69 F. 448 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois | 1895
The complainants, as judgment creditors of the corporation defendant, filed a creditors’ bill in favor of themselves and of other creditors of the judgment debtor, and charge: First. That the corporation defendant was organized on the 26th of February, 1890, by the defendants Meyer, Cohen, and Meyer, with a capital stock of $10,000, Gustave Meyer subscribing for 52 shares, Cohen for 47 shares, and Marcus Meyer for 1 share, and that said defendants elected themselves directors of the company,
The first ground of demurrer is without merit. The allegations of citizenship are full and complete. The objection that it does not appear that the various defendants are residents of the Northern division of the Northern district of Illinois, and that they can be sued in the division of their residence, cannot be sustained. If it be true that they could only be sued in the division of the district in which they reside, that is a personal privilege, which is waived by their general appearance to the action, and it is not a question going to the jurisdiction of the court.
Second. With respect to the objection of niultifariousness, I have examined the numerous decisions to which I was referred at the argument, and there would seem to be some confusion with respect to what constitutes niultifariousness in a bill. The rule of niultifariousness has recently been summed up in Gibson’s Suits in Chancery (section 292; quoted in 1 Beach, Mod. Eq. I’rac. § 129) in a manner which commends itself to my judgment. He says that to make a bill demurrable for niultifariousness it must contain all of the following characteristics: First, two or more causes of action must be joined against two or more defendants; second, these causes of action must have no connection or common origin, but be separate and independent; third, the evidence pertinent to one or more of the causes must be wholly impertinent as to the other or others; fourth, one or more of the causes of action must be capable of being fully determined without bringing-in other cause or causes to adjust any of the legal or equitable rights of the parties; fifth, the decree as to one or more of the separate or independent causes must be conclusive against one or more of the defendants, and the decree proper as to the other
The demurrer is overruled, and the defendants, must answer to the merits by the first Monday of August, 1895.