross- examine witnesses.
Vuagniaux’s objection Pope’s to on the inclusion Board went unheeded. A motion he filed in the adminis- proceeding judgment pleadings in or, trative on the alternative, dismiss, was denied. then injunction preliminary moved for a in his action. civil denied, When motion was also an administrative hearing Department’s disciplinary complaint on the hearing place convened. The during took over a series dates hearing, the summer of In the 1998. course judge Department the administrative law allowed the complaint allegations II delete from count pertaining of its whiplash and vertebral subluxations. Experts Vuag- sides, witnesses were called both niaux testified on his own behalf. judge law the administrative
Following hearing, in accordance findings and recommendations issued her (225 Practice Act 35 of the Medical with section 1998)). (West judge con- administrative law 60/35 counts proved had all three cluded that evidence convincing clear and complaint its *9 Board that Disciplinary to the Medical recommended $2,500. fined The Medical the sum Vuagniaux be law Board the administrative Disciplinary adopted It also judge’s of fact and conclusions of law. findings judge’s agreed with the administrative law recommenda- $2,500. Vuagniaux tion be fined Unlike the adminis- that however, the Board that the judge, trative law believed should include a imposed Vuagniaux sanctions also reprimand. recommendation, made the Board’s with members, including specially ap- concurrence five pointed chiropractor, adopted by Depart- was Pope, In an signed by director. the director and ment’s order 16, 1998, Department dated December reprimanded $2,500 him Vuagniaux’s license and ordered a pay fine. sought
Vuagniaux administrative review of the Department’s decision to article III of the Code pursuant (the Law) (735 Procedure Civil Administrative Review (West 1998)) in seq. et the circuit court of 5/3 —101 motion, On County. Vuagniaux’s the circuit Madison Vuag- court that with subsequently consolidated action injunctive for and relief and al- declaratory niaux’s suit amendments to his lowed make various injunctive Following for complaint declaratory and relief. amendments, summary for Department those moved declaratory judgment against Vuagniaux on his suit for a judgment injunction. motion, and grounds As its where, here, Department argued as the Administra- that tive applicable provides remedy, Review Law is may grievance through a party’s circuit court redress any other type of action. The circuit court found this argument meritorious, to be granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Vuag- niaux’s complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief with prejudice.
The proceedings for administrative review remained pending. Vuagniaux was allowed to amend his complaint for administrative review to include a number of differ- claims, ent including claims he had previously asserted in his action for declaratory injunctive relief. Follow- ing hearing, the circuit court entered an setting order aside the Department’s decision and dismissing the Department’s complaint against Vuagniaux. The court gave numerous reasons for reaching that decision. Among these were that appointment of Dr. Pope to replace Dr. Cook on the Medical Disciplinary Board was not autho- rized law and was unconstitutional, that the statutory composition of the Board process violates due and equal protection, the Department’s administrative com- plaint defective, had failed to properly prove its against Vuagniaux, case and that *10 provisions of the Medical Practice Act regulating advertis- ing are unconstitutionally vague and violate “Vuag- niaux’s right engage to in free commercial and educa- speech.” tional This appeal by the Department followed. The Department took its appeal directly to us based on the circuit court’s determination provisions that the Medical Practice Act were invalid. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Although the constitutionality provisions those has been the focus of the parties’ arguments court, in our a fundamental principle judicial decisionmaking is that questions regarding the constitutionality of statutes should be “only considered where essential to the disposi case, tion i.e., of a where the case cannot be determined on other grounds.” Bonaguro v. County Electoral Officers Board, Having 396 reviewed the law, the have concluded applicable and we record the by undertaken disciplinary the action which rendered its from a basic flaw this case suffered to the wholly unrelated invalid for reasons decision Act. constitutionality of the Medical Practice that the Medical proceedings with the problem body with Board, charged the administrative Disciplinary disci- of the Act to enforcing provisions pertaining the constituted when considered pline, properly was case the merits and recommended Vuagniaux’s It constituted improperly his license be disciplined. by the Pope, chiropractor appointed because it included the after was excluded from replace Board Cook Cook participation by further in the case the administrative consistently argued, law As has and as judge. determined, the correctly Pope’s appoint- circuit court Board impermissible ment was because the had no statu- tory authority constitutional make it. or
