KEVIN VLCEK v. SCOTT BROGEE, et al.
C.A. CASE NO. 25499
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
September 27, 2013
2013-Ohio-4250
FROELICH, J.
T.C. NO. 10CV8556 (Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on the 27th day of September, 2013.
KONRAD KUCZAK, Atty. Reg. No. 0011186, 130 W. Second Street, Suite 1010, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
JONATHAN S. ZWEIZIG, Atty. Reg. No. 0069381, 18 East Water Street, Troy, Ohio 45373
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Bradley M. Muhlenkamp, Alric J. Larson, William Demange aka Bill Demange and Tod Monnier aka Todd Monnier
THOMAS H. PYPER, Atty. Reg. No. 0022981, 7601 Paragon Road, Suite 301, Dayton, Ohio 45459
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Kittyhawk Realty, Inc. and Constance Kersey
GREGORY P. GARNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0039111, 4134 Linden Avenue, Suite 102, Dayton,
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, D. Scott Brogee and Keith Koverman
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Kevin Vlcek, the owner of residential rental property, appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment on Vlcek‘s claims to the company that managed his property, the company‘s agent, and former tenants who allegedly caused damage to the home. For the following reasons, the trial court‘s judgment will be reversed as to Scott Brogee (tenant) and affirmed in part and reversed in part as to Keith Koverman (tenant). In all other respects, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The following facts are undisputed.
{¶ 3} In 1994, Kevin Vlcek purchased a home located at 2404 Harshman Road in Riverside, Ohio. At that time and until December 2008, Vlcek was on active duty with the military and was frequently stationed in other states.
{¶ 4} In October 2000, Vlcek entered into a contract with Kittyhawk Realty, Inc. to manage the Harshman Road property. Although the parties agree that they had a written contract, neither party has located the agreement. Jane Brame originally managed Vlcek‘s property for Kittyhawk. In April 2002, Constance Kersey began running the day-to-day operations of Kittyhawk, and she took over management of the Harshman Road property. Kersey communicated with Vlcek and the defendant-tenants regarding the property.
{¶ 5} In May 2005, the property was rented, through Kittyhawk, to a group of young men, Scott Brogee, Alric Larson, Bill Demange, Todd Monnier, and Bradley
{¶ 6} Demange lived at the house for only one month; he moved out in June 2005. Monnier lived at the property through early April 2007. Larson lived at the Harshman Road house through August 2007. Muhlenkamp resided at the property from May 2005 through May 2006 and from Christmas 2006 through early August 2007. Brogee lived at the property from May 2005 until October 2008, when the property was vacated.
{¶ 7} Justin Dues moved into the residence and began paying a pro-rata portion of the rent in June or July 2006. Shortly after Larson and Muhlenkamp moved out of the residence in August 2007, Koverman moved into the house and started paying rent. In short, by September 2007, Brogee was the only remaining original tenant, and Dues and Koverman had moved into the residence.
{¶ 8} In late 2007, Vlcek needed to provide a copy of the lease on his Harshman Road property to a mortgage lender as part of his purchase of another home in another state. At that time, Vlcek learned from Kersey that the tenants at the Harshman Road house had a month-to-month lease and that some of the original tenants had moved out. Kersey notified Brogee in early 2008 that she needed to know the names of the current tenants and that the tenants would need to sign a new lease.
{¶ 10} In mid-September 2008, a severe windstorm struck the Dayton area. The windstorm caused some damage to the roof and exterior of Vlcek‘s home. On or shortly before October 1, 2008, Koverman, Brogee and Dues notified Kersey that they were terminating the lease and moving out. The letter included the final month‘s rent and included a forwarding address for Brogee, where the security deposit was to be sent. The keys to the house were returned to Kersey on November 3, 2008.
{¶ 11} After the house was vacated, Kersey checked the residence for damage, and she completed a Security Deposit Disposition Form. Kersey itemized damage totaling $1,225. Kersey sent the form to Brogee and informed him that she was keeping the security deposit and that the tenants owed $275. The original and month-to-month tenants dispute that they caused any damage to the property.
