¶ 1 In this personal injury action involving a motor vehicle collision, plaintiff, David Vititoe, appeals the judgment in favor of defendant, Rocky Mountain Pavement Maintenance, Inc., now known as Polk Holdings Company, Inc. Plaintiff asserts that reversal is required because some of the prospective jurors made prejudicial statements during voir dire, and that the trial court erred when it declined to canvass the jury, issue a limiting instruction, or declare a mistrial. He also contends that the jury's verdict is not supported by the evidence and that the court erred by both giving and failing to give certain jury instructions.
¶ 2 We conclude that the prospective jurors' statements were not prejudicial and therefore did not require any corrective action from the trial court. We also conclude that the jury's verdict is supported by the evidence and that the court did not erroneously instruct the jury. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
¶ 3 Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle eastbound on Colfax Avenue in Denver late one night when he made a U-turn. Shortly after he began to proceed westbound, his motorcycle collided with the rear portion of a lowboy trailer that was connected to a tractor being driven by Larry Horton, defendant's employee. The collision occurred in the left, westbound lane as Horton was either stopped at, or beginning to proceed through, the intersection of Colfax and Logan Street. The intersection was controlled by a traffic signal, which had turned green. Although the parties do not dispute these basic facts, the events that led to the collision are contested.
¶ 4 Plaintiff presented several theories of negligence at trial. He alleged that the collision occurred because of defendant's negligent
¶ 5 Plaintiff's expert witness Brooks Rugemer, an expert in truck driver operations and truck driver negligence, testified that defendant had violated regulations that limit truck drivers to a fourteen-hour work day by allowing Horton to work for approximately seventeen-and-one-half hours without requisite rest, and opined that Horton was likely very tired and inattentive at the time of the collision. Eyewitnesses testified that Horton had remained stopped at the intersection after the traffic signal had turned green. Based on this testimony, plaintiff asserted that the collision occurred because Horton had failed to obey the traffic signal and was stopped at the intersection for an unreasonable time due to fatigue.
¶ 6 Plaintiff also asserted that the collision occurred because Horton's truck was not visible at the time of the collision. Plaintiff's witness Tom Feiereisen, who testified as an expert in accident reconstruction, opined that the taillights on the trailer did not comply with Colorado law because they were positioned too low. In addition, an eyewitness testified that she had watched as plaintiff followed another vehicle westbound before that vehicle swerved suddenly to another lane and saw plaintiff collide with an "invisible" object in the street. Based on this testimony, plaintiff contended that the collision occurred because he had not been able to see the tractor-trailer.
¶ 7 Defendant contended that the collision occurred solely because plaintiff had acted negligently. Horton testified that he was not fatigued at the time of the collision. He stated that plaintiff had collided with his trailer just after the traffic signal turned green and while he was in the process of shifting gears to proceed through the intersection. He also testified that the trailer taillights were on at the time of the collision. Some of the eyewitnesses testified that the tractor-trailer was plainly visible from their perspectives. And a police detective testified that plaintiff had told him that he saw the tractor-trailer and accelerated towards it because he thought the rig was proceeding through the intersection.
¶ 8 The jury returned a special verdict form finding that defendant was negligent, but that defendant's negligence was not a cause of plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for defendant.
II. Jurors' Statements During Voir Dire
¶ 9 Plaintiff contends that some of the prospective jurors made prejudicial statements concerning motorcyclists' helmet use during voir dire. He asserts the trial court erred when it refused to canvass the jurors on that topic, give a limiting instruction, or declare a mistrial. We disagree.
A. Background
¶ 10 During voir dire, Juror H asked plaintiff's counsel whether they could discuss motorcyclists' helmet use. Plaintiff's counsel responded by informing Juror H that the law in Colorado did not allow the jury to consider a motorcyclist's helmet use. Later, plaintiff's counsel asked the jurors whether they could disregard any evidence about plaintiff's use of, or failure to use, a helmet in this case.
¶ 11 In response, Juror B stated that, as a former motorcyclist, she would hold plaintiff to a higher standard of care because a motorcycle lacks protective metal to shield a rider from a collision. Juror H also stated that that she would not follow the law regarding the jury's consideration of helmet use.
