The defendant was indicted for a felony (receiving stolen automobile tires and tubes of the value of $68, with the knowledge at the time he received them that they were stolen), and was convicted of a misdemeanor (receiving stolen goods of less value than $50). The undisputed evidence showed that the property was stolen by James McEadd'en and that he had pleaded guilty, *223 and had been convicted of burglary and larceny from the house of said goods, and that the defendant had bought thе goods from McFadden, paying him $55 for them. The only question in the defendant’s trial was whether he knew at the time he received the goods that they had been stolen. He admitted that he bought’them from McFadden, but denied that he knew they were stolen, and introduced many witnesses who testified to his honesty and good character.
A speciаl ground of the motion for new trial excepts to the following excerpt from the charge: “I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant bought or received the goods set out and described in the bill of indictment in the way and manner that it is alleged and described in this indictment they were taken,- and if you believe they were stolen and that this defendant knew at the time he received them, that they were stolen,
or if the circumstances were such as to lead a reasonable man to believe that they were
stolen,
then he would be guilty of the Grime charged in this bill of indictment.”
(Italics ours.) The portion of the charge in itаlics was assigned as error, “in that it stated an erroneous principle of law to the jury upon the material issue in the case, it being the law that before an aсcused could be found guilty of receiving stolen goods, it must be shown that he knew when he received them that they were stolen; that said charge set up an incorrect standard for determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, in that it authorized and directed the jury to find this defendant guilty if the circumstances under which he received the goods were such .as to lead a reasonable man to believe they were stolen, even though in point of fact movant did not have a guilty knowledge оf the fact that they were stolen when he received them.” The ground further alleged “that the effect of the charge was to conclusively presume the defendant guilty if the jury should find that a reasonable man would have had knowledge from the circumstances that the goods were stolen, without regard to whether the defendant himself knew they were stolen and without regard to whether the defendant was a reasonable man.” The indictment in this case was drawn under the Code, § 26-2620, which reads: “If any person shall buy or receive any goods, chattels, money, or other effects that shall have been stolen or feloniously taken from another, knowing the same to bе stolen or feloni
*224
ously taken, such person shall be an accessory after the fact, and shall receive the same punishment as -would be inflicted on tlm pеrson convicted of having stolen or feloniously taken the property.” It thus appears that before one can be convicted of receiving stolеn goods it must appear from the evidence that he
knew
the property was stolen when he received it. It is true that the jury in determining whether a defendant had such knowlеdge can- consider all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, tending to show such knowledge. They might, in passing on the question whether he had such -knowledge, consider whether under all the circumstances of the case
he, the defendant,
as a reasonable man, knew that the goods were stolen, but before he could be convictеd the jury must definitely find that
he knew
that they were stolen when he received them. In State
v.
Hamilton, 166 S. C. 274 (
Ground 5 оf the motion for new trial assigns error on another excerpt from the charge. In charging on the impeachment of witnesses, the court said: “And if you believe that whеn a witness has been successfully impeached, why then it would be your duty to discard the evidence of such witness, but it is for you to say whether or not you will believe the witness sought tо be impeached or the witness brought to impeach him.” It appears from the ground that the only witness sought to be impeached was James MeFadden, convicted thief in the felony case, and'the-main wit *226 ness against the defendant in this case. The witness introduced to impeach him was Herbert Elliott, who testified that McFadden had tоld him that the defendant in this ease did not know that the tires were stolen when he bought them. And McFadden from the witness stand admitted that Elliott’s testimony was true. Therefore, the court’s сharge injected into the trial an issue that was not in it, as to whether the jury should believe McFadden or Elliott, when there was no conflict between their testimony. The chаrge was necessarily confusing to the jury, and under the facts of the case, requires a new trial.
The remaining special ground is without merit; and the general grounds are not now considered.
Judgment reversed.