{¶ 12} On October 29, 2010, Vlcek brought suit against Brogee, Koverman, Dues, Muhlenkamp, Larson, Demange, and Monnier for breach of their lease by failing to maintain Vlcek‘s personal and real property and for violating
{¶ 13} In February 2011, Vlcek amended his complaint to include claims against Kersey and Kittyhawk Realty, Inc. for breach of Kersey‘s duties as property manager and respondeat superior liability, respectively. Kersey and Kittyhawk denied Vlcek‘s claims and brought cross-claims against their co-defendants. Brogee and Koverman filed an amended answer, asserting six counterclaims against Vlcek, four cross-claims against Kersey and Kittyhawk, and two cross-claims against Muhlenkamp, Larson, Demange, and Monnier. Vlcek subsequently filed a second amended complaint, which included additional claims of negligence and indemnification against Kersey for any liability that might attach to Vlcek arising out of the counterclaims added by Brogee and Koverman in their amended answer.
{¶ 14} The defendants filed motions for summary judgment on Vlcek‘s claims, and Vlcek moved for partial summary judgment on Brogee and Koverman‘s counterclaims. We will discuss the motions in more detail below. After considering the parties’ motions, the trial court granted all of the parties’ motions and certified that its decision was immediately appealable under
{¶ 15} Vlcek raises three assignments of error, each of which challenges the trial court‘s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendants. The assignments of error state:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO KITTYHAWK REALTY, INC./CONSTANCE KERSEY.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUSTAINING THE MOTION OF TENANTS MUHLENKAMP, LARSON, DEMANGE, AND MONNIER.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUSTAINING THE MOTION OF TENANTS BROGEE, AND KOVERMAN.
{¶ 16} Pursuant to
{¶ 17} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party‘s pleadings. Dresher at 293;
A. Kittyhawk Realty, Inc. and Kersey
{¶ 18} In his first assignment of error, Vlcek challenges the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment to Kittyhawk Realty and Kersey. He asserts that Kersey‘s breach of her duties as the property manager prevented him from mitigating some of the damage to the home.
{¶ 19} Vlcek‘s fourth claim for relief in his second amended complaint alleged that Kersey negligently failed to perform her duties as the property manager by (1) failing to require the original tenants to sign a lease extension or new lease in 2006, (2) failing to adequately inspect the real estate, (3) failing to notify Vlcek of damage caused by the windstorm and/or submit a claim to Vlcek‘s insurance company for the damage, (4) allowing the month-to-month tenants to remain at the property without a signed lease, (5) failing to conduct a complete inspection of the real estate when Brogee returned the keys to the
{¶ 20} Kersey and Kittyhawk filed a motion for summary judgment on Vlcek‘s claims. They asserted that there was “no causal link between any alleged failure to itemize the damage allegedly caused by the tenants and the harm over which Plaintiff sued.” They stated that any damage was caused by the tenants and that Vlcek could recover damages from the tenants under
{¶ 22} With respect to damages, Vlcek argued that “the reason Mr. Vlcek cannot pinpoint when or which of the tenants caused any particular item of damage is directly because Ms. Kersey did not do what she promised to do; i.e. keep an especially close eye on the Property.” Vlcek further asserted that, if he is bound by the Security Deposit Disposition Form prepared by Kersey, he was damaged to the extent that the damage to the property exceeded $275 ($1,225 - $950). Finally, Vlcek noted that there was evidence that the tenants had a dog. He asserted that Kersey‘s failure to include a pet deposit and pet fee in the lease precluded him from collecting that income.
