173 Ga. 844 | Ga. | 1931
The bill of exceptions in this case complains that the trial judge, “after hearing the evidence in the above-stated ease, entered the following order to wit: ‘At Chambers, Commerce, Georgia, June 27th, 1931. This case was heard at time and place fixed by the order of the court, and decision reserved. Upon considering the evidence in the case and the law, the restraining order heretofore granted by the court is vacated, and an injunction refused No brief of evidence is incorporated in the bill of exceptions, or referred to therein, and the transcript of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court contains only the petition, the
It is plain in this case that there entered into the exercise of his discretion by the judge the evidence which was submitted to his consideration. The language of the order is, “Upon considering the evidence in the case and the law, . . an injunction refused.” In this instance, as in every case, in every legal investigation and trial, the appropriate application of- the law depends upon the facts as disclosed by the evidence. Where no evidence is transmitted to this court, it must generally be assumed that the law applied by the lower court was applicable to the evidence, and the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. In Fleming v. Roberts, 114 Ga. 634 (40 S. E. 792), it was held that though it does not appear, either from the transcript of the record or by a recital in the bill of exceptions, that a brief of the evidence had been approved by the court or had been agreed upon by counsel, this court will not dismiss the bill of exceptions; but it can not pass upon the sole assignment of error in this case, which depends for its' determination upon the evidence, and the judgment of the trial judge will be affirmed. ' See also Stansell v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 123 Ga. 278 (51 S. E. 321); Town of Fairburn v. Edmondson, 160 Ga. 792 (129 S. E. 108), and cit.; Copeland v. Copeland, 166 Ga. 277 (142 S. E. 870).