The Kobys, man and wife, owned property in the City of Louisville and resided there. The appellant, Ada K. Vissman, owned property next door and resided there. In front there was a public sidewalk running the length of both properties. There was a grass plot between the sidewalk and street also running the length of both properties. -Maple trees grew in this grass plot directly in front of the Koby property. Leavеs from these trees had fallen and covered the sidewalk in front of the Koby property so as to conceal a slight upheаval in the sidewalk which had apparently been caused by roots of trees. This break in the sidewalk was in front of the Koby property but very near the Viss-man line and had been there for some time. All of the parties were aware of its existence. The Kobys knew that at the time involved in the complaint the sidewalk in front of their property was covered with leaves.
On the night of November 15, 1954, while the sidewalk .wаs in the condition heretofore described, the plaintiff, Ada K. Vissman, tripped over the upheaval, fell and was injured. She claims that she was conscious of the existence of the break and had been watching for it just immediately before she fell. She claims that she thought she had passed it and tripped over it just as she started to run up a terrace onto her property. It is her contention that the concealment of the defect by the leaves was the cause of her fall and injury. In bringing this action she charges the Kobys with negligence in permitting the leaves to S0‘ accumulate and that a nuisance was thus created. She charges specific violations of various ordinances upon which she predicates her charge of negligence and nuisance. Depositions of the parties were taken. The case was submitted on motion for summary judgment. Judgment was entered for the Kobys and thus this appeal by Vissman.
The trees frоm which the leaves had fallen grew upon the right-of-way. The falling of the leaves was the natural consequence of the changing season and was in no .way superinduced by the Kobys, nor did they fall from the Koby property onto the sidewalk. This sidewalk and the trees were undеr the sole control of the city. What was the duty of the Kobys relative to removing the fallen leaves? “With respect to the duty to construct, maintain, clean or otherwise care for sidewalks, the general rule in this country is that no such duty rests upon the owners or occupants of abutting premises, in the absence of statute or ordinance imposing it upon them.” 25 Am.Jur., 378(65).
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In the instant case, however, it is Insisted that а duty to remove the leaves and keep the sidewalk clear of obstruction Is imposed upon the Kobys by various ordinances which are numbered and quoted in the pleadings and briefs. We do not undertake here to determine whether such ordinances do or do not require abutting owners to remove fallen leaves from the sidewalk. If, however, the ordinances cited should impose a duty of remоval and clearance on the abutting land owners, what liability would be created by the violations thereof? “The decided weight of authority is to the effect that statutes or ordinances which in terms merely require abutting owners to construct or maintain and repair sidewаlks adjoining their premises or to pay the costs thereof in case of default, do not impose liability upon such owners to travеlers injured by the defective walk.” 25 Am.Jur., 661(366). Kentucky follows the foregoing rule. Webster v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., Ky.,
In Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. McClellan, supra, this Court discussed an ordinаnce enacted to prevent the accumulation of dirt upon sidewalks in the City of Louisville. It was a safety measure as would be аn ordinance to prevent the accumulation of leaves upon the sidewalk. In that case we said:
“The general rule is that an ordinance such as the one in question or an ordinance requiring abutting owners to construct or maintain and repair sidewalks adjоining their premises, the work to be done by the municipality at the expense of the abutting owners in case of their failure so to cоnstruct or repair, does not relieve the municipality of liability nor does it impose liability upon such owners for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of a sidewalk. City of Ashland v. Vansant-Kitchen Lumber Co,213 Ky. 518 ,281 S.W. 503 ; annotations in41 A.L.R. 212 , and93 A.L.R. 799 . In Webster v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co, Ky.,105 S.W. 945 , 946, 32 Ky.Law Rep. 404, this court said: ‘If a municipality could, by placing the liability upon the abutting property owner, relieve itself from the duty of keeping its streets in repair, it would have the effect of relaxing its carе and supervision of them. The responsibility would be divided, to the detriment of the public service. If, under an ordinance authorized by the chаrter, the city may require the property owner to keep in repair the sidewalks in front of his premises, the obligation to do so is one that he owes to the city, and not to the individual. It does not impose any duty the breach of which would render him liable to the travelеr.’ ”
We recognize in this state that the violation of an ordinance is negligence per se, Pryor’s Adm’r v. Otter, 1937,
They being in no way responsible for placing the leaves upon the sidewalk we must, under the facts and authorities cited herein, hold that appellant had no cause of action against the Kobys.
The judgment is therefore affirmed,