The Medical Practice Act that all plainly provides of the Medical Board “to be Disciplinary members appointed by by the the and Governor and with advice (West 60/7(A) 1998). consent Senate.” ILCS the anyone There is no situation under Act where other Governor, than and by and with the advice consent of Senate, may person appoint to be member of terms, Upon expiration Board. of the Board members’ their appointed by successors must be Governor of the Senate. If a occurs vacancy with consent term, expiration before the of a Board member’s it is Governor, with the advice and consent of the Sen- ate, vacancy. to fill who is authorized 60/ 1998). 7(B) (West
There are two in which the circumstances Governor regard can take action with Board members without first has involving the Senate. The is where Board misfeasance, *11 that a member be removed recommended duty. neglect malfeasance, case, or wilful In such a may offending Governor own, remove the member on his public hearing, after a notice and unless the member expressly right hearing waives notice such 60/7(B) (West 1998). writing. 225 ILCS The second vacancy where a occurs while the Senate inis recess. provisions governing There, the basic constitutional appointments apply recess and the Governor is autho temporary appointment rized meeting to “make until the next Senate, nomination when he make a shall § 1970, to fill V, such office.” Ill. Const. art. 9. participation by unnecessary While the Senate is foregoing participation by situations, the Governor is always required. Neither the Medical nor Practice Act permit appointment the Illinois Constitution of 1970 or involuntary guberna removal of Board members without agency, torial action. anAs administrative the Medical Disciplinary by Board is and was constrained these general authority. limitations. It has no or common law only powers possesses granted The it are those it legislature, any action takes must be autho People rized statute. Business & Professional Comm’n, Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce 136 Ill. 2d (1989). 192, 243-44 authority appoint Pope,
Because the Board had no lawfully it was at constituted the time it recom reprimanded mended that and fined. Department’s decision, which based on the Board’s given recommendation, is therefore invalid and cannot be Rights effect. See v. Comm’n, Gilchrist Human 312 Ill. App. 3d body
Unlike the administrative whose decision was challenged Comm’n, in Daniels v. Industrial (2002), Department no claim deci makes that its legitimized grounds Pope sion can be on the was a doctrine, de Under the officer officer. de facto facto
187 under duties of an office actually the performing person facto, an officer de of considered to be color title is or public far as the officer are valid so his acts as such an in them are concerned. who have an interest parties third Review, Township v. Board rel. Chillicothe People ex of (1960). doctrine, to the Pursuant 424, Ill. 2d to the of challenges collateral may not assert litigants of hold as a means contest to office qualifications ficer’s the acts. Daniels v. Industrial the officer’s ing legality J., (McMorrow, Comm’n, specially 201 Ill. at 174 2d J.). Freeman, joined by concurring, of an The before does not involve the effects case us or public party, on a member of the a third officer’s acts being act are not qualifications and the officer’s to challenge to proceeding. contested a collateral Board authority to act as a member the was Pope’s at proceeding Pope appointed, raised in the which was made, by the time the a doctor whose appointment directly by appointment, case was affected the to the responsible considering disciplinary tribunal for the doctor, the tribunal charges against before considered the doctor’s case on the merits or made its de there- recommendations. The officer doctrine is facto inapplicable. fore
In attempting Pope’s appointment, to justify Department dispute does not the Medical Practice authorizing actions. It provisions Act contains no its however, implicit authority argues, the Board has particular case temporary make for appointments from Board member is excluded permanent where a argu- voluntarily recuses himself. This participating or earlier in this opinion, ment is untenable. As discussed are creatures of administrative bodies such as the Board or law possess general powers. statute and no common or claimed an administrative Any power authority by provisions must find its agency source within statute which agency was created. The agency’s authority from express must either arise language statute or “devolve fair implication and intend ment from provisions the express as an [statute] incident achieving objectives for which the [agency] was created.” Schalz v. McHenry County Comm’n, Merit Sheriffs 202-03 being