{¶ 23} In granting Kersey and Kittyhawk‘s motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Kersey and Kittyhawk breached their duties to Vlcek under the management agreement, but that Frye‘s affidavit failed to establish that the alleged deficiencies were the proximate cause of the damage that Vlcek asserted. The court noted that Vlcek could not say when the asserted damage occurred or which tenant caused the damage. The trial court further stated, “That Kersey understated the damage that exceeded the security deposit does not prevent Vlcek from seeking full restitution from the Tenant Defendants.”
“Causation” refers to the cause and effect relationship between tortious conduct and a loss that must exist before liability for that loss may be imposed. While difficult to define, “proximate cause” is generally established ” ‘where an original act is wrongful or negligent and, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces a result [that] would not have taken place without the act.’ ” It is also well settled that because the issue of proximate cause is not open to speculation, conjecture as to whether the breach of duty caused the particular damage is not sufficient as a matter of law.
{¶ 25} Upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court properly concluded that there was no evidence that Kersey‘s actions proximately caused the damages Vlcek claimed. Vlcek and Kersey visited and inspected the Harshman Road residence in the fall of 2005. At the time, they did not notice any appreciable damage to the property. Kersey drove by the residence on numerous occasions while the home was rented by the original and month-to-month tenants, but she did not stop at the house until late fall of 2007 or January 2008, when she attempted to have a new lease signed. At that time, Kersey noticed damage to the rear door, but she did not go inside the house. Neither Kersey, Vlcek, nor another representative of Vlcek inspected the house until after the month-to-month tenants moved out.
{¶ 26} Although the tenants claim that they did not damage the property, there is
{¶ 27} Because the timing of these events is unknown, Vlcek has not demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kersey‘s actions resulted in any damage to the property. It is possible that all of the damage occurred shortly after Vlcek and Kersey‘s 2005 inspection of the property and that a future inspection by Kersey would not have prevented any additional damage. It is equally possible that the damage of which Vlcek complains occurred shortly before the month-to-month tenants moved out and that earlier inspections by Kersey would not have revealed damage to the property. Similarly, because it is impossible to tell from the record when and how long a dog may have been on the property, it is speculative whether and to what extent Vlcek may have been entitled to income had a provision regarding pets been part of the lease.
{¶ 28} Vlcek argues that Kersey and Kittyhawk proximately caused him injury in the amount of damage to the property because, as a matter of law, he cannot sue the tenant-defendants for damages over the amount of damages set forth on the Security Deposit Disposition Form. Vlcek asserted at oral argument that, due to Kersey‘s failure to identify and itemize all damage to the property, the tenant-defendants have a “free pass for everything over $1,225.”
{¶ 30}
(B) Upon termination of the rental agreement any property or money held by the landlord as a security deposit may be applied to the payment of past due rent and to the payment of the amount of damages that the landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant‘s noncompliance with section 5321.05 of the Revised Code or the rental agreement. Any deduction from the security deposit shall be itemized and identified by the landlord in a written notice delivered to the tenant together with the amount due, within thirty days after termination of the rental agreement and delivery of possession. The tenant shall provide the landlord in writing with a forwarding address or new address to which the written notice and amount due from the landlord may be sent. If the tenant fails to provide the landlord with the forwarding or new address as required, the tenant shall not be entitled to damages or attorneys
fees under division (C) of this section.
(C) If the landlord fails to comply with division (B) of this section, the tenant may recover the property and money due him, together with damages in an amount equal to the amount wrongfully withheld, and reasonable attorneys fees.
{¶ 31} In Adams v. Davenport, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2005-CA-108, 2006-Ohio-4646, which was cited by the trial court, the tenant brought suit against his landlord for failure to return his security deposit and unlawfully confiscating certain personal property. We held that a landlord must comply with his statutory duties under
{¶ 32} We have found no cases where a landlord has complied with
{¶ 33} Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that the Ohio legislature‘s intent in enacting
One, to specifically permit the landlord, upon termination of the rental agreement, to deduct from the rental deposit any unpaid rents and actual damages to the premises occasioned by the tenant. Two, to require prompt refunds of all or part of the security deposit or, in the alternative, to provide an explanation to the tenant why all or any part of the deposit was not returned to him. And, three, to provide a penalty by way of damages and reasonable attorney fees against a noncomplying landlord for the wrongful withholding of any or all of the security deposit.
