Visoly v. BodekVisoly v. Bodek
Lapidus & Frankel and Richard L. Lapidus, Miami, for appellees.
Before JORGENSON, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff below, Aviad Visoly, appeals from a final judgment, whiсh in part, does not permit him to voluntarily dismiss the action. We affirm.
Thе defendant below, Security Pacific Credit Corporation, filеd a verified motion to strike the complaint as sham pursuant to
Rule 1.150, Fla.R.Civ.P. provides that upon granting a mоtion to strike for sham, the court may enter summary judgment. There is no difference or distinction between the summary judgment rule and the rule relating to the striking for sham pleadings so far as voluntary dismissals are concerned. Both rules authorize the entry of summary judgments. The voluntаry dismissal is untimely and is denied.
Visoly contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to voluntarily dismiss his action where
The voluntary dismissal rule permits the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his action “at any time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment.” The rule, however, does not specificаlly refer to motions to strike as sham. Nonetheless, as far as
We find that the remaining points lack merit.
Affirmed.
LEVY and GODERICH, JJ., concur.
JORGENSON, Judge, specially concurring.
I agree with the result that the court has reached today and with the court‘s reasoning. I write separately only to distinguish this case from our decision in Freeman v. Mintz, 523 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied sub nom Coldwell Banker-Klock Co. v. Freeman, 534 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1988). In Freeman, we held that a trial court was without jurisdiction to dismiss a case involuntarily once plaintiff‘s counsel had filed a written notice of voluntary dismissal. In this casе, unlike in Freeman, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as shаm. The court has properly likened that motion to a motion for summary judgment, thereby removing this case from the Freeman rule.