There no explicit statutory authorization the Board appoint replacement when members one of existing case, its hear a members cannot the appoint- ment of can Pope upheld foregoing under the standard if only authority for such an can appointment fairly be *13 implied provisions from the express of the Medical an achieving objectives Practice Act as incident to the for view, which the Board was created. In our such no implication can be made. statute,
By four only of the Board’s voting seven members are needed for a and quorum, vacancies in the of the Board membership impair “shall not the of a right quorum to exercise rights perform all the and all the du- *** 60/7(E) (West 1998). ties of the Board.” 225 If may the Board continue to work a conduct its with vacancy, may where, surely here, continue its work as particular a Board member is for some to reason unable participate particular in a power matter. Its to function is no more impeded than ours is when one of our members is unable to take in the consideration and part a disposition of case. Just the one our as absence of disqualification members due to not or recusal does bypass judicial entitle us to normal mecha- the selection nism and invite from judge join another another court to temporarily, us the removal of a Board member from participation disciplinary action not specific does empower remaining Board members to the sidestep statutory and process nomination confirmation and invite We therefore a substitute. join to them as another doctor temporary Board appoint to power do not believe Practice from the Medical fairly implied be members can statutory Board’s achieving to Act as an incident purposes. exceeded appointment
Having Pope’s concluded authority and constitutional statutory the Board’s on the recom Department based that the decision cannot Board constituted improperly mendation of the Depart circuit court that stand, agree we with the his reprimand to fine ment’s decision court, Unlike circuit license must set aside. however, remedy this appropriate we believe that matter to the for case is remand the aby legally constituted Board. See reconsideration Comm’n, (2002); Ill. v. 2d 160 Daniels Industrial Comm’n, 312 Ill. 3d 597 App. Gilchrist v. Human Rights (causes (2000) agencies remanded administrative were found hearings original agency new when decisions public by participation to have been made or with the by officers whose were authorized appointments statute). ordering proceedings
In a remand for further Department, ap- we hasten to add that the unauthorized entire disciplinary does not render the pointment Pope proceeding nullity. merely It invalidates actions following Pope’s appointment taken the Department initial to the Board. Because the Board’s decision *14 preceded pursue charges against Vuagniaux Pope’s Board, on the it is unaffected. Because the participation charges followed hearings regarding those evidentiary are to appointment, however, they are invalid and Pope’s disregarded. pursue If the Department still wishes afford charges Vuagniaux, must disciplinary against hearings. him for a set of opportunity the new elimi- such relief Our decision afford 190 regarding
nates the need for tous address issues the suf- ficiency presented by Department of the evidence the original proceedings procedural rulings the or the made premature there. It also renders consideration whether advertising provisions the of the Medical Practice Act rights speech guaranteed by violate to free the first (U.S. amendment to the United States Constitution I) corresponding protections Const., amend. under the Constitution Illinois. governmental advertising by
Whether
on
restrictions
professionals
medical
contravene the first amendment is
judged by
governing
speech.
the standards
commercial
Department
Regulation,
See Desnick v.
of Professional
(1996);
When to a constitu- tionality amendment, first based on the courts differenti- as-applied challenge an an ate between overbreadth
191
challenge
asserts
An
challenge.
as-applied
fall
litigation
to the
gave
which
rise
acts
particular
An
could cover.
regulation
drawn
properly
outside what a
hand,
a
the other
attacks
challenge, on
overbreadth
a
enabling
to whom
validity,
persons
facial
regulation’s
challenge the
constitutionally
applied
be
may
statute
conceivably
applied
may
that it
ground
statute on the
not before the
unconstitutionally to others
situations
Regulation,
Desnick v. Department
court.