¶ 12 The trial court told the jury, "We're not supposed to consider [helmet use] for who's at fault or for any of it, including the financial compensation for what happens." Immediately thereafter, plaintiff's counsel told the panel that because Colorado does not have a mandatory helmet law, evidence regarding helmet use is "not relevant" and is not to be considered. Plaintiff's counsel then requested other prospective jurors to share their views:
.... Anybody else that, you know, and this is a wonderful opportunity because there may be other cases that are in need of your services right now. If this type of case violates a right to feel comfortable infollowing the law and not violating your ethical principles....
¶ 13 Responding to counsel's invitation, Juror K stated that he owned a scooter and that, although he "like[d] the fact that there's a no helmet law in Colorado," felt as though he was held to a higher "burden" when he rode it. Nevertheless, Juror K stated that he would try to listen to the evidence and determine the case fairly.
¶ 14 Juror F stated that he would have a "tough time" balancing the law against his notions of common sense, but acknowledged that a driver of any vehicle must exercise the same type of common sense.
¶ 15 Citing the prospective jurors' statements about helmet use, plaintiff's counsel asked the court to canvass the panel and, if the court determined that other jurors were biased, to declare a mistrial. The trial court declined to do so. It reasoned that plaintiff's counsel had elected to voir dire the panel as he did and chose not to limit his questioning to whether the prospective jurors could perform their duties without knowledge of plaintiff's helmet use. It also reasoned that the jury was not going to hear any evidence regarding plaintiff's helmet use and therefore the statements would not affect the jury. The court refused to issue a limiting instruction because plaintiff's counsel had stated the law and that characterization stood unchallenged.
¶ 16 After some of the prospective jurors were excused for hardship, Juror M stated that, based on her prior experiences with collisions involving motorcycles, she would be unable to follow the law regarding evidence of helmet use, and that motorcyclists are held to a higher standard of care.
¶ 17 While defense counsel was questioning the prospective jurors, he told the jurors that they could draw any conclusions they wished, but they would not hear any evidence regarding helmet use.
B. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 18 This issue is preserved. We review the trial court's decision to deny each of plaintiff's requests for an abuse of discretion. See Kinney v. People,
C. Law
¶ 19 "[U]nder the law of comparative negligence in Colorado, evidence of a plaintiff's failure to wear a protective helmet is inadmissible to show negligence on the part of the plaintiff or to mitigate damages." Dare v. Sobule,
¶ 20 "The purpose of voir dire is to determine whether any potential juror has beliefs that would interfere with a party's right to receive a fair and impartial trial." Black v. Waterman,
¶ 21 In Mersman, the defendant was charged with several offenses related to his operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id . at 201. After one of the prospective jurors stated that she knew the defendant's only witness " 'through the drug scene,' " the trial court denied the defendant's request for a mistrial. Id . at 203.
¶ 22 On appeal, a division of this court determined that the juror's statements "may, in fact, have been prejudicial." Id . However, the division concluded that the trial court had not plainly erred by failing to canvass the jury or issue a limiting instruction because
D. Application
¶ 23 Relying on Mersman, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction, canvass the jury, or declare a mistrial in response to the potential jurors' statements about helmet use. We disagree.
¶ 24 There may be situations in which a prospective juror makes a statement that demands corrective action by the trial court. See id . at 203-04. However, such action is necessary only where the statement is potentially prejudicial. See id . at 203 ; cf. People v. Brewer,
¶ 25 In Mersman, the prospective juror's statement implied that she knew the defendant's only witness had been involved in either using or dealing drugs. See
¶ 26 Whether a statement made by a prospective juror is potentially prejudicial depends significantly on the facts and circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan,
¶ 27 In Tegzes, the defendant was charged with two offenses concerning the possession of cocaine.