Vardeman v. Llewellyn, 17 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 476 N.E.2d 1038 (1985). The itemization requirement of
{¶ 34} Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that any failure by Kersey to fully identify and itemize the damage to the Harshman Road property does not prevent Vlcek from seeking full recovery against the defendant-tenants for the actual property damage. Consequently, Vlcek has not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Kersey‘s alleged failure to fully identify and itemize the damage proximately caused an injury to him.
{¶ 35} Vlcek‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 36} In his second assignment of error, Vlcek claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Muhlenkamp, Larson, Demange and Monnier.
{¶ 37} Vlcek‘s second amended complaint alleged that all of the original tenants (including Brogee) breached the lease in the following respects: (1) failed to return the property to Vlcek in a clean and sanitary condition, (2) altered and/or redecorated the real estate without permission, (3) placed nails in the walls without permission, (4) failed to use the dehumidifier as required, (5) failed to repair all damages caused by the tenants, their family, and/or guests, (6) allowed the real estate to be occupied by persons who were not on the lease, (7) parked vehicles on the yard and other grassy areas, (8) failed to maintain the yard, (9) failed to keep gutters and down spouts free of debris, (10) failed to dispose of all trash, (11) failed to maintain the appliances, (12) failed to return all lights and smoke detectors in a workable condition, and (13) failed to clean the carpets annually.
{¶ 38} The original defendants (excluding Brogee) sought summary judgment on Vlcek‘s claims. They asserted that Vlcek, through his agent, Kersey, entered into a new lease with Brogee, Koverman, and Dues in January 2008. As a result of that lease, Vlcek‘s claims against the original tenants were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for property damage claims. The original defendants further asserted that Vlcek‘s claims against them failed because Vlcek could not identify which damage was caused by which tenant.
{¶ 39} The trial court rejected Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier‘s statute of limitations argument. It concluded, however, that Vlcek could not establish that
{¶ 40} Vlcek raises several challenges to the trial court‘s conclusions. All of Vlcek‘s arguments rely on his contention that the May 2005 lease remained in effect, albeit on a month-to-month basis, through October 2008, when the last tenants moved out.
{¶ 41} Vlcek‘s primary argument is that the trial court erred in concluding that Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier ceased to be tenants when Vlcek entered into a new landlord-tenant relationship with Brogee, Koverman, and Dues. He argues that Kersey left a proposed lease with Brogee, Koverman and Dues, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the month-to-month tenants promptly signed the lease, and that the month-to-month tenants merely counteroffered when they signed the lease because they changed the provision regarding the security deposit.
{¶ 42} Under Ohio law, after a written lease has expired, there are two categories of tenancy: (1) a tenant in sufferance (also called a holdover tenant) and (2) a tenant at will. A tenant whose lease has terminated is a tenant in sufferance; such a party has no agreement as
{¶ 43} Under the May 2005 lease, the original tenants were required to provide 30 days’ notice of their intent to vacate. If no notice were given, “the current lease will automatically renew itself on the first of each month and continue as a month to month lease, with all terms of the lease remaining in full force and effect.” (Section E, ¶ 28.) The tenants were also responsible for notifying Kittyhawk of any changes in the “number of occupants, classification or status.” (Section J.)