Professional
of
at
519-20.
plain
available to
challenge is not
The overbreadth
regulating com
validity
of a statute
contesting
tiffs
University
Trustees
the State
speech.
mercial
Board
of
of
388,
L.
109
Fox,
469, 106
Ed. 2d
New York v.
492 U.S.
of
speech
commercial
S. Ct. 3028
That is so because
‘chilled,’
to be
hardy,
likely
is considered “more
less
Board
Trustees
surrogate litigators.”
of
not in need
of
of
L.
York,
481,
at
106
University
the State
New
U.S.
of
Accordingly, any party
at
at 3035.
Ed. 2d
S. Ct.
constitutionality of a restriction on com
challenging the
standing
normally
mercial
must
demonstrate his
speech
showing
particular
protected
that his
conduct is
by first
Department
amendment. Desnick v.
under
first
Statutes
commercial
are
speech
subject to
grounds
attack on the
they
that
are unconstitutional on
face,
simply
their
not
as applied, where the constitutional
challenge
vagueness.
Bar,
is based on
Jacobs v. Florida
(11th
901,
1995); see,
50 F.3d
907
Cir.
Posadas
e.g.,
de
Rico,
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. Puerto
478
328,
(1986).
266,
U.S.
92 L. Ed. 2d
Vuagniaux facially 26(b) of the case is doctrine this section vagueness Act, doctors to include permits Practice which Medical to their “areas pertaining advertising their information certifica including appropriate board specialization, professional practice.” or limitation of tion 60/ 26(b) (West 1998). takes issue with this phrase “appropri not define the statute because does list of or include a certifications ate board certification” Although the circuit court considered to be appropriate. by Vuagniaux’s its decision persuaded argument, appeal. no deference on consider de novo enjoys We undertaking In our whether statute is constitutional. statutory review, presume we enactments party challenging burden is on the constitutional. The any constitutional invalid clearly the statute establish *17 one, is a and this court will ity. The burden formidable reasonably it validity pos a statute’s whenever is uphold v. 184 Ill. People Cassidy, to do so. ex rel. Lumpkin sible (1998). 2d process mandate absolute or
Due does not standards statutory precision mathematical the formulation of Although require regulation it does that a enactments. uncertain, vague, not be indefinite or the doctrine require different recognizes that different situations specific A need not be more specificity. regulation levels of Izzo, v. People under the possible than is circumstances. 109, 26(b) Act, provi- Practice Section of the Medical physi- challenged by Vuagniaux vague, pertains sion as widely a used cians. “Board certification” is standard a to be practice physician in the of medicine. For term commonly “board certified” is understood to mean that passed he has an examination administered a medical specialty requirements board, has fulfilled all of that specialist, board for certification as a and has been certi- specialist. fied a board as 1 Schmidt, See At- (Cum. 2002). torneys’ Dictionary Supp. of Medicine 12 26(b)’s “appropriate” Section use the word in connec- any ambigu- tion with “board certification” does add 26(b) ity pertains advertising to the term. Section physician’s specialization. area of When the statute says physician may “appropriate include board simply may ads, certification” in his it means he make mention of whatever board certification he has particular received that is relevant to the area of specialization advertising. he is governs types
The Medical Practice Act different physicians engaged spectrum specialties in a whose by variety standards administered of different medi- generic cal boards. The statute’s reference to board specifying particular certifications without each board or particular type each of certification is a reflection of this possible every situation. Enumeration of board certifica- unduly prove tion would be It cumbersome. could also preventing emerging restrictive, doctors in new or specialties advertising legitimate from board certifica- yet officially pre- tions that had not made onto the scribed fist. nothing note, moreover,