¶ 29 Furthermore, the jury heard no direct evidence that plaintiff was not wearing a helmet. While a bartender at a local establishment, who knew plaintiff, testified that plaintiff was not carrying a helmet with him when the bartender saw him the evening of the collision, such evidence was introduced by plaintiff's counsel. Hence, any error inhering in such testimony was invited, and thus is not reversible. See People v. Wittrein,
¶ 30 Moreover, during voir dire, the trial court informed the panel that it could not consider a motorcyclist's use of, or failure to use, a helmet to determine liability or damages. And, at the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that it must "consider only the evidence received at trial[,]" which consisted of the sworn testimony, the exhibits that had been admitted, stipulations, and presumptions. "Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that a jury follows a trial court's instructions." Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood,
¶ 31 There is no such contrary evidence in this case. The trial court dismissed Juror M, Juror H, and Juror B-the jurors who had said they would not follow the law-for cause. None of the jurors who ultimately served expressed a similar sentiment when they were questioned during voir dire. As a result, plaintiff's contention relies solely "on speculation as to the effect, if any, the potential jurors' statements had on the actual jurors." Guzman,
¶ 32 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court's refusal to canvass the jury, give a limiting instruction, or declare a mistrial was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion.
III. Evidentiary Support for the Jury's Verdict
¶ 33 Plaintiff asserts that the judgment must be reversed because the evidence admitted at trial does not support the jury's verdict. He contends that the jury could not have reasonably found-as it did-that defendant had acted negligently, but that such negligence was not a cause of his injuries. We disagree.
A. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 34 This issue is preserved. When a jury verdict is challenged on the grounds that it is unsupported by the evidence, we must review the entire record to determine whether there is competent evidence from which the jury logically could have reached its verdict. Hock v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
¶ 35 "An appellate court has a duty to attempt to reconcile the jury's answers to special verdicts if it is at all possible." City of Aurora v. Loveless,
¶ 36 "[W]e must determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the
B. Law
¶ 37 "In Colorado a finding of negligence does not create liability on the part of a defendant unless that negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." Loveless,
¶ 38 "Proximate cause has two aspects: causation in fact and legal causation." Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C.,
¶ 39 To establish causation in fact, " 'a plaintiff must show either that (1) but for the defendant's alleged negligence, the claimed injury would not have occurred, or (2) the defendant's alleged negligence was a necessary component of a causal set that would have caused the injury.' " Reigel,
¶ 40 The former, or "but-for" test, is "satisfied if the negligent conduct in a 'natural and continued sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produce[d] the result complained of, and without which the result would not have occurred.' " Reigel,
¶ 41 The latter test may be used where causes other than the defendant's negligence "may be at play."
C. Application
¶ 42 Plaintiff contends that defendant's negligence must have been a cause of his injuries because the parties stipulated that the collision had caused those injuries and the evidence presented only two possible causes of the collision: plaintiff's negligence or defendant's negligence. We are not persuaded.
¶ 43 At the outset, we reject plaintiff's contention that the stipulation regarding his damages defeats the jury's verdict on its own. The parties stipulated that plaintiff had "injuries and losses from the collision and has incurred medical bills totaling $447,126.16." (Emphasis added.) While this stipulation establishes that the collision
¶ 44 In asserting that defendant's negligence was a cause of the collision, plaintiff relies exclusively on one of the negligence theories he presented at trial. That theory posited that defendant was negligent for failing to abide by regulations that limit truck drivers to a fourteen-hour work day. He contends that the collision would not have occurred but for defendant's negligent failure to follow those regulations because, if defendant had done so, the vehicle that Horton was driving would not have been present on the road.
¶ 45 However, plaintiff's argument is belied by Rugemer's testimony. On direct examination, Rugemer explained that regulations limit the number of hours a truck driver may work and that they exist to prevent fatigue. He opined that Horton was driving in violation of those regulations and was likely very tired at the time of the collision. However, on cross-examination, Rugemer conceded that none of the people who had observed Horton at the scene of the collision had noted or reported that he appeared tired or fatigued. Rugemer also stated that he had no opinion as to whether the regulatory violation was a cause of the collision.