{¶ 44} By its terms, the May 2005 written lease expired on May 31, 2006, and it was renewed on a month-to-month basis. By late 2007, all of the original tenants except Brogee had moved out of the residence. Around that time, Kersey learned that Brogee, Koverman, and Dues were residing at the Harshman Road property and she prepared a written month-to-month lease naming those residents as tenants. Although the parties have presented a copy of a proposed written month-to-month lease prepared and signed by Kersey
{¶ 45} Regardless of whether the proposed 2008 month-to-month lease was properly executed, Kersey and Vlcek received and accepted rent payments from the month-to-month tenants from January 2008 through October 2008. Kersey knew that Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier had moved out and that Brogee, Koverman, and Dues resided there. Even assuming the absence of an enforceable, written contract with Brogee, Koverman, and Dues, Vlcek entered into a month-to-month rental agreement with the month-to-month tenants based on his acceptance of their monthly rent payments. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the four original tenants who had vacated the premises were no longer tenants in 2008.
{¶ 46} Vlcek further argues that he did not need to establish which tenants caused what damage in order for Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier to be liable. He states that they waived any defense that the damage was caused by others by failing to submit the move-in checklist to Kersey. Although the original tenants did not complete the move-in checklist that Kersey provided, Kersey testified during her deposition that the original tenants “did a video inspection of the property and videoed it on a disk. * * * I think it had sound to it. I don‘t know. I never played it.” Vlcek also stated in his affidavit that “one of the original tenants took some photographs of the Property shortly after the original tenants took possession and sent a copy of those photographs to Kittyhawk.” Thus, Vlcek has acknowledged that the original tenants conducted a move-in inspection of the property and provided it to Kersey. Vlcek cannot establish that the original tenants waived a defense
{¶ 47} Finally, Vlcek argues that Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier agreed to be jointly and severally liable for damages in the May 2005 lease and, as a result, they are responsible for any damage done to the property.
In general, a landlord may recover damages from a tenant for violations of
R.C. 5321.05 , which provides a lengthy list of obligations tenants owe to a landlord concerning maintenance of the leased premises. In particular,R.C. 5321.05(A) provides in relevant part that a tenant shall refrain from ” * * * intentionally or negligently destroying, defacing, damaging or removing any fixture, appliance, or other part of the premises; * * *.” The landlord, however, bears the burden of submitting sufficient evidence linking any alleged damage to a failure on the part of a tenant to fulfill those obligations. (Citations omitted.)
Zilka v. Asberry, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-04-022, 2005-Ohio-1881, ¶ 9.
{¶ 48} Even assuming that Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier agreed to be jointly and severally liable, Vlcek has presented no evidence establishing that any of the damage was caused during their tenancy. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier.
{¶ 49} The second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Month-to-Month Tenants (excluding Dues)
{¶ 50} In his third assignment of error, Vlcek claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Brogee and Koverman.
{¶ 51} Vlcek‘s second amended complaint contained two counts against the
{¶ 52} The trial court sustained Brogee and Koverman‘s motion for summary judgment for the same reasons as the original tenants’ motion. The trial court stated that “Vlcek has admitted that he is unable to prove what tenant caused damage to his Property or when any particular damage took place.” The court noted that Koverman admitted to punching a hole in a wall that was not repaired and that the evidence established that Dues damaged a door. However, Kersey‘s Security Deposit Disposition Form charged $400 to repair and paint walls and $200 to replace a bedroom door. The court stated that these amounts, plus the $195 chargeable to Larson, were “well within the $950 security deposit kept by Kersey when Brogee and Koverman vacated the premises.” In parenthesis, the trial court further noted:
The Court is aware that Terry Walton estimated $2,600 to “Repair and replace damaged drywall” and $225 to “replace (one) broken bedroom door.” However, the Court concludes that the appropriate measure of damages is that of Kersey, who managed the property as Vlcek‘s agent and assessed the damage upon Brogee‘s and Koverman‘s departure. Furthermore, Walton‘s estimate to “repair and replace damaged drywall” referred to the “Whole House.”
{¶ 53} While we might not have used the same words as the trial court, we agree
{¶ 54} As for Koverman‘s liability for alleged property damage other than the hole in the wall, Vlcek‘s claims against Koverman fail for the same reasons as Vlcek‘s claims against Larson, Muhlenkamp, Demange and Monnier. Vlcek cannot identify which tenant cause what damage at what time. Accordingly, Vlcek cannot establish that any additional property damage was caused by Koverman. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Koverman on Count Two of Vlcek‘s second amended complaint.
