182 Ga. 569 | Ga. | 1936
The present controversy is over a tract of land which was formerly owned by B. F. Yoyles, now deceased. In 1920 he conveyed tbe land to P. F. M. Furr by a deed absolute on its face, but in fact given as security for a debt. Yoyles died, and the debt was never paid. Under successive conveyances the Federal Land Bank of Columbia claimed title. The bank leased the land to J. O. Yoyles, a son of B. F. Yoyles, and in 1931 instituted dispossessory proceedings against J. O. Yoyles as a tenant holding over. Yoyles might have resisted ouster by making affidavit, giving bond, etc., as prescribed in the Code, § .61-303, and having an issue made for trial in the superior court, as provided in § 61-301. In that event, if the issue be determined against the alleged tenant, the landlord shall be entitled to a writ of possession and be placed in possession by the sheriff. But Yoyles filed a petition in equity to enjoin the dispossessory proceedings, admit
The bank filed an amendment, setting up the order passed by the court on May 3, 1932; that Mrs. Yoyles had demurred to the pleadings and made a motion to strike; that she claimed title under a quitclaim deed from P. E. M. Eurr under date of February 12, 1932; that B. F. Yoyles in his lifetime owned the land in
There was a hearing before the court and a jury at the August term, 1935, at which time the bank introduced documentary evidence in support of its chain of title. Mrs. Voyles testified that she was the wife of B. F. Voyles, who died nineteen years previously, and that she was living with him as man and wife at the time of his death, and remained in possession of the land until she was removed by the receiver appointed by the court; that she had not received or applied for a year’s support or dower from the estate of her husband; that she did not know that her husband owed P. F. M. Purr anything, did not know that a suit was brought against her husband, knew nothing about the suit, and knew nothing about any administration of his estate or about the levy on the land; that she was in possession, but never received any notice; that J. O. Voyles was never in possession of the land; that she was in possession all the time; that Voyles, her stepson, lived there with her and looked after things; that she did not herself farm, but he looked after the business; that she did not know anything about J. O. Voyles renting the land from the bank, or about the deed from Furr to her; that Mr. Strickland and Mr. Gillen represented her, and she supposed they got the deed. E. C. Culberson, sheriff, testified that at the time he was given an order to dispossess J. O. Voyles he took him away; that he found Mrs. B. F. Voyles on the premises, but did not remove her; and that she said what was there belonged to her. Mrs. Voyles introduced a quitclaim deed from P. F. M. Furr to herself, dated February 12, 1932, conveying the land in controversy for a consideration of $1, the deed not being recorded. The court directed a verdict in'favor of the bank. Mrs. Voyles filed a motion for a new trial on the general grounds, and amended with grounds that the court erred in admitting in evidence 'certain deeds in the chain of title of the bank; that the pleadings and the evidence showed that the case was ■ disposed of before she was brought into court,
As it is urged by Mrs. Yoyles that it was not permissible to make her a party under any ancillary petition, it is pertinent first to dispose of this objection. “The term 'ancillary bill’ is applied to proceedings growing out of the original proceedings in the same court, and dependent on such proceedings, and instituted for the purpose of enforcing a judgment or rendering complete justice among all the parties at interest.” 1 Words and Phrases (1st Series), 384. “An ancillary suit in equity is one growing out of a prior suit in the same court, dependent upon and instituted for the purpose of impeaching or enforcing the judgment or decree in a prior suit, and the jurisdiction of such suit is dependent upon the jurisdiction of the court of the prior suit.” Id. (3d Series), 451. “A supplemental bill may also be filed, as well after as before a decree; and the bill, if after a decree, may be either in aid of the decree, that it may be carried fully into execution. . . The jurisdiction of courts of equity to interpret and effectuate their own decrees by injunctions or writs of assistance, in order to avoid the litigation of questions once settled between the same parties, is well settled. Story’s Eq. Jur. § 959; Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch. 609, 612; Schenck v. Conover, 13 N. J. Eq. (2 Beasley), 220; Buffum’s Case, 13 N. H. 14; Sheperd v. Towgood, Tur. & Rus. 379; Davis v. Black, 6 Beav. 393. In Kershaw v. Thompson, the authorities are fully reviewed by Chancellor Kent, and need not be re-examined here.” Wilson v. Alexander, 276 Fed. 875, 881; Riverdale Mills v. Manufacturing Co., 198 U. S. 188, 195 (25 Sup. Ct. 629, 632, 49 L. ed. 1008). “Generally equity jurisprudence embraces the same matters of jurisdiction and matters of remedy as were allowed and practiced in England.” Code of 1933, § 37-124. Etheridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1,