¶ 46 "The credibility of the witnesses, the sufficiency, probative effect and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all within the province of the fact finder, whose decision will not be disturbed on review unless manifestly erroneous." Vaccaro v. Am. Family Ins. Grp.,
¶ 47 Moreover, the jury could have rejected Rugemer's testimony entirely. See id . Plaintiff presented several theories regarding defendant's negligence and we will not assume that the jury relied exclusively on one such theory. See City of Fountain v. Gast,
¶ 48 Plaintiff alleged that Horton had negligently failed to activate the taillights on his trailer. An eyewitness testified that she saw plaintiff following another vehicle before the collision, and that she watched that other vehicle suddenly swerve to a different lane of traffic before plaintiff's motorcycle collided with an "invisible" object in the street. After the eyewitness testified, however, Feiereisen opined that, based on average reaction times and braking speeds, there was a "high probability" that the collision would have occurred even if Horton's taillights were on. This was so, Feieresian explained, because plaintiff "was ... in the dead zone by the time the [other vehicle's movement] allowed him to see the back of the trailer."
¶ 49 Based on the testimony from these two witnesses, the jury could have found that Horton was negligent for failing to activate his taillights. But the jury could have also logically determined that Horton's negligence was not a cause of the collision because plaintiff's motorcycle would have collided with the rear of the trailer regardless. Cf. Morales,
¶ 50 Hence, there "is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers ... consistent." Loveless,
IV. Jury Instructions
¶ 51 Plaintiff contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in three ways. First, plaintiff asserts that the trial court should have instructed the jury about Dep't of Regulatory Agencies Reg. 6102(a)(I), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 723-6102(a)(I), which adopts the truck driver hours-of-service limitations set forth in 49 C.F.R. 395.3 (2014). He contends that the regulations should have been included in Instruction 21, which instructed the jury about his theory of negligence per se, and that the trial court erred by giving the instruction without reference to those regulations.
¶ 52 Second, he argues that the trial court should have omitted any reference to the doctrine of assumption of the risk in Instruction 16, which defined negligence, because the evidence presented at trial did not support that instruction.
¶ 53 Third, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by giving Instructions 24 and 25, which instructed the jury that the law presumes a driver is negligent if the driver hits another vehicle in the rear. Plaintiff contends that this collision was a "barrier" collision to which the presumption does not apply.
¶ 54 We decline to address the merits of plaintiff's arguments regarding Instruction 21 and conclude that the court did not err in giving Instructions 16, 24, and 25.
A. Instruction 21
¶ 55 Plaintiff contends that the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury concerning Reg. 6102(a)(I) and 49 C.F.R. 395.3. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court's duty to correctly inform the jury on matters of the law required it to include the regulations in Instruction 21. Acknowledging that he did not raise this contention at trial, plaintiff urges us to review the merits of his contentions for plain error. Defendant contends we should not review plaintiff's argument because he has waived it. We agree with defendant.
¶ 56 Although we agree that a trial court is obligated to correctly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, that obligation "does not transform the court into an advocate for either party, nor does it relieve parties of the obligation to bring objections to the court's attention to preserve matters for appellate review." Vanderpool v. Loftness,
¶ 57 Before trial, the trial court gave plaintiff an opportunity to tender a proposed instruction regarding negligence per se and plaintiff provided an instruction that did not refer to either of the regulations he now contends should have been included. Moreover, the trial court held numerous jury instruction conferences throughout the course of trial, during which the parties discussed Instruction 21. Based on Rugemer's testimony about the regulations, it appears plaintiff was aware that such regulations existed. Yet at no time did plaintiff request that the regulations be included in any of the jury instructions.
¶ 58 Hence, plaintiff had ample opportunities to bring the regulations to the court's attention and advocate for their inclusion in the jury instructions. But he did not do so. Therefore, we conclude that the "trial court satisfied its responsibilit[y]" to correctly instruct the jury on the law. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
¶ 59 Plaintiff contends that even if the trial court did not have a duty to include the regulations on its own, we should apply the plain error standard to review the merits of his contention regarding Instruction 21. We are not persuaded.
¶ 60 " C.R.C.P. 51 requires parties to object to alleged errors in instructions before they are given to the jury and only the objected-upon grounds will be considered on appeal." Day v. Johnson,
¶ 61 We decline to review for plain error here. Rugemer testified about the federal regulation, which is identical to the state regulation governing truck drivers. See Reg. 6102(a)(I) (incorporating 49 C.F.R. 395.3 ). He opined that the purpose of the regulation was to prevent fatigue, and that Horton was violating the regulation at the time of the collision. During closing, plaintiff's counsel argued that Horton had violated the regulations and was "out of it" at the time of the collision. The jury was properly instructed that negligence "means ... the doing of an act which a reasonably careful person would not do, under the same or similar circumstances to protect oneself or others from injury." Based on the information provided to it, the jury could have concluded that defendant had acted negligently based on the number of hours Horton had worked on the day of the collision. Therefore, we perceive no manifest injustice.