{¶ 55} We reach a different conclusion with respect to Vlcek‘s property damage claim against Brogee. It is undisputed that Brogee resided at the residence at all relevant times and that he signed the original May 2005 lease. Brogee stated in his affidavit that he received a written month-to-month lease from Kersey, that he, Koverman, and Dues signed it, that he made a copy of the lease for himself, and that he mailed the original signed copy to Kersey. (Brogee Aff. ¶ 85-88.) Brogee stated that the new lease provided the same terms and conditions as the original 2005 lease, except that only the month-to-month tenants were on the lease. (Brogee Aff. ¶ 83.) Accordingly, Brogee apparently concedes that he was subject to various obligations under the 2008 month-to-month lease and
{¶ 56} Both the 2005 and 2008 leases contained an “acknowledgments” provision immediately above the signature lines. That provision states:
I/We the undersigned Tenants have read, understand and accept all the terms and conditions of this lease agreement and hereby agree to abide by said terms and conditions during the tem [sic] of this lease and/or any extensions thereof. Also, if I/We sign this agreement with another person/persons, I will be held accountable individually and collectively.
The plain meaning of this provision is that each tenant is jointly and severally liable for the tenants’ obligations under the lease. Thus, under the lease, if one of Brogee‘s co-tenants causes damage to the residence, Brogee is jointly and severally liable for that damage. Such a term is not contrary to Ohio‘s Landlords and Tenants Act,
{¶ 57} There is no evidence that Brogee himself damaged the residence, and all of the defendant-tenants dispute that any damage, in fact, occurred. However, Vlcek presented evidence that physical damage was done to his property. Vlcek stated in his affidavit that the hot tub was not working and a pool ball had gotten lodged in the sump pump causing the motor to burn out. Vlcek stated that there was damage to ceiling fans, several doors, and walls. Vlcek provided an affidavit from his sister, Rosemary Bern, attesting that the interior of the home was “absolutely filthy and damaged.” He also provided an estimate from Terry Walton, a general contractor, itemizing approximately $25,000 of repairs. Based on the record, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the extent of damage to the property and that, due to the acknowledgment provisions in the leases and the fact that Brogee was a tenant at all relevant times, Vlcek is not precluded from asserting a claim for property damage against Brogee.
{¶ 59} Vlcek presented evidence that could support a conclusion that Brogee and Koverman breached the terms of their lease in these respects. Vlcek and Bern both stated in affidavits that the house was not clean and sanitary after the house was vacated. Bern described the house as “absolutely filthy.” Vlcek further stated that “[t]he dehumidifier was unplugged [and] shoved in the corner of the basement. There was much dust on it. The only use that I saw for it was being used for was to hold the cups for a keg party.” As for the yard, Vlcek observed “garbage everywhere, broken beer bottles, bottle caps. I mean I‘m still finding that stuff.” Vlcek stated that he incurred cleaning costs. Although Vlcek cannot establish that Koverman caused physical damage to the property (other than the admitted hole in the drywall), there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Koverman and Brogee failed to comply with these conditions of the lease, resulting in extensive cleaning costs to Vlcek.
{¶ 60} Accordingly, the third assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 61} The facts and legal issues presented to the trial court and to this court do not lend themselves to terse or cursory resolution. Their disposition is not advanced by ad
{¶ 62} The trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed in part and reversed in part. Specifically, the portion of the trial court‘s judgment that granted summary judgment to Scott Brogee will be reversed, and the portion of the trial court‘s judgment that granted summary judgment to Keith Koverman will be affirmed in part and reversed in part. In all other respects, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed. The matter will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Konrad Kuczak
Jonathan S. Zweizig
Thomas H. Pyper
Gregory P. Garner
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz