248 Pa. 478 | Pa. | 1915
Opinion by
The Vitagraph Company of America, a New York corporation, instituted this action in replevin, and the jury rendered a verdict for the defendant as follows: “Value of goods, $2,000; damages for detention, $8,424; exemplary damages, $10,000.” Judgment was entered upon the verdict and the plaintiff has appealed.
The Act of April 1.9, 1901, P. L. 88, provides the form of pleadings in replevin, and Section 6 stipulates that “the declaration and affidavit of defense as originally filed, or as amended by leave of court, shall constitute the issues under which, without other pleadings, the question of title to, or right of possession of, the goods and chattels as between all the parties shall be determined by a jury.”
The plaintiff claimed 27 moving picture films and averred, in its original declaration, that a corporation known as the Motion Picture Patents Company was the owner of certain patents relating to the manufacture of such films; that the Patents Company did not sell, manufacture, or use the films, but licensed others, including the plaintiff, to manufacture and lease, but not to sell, them to other concerns known as exchanges, which were
The defendant’s original affidavit of defense, after first calling attention to alleged defects in the statement of claim, and entering certain defenses which were not pressed at trial, averred that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain any action based on the defendant’s license agreement because the plaintiff, together with the Motion Picture Patents Company, seven other -cor porations and two individuals (all except the Patents Company being licensed exchanges) form a combination “in restraint of trade and in violation of the laws of the State of Pennsylvania and of the acts of congress” relating to monopolies; that the notice of the termination of his license was not given to him on January 3, 1911, as averred in the declaration, but on January 4, 1911. None of the material averments of fact as to the ownership of the films, the terms of the contracts, or concerning the cancellation of the defendant’s license, is specifically denied in this affidavit of defense, but it ends with a mere general denial that amounts to no more than a statement of the defendant’s conclusion that he had not “at any time or in any manner violated the terms and conditions of any agreement between him and the Motion Picture Patents Company”; after which the defendant, without controverting the plaintiff’s ownership of the films, denied that the plaintiff “at the time of the issuance of the writ in this case had any right of possession in and to the films taken,” and asserted that the notice of the cancellation of his license was “unfounded, malicious and false and resulted from a conspiracy between the plaintiff and the Motion Picture Patents Company and others to ruin and oppress the defendant and to destroy his trade and business.”
After the defendant’s affidavit had been filed, the plaintiff, by leave of court, filed an amended declaration in which it reiterated the averments concerning its
The defendant filed an amended affidavit of defense in which he increased his claim of damages and alleged that the writ had been sued out “without color of right,” and that the taking of the films under the replevin was “attended by circumstances of hardship, vexation and outrage......all of which was part of a scheme to deprive the defendant of his lawful livelihood and to remove him from the field of competition......and was an unlawful and malicious abuse of the process of law.” It is to be noticed that the supplemental affidavit of defense does not contain any denial of the material facts averred as justifying the Motion Picture Patents Company’s cancellation of the defendant’s license, or of’ the
Not only the pleadings, but the proofs at trial showed the plaintiff’s title, and hence its color of right to the writ, for we find on the record either copies of the actual invoices introduced by the defendant or evidence indicating that such documents were produced and identified, which show that he received from the Vitagraph Company certain of the 27 films in controversy. In addition, there was testimony that the films Avere shipped to the defendant by the plaintiff company, each in a tin box with the license label thereon. Furthermore, when called under cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he had received from the plaintiff a large number of the films, all between April 13, 1909, and July 5, 1910, and that they were accompanied by the plaintiff’s bills and invoices. Thus, aside from the pleadings, the evidence was amply sufficient to prove that most of the films in controversy (all but two) were actually shipped by the plaintiff and received by the defendant. Morevover, there was testimony to show that the bills accompanying these films contained the following, “The films covered by this invoice are leased and not sold; subject to the conditions of a license issued'to lessee by the
Notwithstanding the apparent ownership of the plaintiff, as impliedly conceded in the pleadings and shown by the evidence, the defendant contended at trial that the 27 replevied films belonged to him; he said that in 1909, at the time of his license contract, he had on hand about 1,000 films, purchased outright and belonging absolutely to him; that the arrangement was, at first, that he should at the end of each month return all the films received during the seventh month prior; that the Patents Company, in February, 1910, changed this to
Before taking up the question of the right of possession to the replevied films at the time the suit was
From the evidence produced, we do not see how, justifiably, either the General Film Company or the plaintiff could be found to have been a member of a conspiracy such as the defendant alleges existed against him. The arrangement under which he was working appears to have been entered into with his eyes open and with a fall knowledge of its terms; so he must have known that his license could be revoked at any time by the plaintiff company, either with or without a cause. He admitted that he was one of four film exchanges in Philadelphia that went into this licensing arrangement, when other dealers, although offered a license, refused to do so, and that competitors are “in existence to-day notwithstanding that they could not get that license”; but, as before stated, when it came to trial the defendant did not depend upon his averments of a general conspiracy in restraint of trade, but alleged a special conspiracy against him, to prove which he called a witness' who showed that a meeting was held in New York, in December, 1910, that was attended by a representative of the Patents Company and by representatives of most of the ten licensed manufacturers; that this was a gathering which took place every year at about the same time; that at this particular meeting the licensed manufacturers approved a determination that had previously been reached by the Patents Company to cancel the defendant’s li
Whatever the real fact of the matter may be, the defendant failed to prove any special combination to work against him or his interests — the only combination
The questions we now have to determine are: Did the plaintiff prove a present right of possession to the replevied films, and, if not, what was the value of the possession to the defendant. The license contract contains several provisions concerning its termination, one of them stipulating that it might be terminated by the licensor at any time upon fourteen days’ notice; but
We are conscious of the fact that in the like case of Lubin Mfg. Oo. v. Swaab, supra, we said (p. 191), “Owing to the position in which the defendant is placed by the terms of the license contract under which he operated his business, the damages which it is possible for him to recover may be inconsiderable, but we cannot say as a matter of law that they would be merely nominal,” but more mature study and consideration have brought the conviction that we erred in determining that the defendant’s possession had more than a nominal value, and since the present writer was the author of that opinion, he does not hesitate so to state at this first opportunity.
Most of the cases cited by the appellee were presented on the theory that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings of fact necessary to support the verdict of the jury as to the ownership of the films and the damages awarded; but, since we have determined the evidence to be insufficient in those respects, an extended review of the authorities becomes unnecessary; we have examined all of them, however, and find nothing in conflict with the views expressed in this opinion. M’Donald v. Scaife, 11 Pa. 381; Schofield v. Ferrers, 46 Pa. 438; Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176; Rafferty v. Haldron, 81* Pa. 438; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399; Dennis v. Barber, 6 S. & R. 420, and Wiley v. McGrath, 194 Pa. 498, are all instances of verdicts for plaintiffs where the evidence showed that the actual taking was attended by circumstances of “outrage and oppression” comprising “vindictiveness, wantonness, fraud, deceit or real violence,” or that the detention was accompanied by “vexation and oppression.” In Cummings v. Gann, 52 Pa. 484; 491, we said that it must be “a rare case of misconduct” when exemplary damages, are allowed in an action of replevin, and in Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. 70, 85, we said that where the evidence failed to show such misconduct the court should not permit exemplary damages. M’Cabe v. More-
We have written at some length in order to develop plainly the reasons which impelled us to the conclusion that the large monetary awards comprehended in the present verdict could not be sustained; but it is not necessary to pass specifically upon each of the 23 assignments of error, many of which concern mere details of the trial; without adding further to this already too