¶ 62 Accordingly, we decline to review the merits of plaintiff's contention regarding Instruction 21. See Day,
B. Instruction 16
¶ 63 Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by giving Instruction 16, which informed the jury about the doctrine of assumption of the risk. We disagree.
1. Background
¶ 64 At trial, plaintiff elicited testimony from the detective who had investigated the collision. The detective testified that, as a part of his investigation, he had spoken to plaintiff about the collision:
[Counsel]: In your conversations with [plaintiff], he told you that initially he was travelling eastbound, right?
[Detective]: Yes.
[Counsel]: And then he told you that after making a U-turn he had accelerated and hit the truck, right?
[Detective]: Yes.
[Counsel]: Because what he told you is that he thought the truck was proceeding through a green light on Logan, right?
[Detective]: Yes, that's what he said.
¶ 65 Based on the detective's testimony, defendant requested an instruction concerning assumption of the risk. The trial court determined that the detective's testimony tended to establish that plaintiff "accelerated toward something he saw." The court reasoned that such a statement was sufficient to support the instruction and included a description of the doctrine in Instruction 16.
2. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 66 The parties agree, and we concur, that plaintiff preserved his argument regarding Instruction 16.
¶ 67 "Trial courts have a duty to correctly instruct juries on matters of law." Bedor v. Johnson,
3. Law
¶ 68 "[A] person assumes the risk of injury or damage if he voluntarily or unreasonably
¶ 69 "[A]ssumption of risk requires knowledge of the danger and consent to it." Carter v. Lovelace,
4. Application
¶ 70 At the outset, we reject plaintiff's contention that Instruction 16 misstated the law because it did not inform the jury about the effect of the assumption of the risk doctrine. In pertinent part, the instruction stated: "Negligence may also mean assumption of the risk...." The supreme court has held that one of the "obvious purposes of section 13-21-111.7 was to make clear that the voluntary assumption of a known risk was a variant of contributory negligence for purposes of tort liability under the comparative negligence statutory scheme." Harris,
¶ 71 Plaintiff contends that Instruction 16 should not have included any reference to assumption of the risk because his statement to the detective reveals that he thought Horton's truck was proceeding through the intersection. Therefore, he asserts, he did not have knowledge of, or consent to, the risk posed by Horton's truck, which was stopped at the time of the collision. We are not persuaded.
¶ 72 As the trial court determined, plaintiff's statements to the detective can fairly be read as an admission that he knew Horton's truck was in front of him and voluntarily accelerated towards it. Plaintiff testified that he had ridden motorcycles since the age of five, and a reasonable juror could conclude that any driver of such experience understands the risk and danger posed by a collision with another vehicle. Cf. Fay v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc.,
¶ 73 Plaintiff's reliance on Carter as support for a contrary conclusion is misplaced. There, the plaintiff was attempting to pass two oversized vehicles when he collided with the lead vehicle, which had begun to turn left onto a dirt road.
¶ 74 According to the detective who investigated the collision in this case, plaintiff acknowledged that he saw Horton's truck in his lane of traffic and accelerated nevertheless.
¶ 75 Plaintiff also argues that his statements to the detective do not constitute evidentiary support for the instruction because they cannot be "taken conclusively as accurate" because of his brain injury. However, a party is not required to establish that the evidence upon which it relies for a jury instruction is conclusively accurate. See Vaccaro, ¶ 34 (determining the credibility of witnesses and the probative effect and weight of evidence "are issues properly left to the jury"). Rather, a party is entitled to a jury instruction if it is supported by sufficient competent evidence and it is consistent with the existing law. Devenyns v. Hartig,
¶ 76 We conclude that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury about assumption of the risk in Instruction 16.
C. Instructions 24 and 25
¶ 77 Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by giving Instructions 24 and 25, which informed the jury that the law presumes a driver is negligent if the driver's vehicle hits another vehicle in the rear. Specifically, he argues that the trial court's decision to give the instructions was not supported by the evidence because the collision in this case was not a typical rear-end collision, but a barrier crash. He also asserts that the presumption is premised upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and therefore may only be applied in favor of a plaintiff. We discern no error.
1. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 78 The parties agree, and we concur, that plaintiff preserved his argument that Instructions 24 and 25 should not have been given because of the nature of the collision at issue. Accordingly, we will review de novo the jury instructions to determine whether they correctly state the law. Day,
¶ 79 However, plaintiff did not present the argument to the trial court that only a plaintiff may rely on the presumption that arises in a rear-end collision. "[A]rguments not presented to or ruled on by the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Sterenbuch v. Goss,
¶ 80 We also decline to review the merits of plaintiff's latter contention for plain error. At most, the jury could have used the presumption described in Instructions 24 and 25 to find plaintiff negligent. However, the jury never reached the issue of plaintiff's negligence because it decided that defendant's negligence was not a cause of the collision. Therefore, no manifest injustice resulted from the trial court's decision to instruct the jury about the presumption. See Harris,
¶ 81 "A presumption is ... a rule based upon experience or public policy established in the law to assist the jury in uncovering the truth." Trione v. Mike Wallen Standard, Inc.,
¶ 82 Res ipsa loquitur "is a rule of evidence which defines the circumstances under which a presumption of negligence will arise as a matter of law." Spoor v. Serota,
¶ 83 "[S]atisfying res ipsa loquitur's elements creates a rebuttable presumption that 'imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.' " Chapman v. Harner,
¶ 84 The general rule in a rear-end collision is that the driver of the car that follows and overtakes the car in front is presumed to be negligent. Kendrick v. Pippin,
¶ 85 However, the instruction is not required as a matter of law in all cases involving a rear-end collision. Bettner,
3. Application
¶ 86 The parties agree, and we concur, that Instructions 24 and 25 accurately stated the law. The dispute in this case centers on whether the evidence supported the giving of the instructions.
¶ 87 The rear-end presumption should not be applied "solely because the front of one vehicle makes contact with the rear of another vehicle." Bettner,
¶ 88 In this case, neither party presented any evidence to suggest that the collision was caused by anything other than negligence. Cf.
¶ 89 "The mere happening of an accident does not raise a presumption of negligence." Hamilton v. Smith,
¶ 90 Plaintiff contended the collision occurred as a result of Horton's negligent failure to activate his taillights, see § 42-4204(1), C.R.S. 2014 (Every vehicle "shall display lighted lamps and illuminating devices" at night.); proceed in a timely manner through a green light, see § 42-4-603(1), C.R.S.2014 (no driver may disobey the instructions of an official traffic control device); and remove his truck from the road after he had become fatigued.
¶ 91 Defendant argued the collision was the result of plaintiff's negligent failure to keep a proper lookout. See § 42-4-1402(1), C.R.S.2014 (a person who drives in an imprudent manner is guilty of careless driving); see also Fay ,
¶ 92 While the parties' accounts of the collision differ significantly, the parties seem to agree that this collision would not have occurred if both parties had operated their vehicles in a reasonably prudent manner. Furthermore, past experience leads us to conclude that an event such as this one does not ordinarily occur unless someone has been negligent. See Kendrick,
¶ 93 As drivers, both plaintiff and Horton had a duty to operate their vehicles with reasonable care. See Hesse v. McClintic,
¶ 94 The parties do not appear to dispute that the collision occurred in the inside westbound lane of Colfax Avenue, that the vehicles were within one block of one another when plaintiff made a U-turn, or that both vehicles were facing west. Thus, the parties do not dispute that the Bettner requirements were satisfied by the facts of this case. See
¶ 95 Instead, plaintiff contends that defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding the rear-end presumption because the collision in this case amounted to a barrier crash. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that this was not a typical rear-end collision because Horton's truck was stopped at an intersection when the collision occurred and did not move forward as a result of the collision. We are not persuaded.
¶ 96 It is clear that the rear-end presumption applies when a "driver ... overtakes and collides with a car stopped ahead on the roadway." Huntoon,
¶ 97 For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by giving Instructions 24 and 25.
V. Conclusion
¶ 98 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE J. JONES concur.