We that there indicate present statutory regulatory prov- that the scheme is ing knowledge, difficult to follow or administer. To our only physician advertising to have run afoul of the provision Vuagniaux. on “board certification” is Consid- ering specialist” Vuag- that the “brain stem certification by any niaux claimed in his ads was not bestowed medi- *18 board, cal but came instead from the educational Vuagniaux technique, institution where learned the it is reasonably have been how he could us see difficult for as qualified his certification thinking that into the misled A under statute. certification” board “appropriate an vague provision as to whether definitive answer course, proceed- must, of await new to him as applied however, it is clear point, remand. At this ings following that showing his of cannot meet burden that vagueness on its face. is void for statute two additional judgment presents court’s The circuit necessary light remains whose resolution questions The first proceedings. remand for further our decision to by Vuag- filed a motion to dismiss disposition concerns action. The circuit court during disciplinary niaux Department’s III of the that counts II and concluded a and that insufficient as matter law complaint were or to judgment pleadings on the Vuagniaux’s motion for at the administrative granted should have been dismiss facts inform- those “did not set forth level because counts applicable his ing [Vuagniaux] ads violated wherein law.” com ruling. Administrative
We cannot sustain charges with the required are not to state the plaints refinements, pleadings in or subtleties as precision, same v. judicial Abrahamson Illinois proceeding. Ill. 2d Sec Regulation, of Professional 25(a)(4) Administrative Procedure tion of the Illinois 10— (West 25(a)(4) (5 1998)), which is Act ILCS 100/10 — the Medical Practice adopted by and into incorporated (225 (West 1998)), “[e]xcept provides Act ILCS 60/47 provided is otherwise a more detailed statement where in a contested law,” party the notice on a served statement of the plain include “a short and case shall asserted, failure consequences matters file other reference number.” respond, and the official or (West 1998). 25(a)(4) No additional 5 ILCS 100/10 — Medical Act itself. is mandated Practice specificity *19 requires simply Department notify It that the the ac- writing charges cused doctor of the made and the time place hearing charges the where on the will be conducted, direct the doctor to file his written charges specified answer to the time, under oath within a and that it advise doctor that if he fails to file such against answer, an a default will be taken him and his subject disciplinary license will be to such action as the (West Department may proper. deem 225 ILCS 60/36 1998). applying provisions,
In these the courts held have charges agency that only filed before an administrative “need sufficiently alleged wrongdoer
be drawn so that the reasonably apprised against is ligently prepare of the case him to intel Siddiqui Depart
his defense.” v. See Regulation, App. ment 307 Ill. 3d of Professional complaint against Vuagniaux The filed met specifically allegedly that standard. It identified the improper they advertisements, identified where and when published, statutory provisions they were set forth the alleged why they violated, were to have and described allega were claimed to in violation of the These law. provided Vuagniaux ample tions with notice of the nature charges against Vuagniaux any way him. If was in impaired ability appar himself, in his to defend it is not complaint ent in the we materials have before us. The is subject pleadings. therefore not to on dismissal aspect judgment final the circuit court’s we must address before the matter is remanded is its disciplinary determination that mechanism estab- lished the Medical Practice Act violates constitutional rights process protection equal to due because it subjects physicians chiropractors discipline by who are physicians chiropractors. According Vuag- are not who only chiropractors permitted niaux, should be to stand in judgment chiropractors. of other Because Medical Disciplinary Board to include Act calls for Practice voting among only chiropractor members its seven one (West (see 60/7(A) 1998)),Vuagniaux contends 225 ILCS inherently Board, as and that the flawed that the law is permitted to law, not be under the should constituted against disciplinary action him. take statutory composition challenging In Disciplinary Board, no first amend asserts ability infringement his claimed on ment claims. The speech. pursue profession, not his freedom his to Legislation infringing right pursue profession test. Potts v. Illinois under the rational basis is examined *20 Department Registration Education, 128 Ill. 2d & of (1989). “ ‘highly is limited and deferen Rational basis review ” Arangold Corp. Zehnder, 2d 142, v. 204 Ill. tial.’ (2003), Rights quoting Educational v. Committee for Edgar, 1, 33 Under the rational basis upheld test, if it rational statute will be bears relationship legitimate legislative purpose to a and is discriminatory. arbitrary Potts v. Illinois neither nor Department Registration Education, 128 Ill. 2d at & of 330. composition Disciplinary assails grounds prevents chiropractors
Board on that it from by being judged peers subjects their and them disci- pline their doctors who do not understand work against disagree. prejudiced them. While chiro- are We seg- may practors certain once have been ostracized community, the Medical Practice ments of the medical equal of the medical them as full and members Act treats degree holding profession. law, of those Under the profes- chiropractic possess precisely the of same doctor holding degrees of those as doctors sional stature as osteopathy. regarded as of All are medicine or doctors physicians. Although physicians on the more of the Disciplinary medicine, Board are doctors of the record in apportionment this case indicates that the of member- ship Disciplinary on the Board was intended to reflect type physician practicing the relative number of each chiropractors in the state. Medical doctors outnumber simply the Board because medical doctors outnumber chiropractors profession. propor- in the It a matter representation, antichiropractic prejudice. tional physicians Disciplinary on the Board who are may doctors of medicine not be conversant with practices employed by physicians methods and who are chiropractic. physicians Likewise, doctors of chiropractors are who normally knowledgeable
will not about practices employed by physicians the methods and who just this, doctors of medicine. The law understands practitioners speciality as it in understands one chiropractic may medicine or know little of the work of practitioners specialty. why in another That is it does not Disciplinary restrict members Board to reliance on personal training experience judging their fellow physicians. Under the Medical Practice Act and the regulations provi- Act, enacted accordance with hearings sion is made for full experts in contested cases where they testify, in the relevant field can as were testify Through expert called to in this case. relevant testimony, specialized Board can obtain members *21 knowledge just particular a case, needed to assess as jurors guided by expert testimony are educated and in complex civil and criminal matters. circumstances,
Under these believe that we the legislature structuring a had rational basis for the Disciplinary way composi- Board the it did and that the arbitrary discriminatory. tion of the Board is neither nor disciplinary system that the While asserts superior only would work better and if achieve results charges against medical doctors could consider medical charges could consider only chiropractors doctors and theoreti- arguments are purely his against chiropractors, For of problems. their own set They present cal. also could against physician if action disciplinary example, his same by other with only physicians conducted be Vuagniaux urges, might one as training background, and within similarly specialists to conclude that required be only groups subject could physician each of basic same by practiced who discipline physicians so, disciplin- If that numerous additional specialty. were all necessary would be accommodate ary boards specialties. Bureaucracy proliferate. different would system of the of the relative merits Regardless however, such considerations proposed Vuagniaux, in evaluating present no in the law its consequence of investigated legislature is to have presumed form. of good is best for the ascertained what question good people and for the profession the medical practice. medical among professionals whom Whether or legislature the course chosen wise whether is the means to achieve the desired result is not best inquiry. legislature, for the proper subject judicial It is courts, advantages and not to balance the Potts Illinois disadvantages requirements. the law’s v. Education, at & Department Registration 333. circuit foregoing reasons, judgment
For the part part, affirmed in and reversed in and the court is proceed- remanded to the further cause is ings opinion. consistent with this and reversed part part;
Affirmed cause remanded. McMORROW, dissenting: CHIEF JUSTICE issue, has raised the this Although party neither consider, its obligation has an sua sponte, court See, e.g., People v. present appeal. over the jurisdiction *22 200
Fuller, 7 Because I conclude that we not under Trent v. Winningham, 172 jurisdiction do have (1996), 2d and Hearne v. Illinois State Board of Ill. 420 Education, Ill. (1999), 2d 443 I respectfully dissent. Trent,
In
plaintiff,
Trent,
Barbara
sought retroac
tive
support
child
from the
father
her child under sec
14(b)
(750
tion
of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984
(West
45/14(b)
1992)). The trial court denied Trent’s
claim for support, holding that she
not
entitled to
the support,
that
the claim
and,
was time-barred
in the
14(b)
alternative,
that section
was unconstitutional.
Trent,
This court did not reach the merits Trent’s claim sua support. Instead, jurisdiction after examining our sponte, concluded we that circuit court’s constitu ruling tional could not as a serve basis for direct review 302(a) under Rule because the circuit court had also plaintiff alternative, denied the relief on nonconstitu grounds. tional In so we holding, judg noted that when ment of the circuit court upon is based a finding that 302(a) legislation unconstitutional, Rule mandates parties bypass to the normal appellate process and proceed to this directly explained court. this We process direct review problematic becomes when the judgment of alternative, the circuit court contains non- grounds, constitutional as this compelled court is then consider it might issues otherwise decline to “in address appellate deference our court where the issues would Trent, have been reviewable as a matter of right.” 2d Ill. at 426. noted We also that when circuit court legislation unconstitutional, holds stability system legal is undermined. We admonished courts “not compromise stability place the first declar- particular ing legislation case unconstitutional when require alternative, nonconstitu it,” i.e., when does grounds at Trent, 172 Ill. 2d the case. can resolve tional 425. *23 plaintiff had denied circuit court in Trent
Because the grounds, two, the constitu nonconstitutional relief necessary holding not for the resolution tional was above, noted we concluded case. Based on the concerns 302(a)jurisdiction improper. Ill. Trent, 172 was that Rule the court’s order and 2d at 426. vacated circuit We instructions remanded the cause to the circuit court with holding that new, order, a modified without the to enter 14(b) Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at unconstitutional. section was 427. reaffirmed in Hearne. In
Our decision in Trent was Chicago had dismissed Hearne, a schoolteacher who been by filed suit in the circuit court the board education contesting Upon review, administrative the his dismissal. finding dismissal, circuit court set aside the that the weight supported Hearne, of the evidence reinstatement. portion However, 2d the court also held a 185 Ill. at 451. and ordered of the Illinois School Code unconstitutional as the teacher reinstated on this alternative basis well.
Hearne, Ill. at board filed a 185 2d 451-52. The school argued that, Trent, to reconsider in under motion which constitu the circuit court should have reached the Hearne, Ill. 2d at 452. The circuit court tional claim. stating appropriate motion, that it was denied question to correct a in order reach constitutional legisla “fundamentally process unfair” created of hav tion other courts from the burden and to relieve “vague ambiguous ing interpret a statute.” finding of Hearne, 2d at Based on the 185 111. 452. sought unconstitutionality, appeal in this court direct was 302(a). under Rule holding
Applying
Trent,
our
we concludedthat
circuit
ruling
court’s constitutional
provide
did not
proper
rejected
basis for direct review.
expressly
We
circuit court’s rationale
reaching
for
the constitutional
issue, noting that the circuit court’s
ruling
constitutional
granted the teacher “additional and alternative relief’
which
“not necessary
plaintiffs
was
to resolve
claim
Hearne,
administrative review.”
As in (Hearne, 2d at 185 Ill. relief’ “alternative 456) the Medical holdings provisions based its unconstitutional, none of though even Practice Act were the circuit court’s necessary for holdings were these Hearne and under Accordingly, of the case. disposition vacate the Trent, this case resolution of proper the cause to order and to remand circuit court’s order which instructions to enter new circuit court with Hearne, holdings unconstitutionality. See excludes the 2d 427. 457; Trent, at 172 Ill. at to the I and Trent relevant believe that Hearne acknowledge majority Because the does case. present set forth explain why principles either decision or respectfully I dissent. inapplicable, those decisions are join in dis- FREEMAN and CARMAN this JUSTICES sent.
(No. 94425. ILLINOIS, OF Appel- THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE CAMPBELL, JR., Appellant. v. RICHARD D. lee, 18, Rehearing denied Opinion December filed 2003. January 2004.