Ordinarily the issue on the hearing of a defense to a dispossessory-warrant proceeding does not involve the question of title between the landlord and the tenant. When, however, it is made an issue by the tenant, the judgment thereon is conclusive between the parties. Hammond v. Thornton, 107 Ga. 259 (33 S. E. 183); Garrick v. Tidwell, 151 Ga. 294 (106 S. E. 551); Allen v. Allen, 154 Ga. 581, 587 (115 S. E. 17). In the equitable suit brought by J. O. Voyles he specifically alleged that the bank was the holder of the legal title, claiming only that he had a contract of rental. The bank admitted the allegation that it had legal title, but denied that Voyles had any contract or right of possession. Judgment
The above furnishes a sufficient basis for a court of equity
But notwithstanding such general provisions and authorities, can it be said that Mrs. Yoyles is entitled to have her claim tried in an ordinary common-law action of ejectment? Her contention is based on the theory that where a sheriff is ordered, as an incident to a judgment, to put one in possession, he can not oust any one claiming under a title independent of that of the defendant. In Mattlage v. Mulherin, 106 Ga. 834, 839 (32 S. E. 940), it was held: “A lessee from the grantor in a security deed, which has been duly filed and recorded, can be dispossessed in a summary way by the sheriff for the purpose of placing in possession a purchaser of the property at a sale-had under a judgment setting up a special lien upon the same, rendered in a suit by the creditor on the debt secured by such deed, notwithstanding the lease may be older than the judgment under which the sale was had.” Mr. Justice Cobb entered into a full discussion of what are now §§ 39-1309, 39-1312, 39-1313, and 39-1314 of the Codé of 1933, dealing with what parties may or may not be ousted after judgment rendered; and stated: “It would be unreasonable to hold that it was the intention of the General Assembly, in the language which is used in these various statutes, that a person who bought or leased from a mortgagor after the mortgage was duly filed and recorded, or from a grantor in a security deed after
In Coker v. Smith, 63 Ga. 517, "Coker foreclosed a mortgage upon certain real estate belonging to. Worrill; and trouble and difficulties arising to enforce the judgment at law, he filed a bill in equity and had a receiver appointed to take charge and possession of the land. The receiver failed to possess himself of all of the land, but a part of it was held by Smith, not under the receiver but by purchase from Worrill, before the bill was filed, though after the foreclosure at law. A decree was had on the bill and a sale of the land under the decree, and Coker bought it. The fact that Smith was in possession of part of it seems to have been • unnoticed when the decree was had. Smith was not made a party to the bill and had nothing to do with the decree, which seems to have been a consent decree agreed upon between Coker and Worrill. After the sale under the decree Coker filed a petition to have Smith removed, returnable to the first term of the court, to be
Assuming that Mrs. Yoyles could be made a party, which we hold to be true, it would seem beyond question that the same rights allowed to the defendant as against the party bringing the suit in equity would also be accorded the defendant against Mrs. Yoyles. This suit originated, it will be remembered, by J. O. Yoyles seeking an injunction against the enforcement of a dispossessory warrant sued out by the bank, and we think that under the principle
Upon the final hearing before a court and jury the bank introduced in evidence its muniments of title, dating from the first deed from B. F. Yoyles, deceased. It is unnecessary to analyze these documents. It is sufficient to say that they showed full legal title in the bank. Mrs. Voyles’ quitclaim deed from Furr was given at a time when he had conveyed his title to another person. Mrs. Yoyles’ claim of possession seems to us belated and coming with poor grace, and that was evidently the view of the trial judge. During all the time when proceedings were being had against J. O. Yoyles, her stepson, living on the premises part of the time as lessee under a contract with the bank and thereafter as a tenant holding over, and throughout the’time in which the case was appealed to this court, she never intimated that she' asserted or intended to assert any right whatever. When J. O. Yoyles was finally concluded by a judgment- of this court, and it became imminent that the property would pass into the hands of the bank, she voiced for the first time her alleged rights to pos
Judg'rnenl affirmed.