MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Daniel Virtue worked a series of jobs -with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters from October 2000 to January 2007. As a result of his service with the IBT, his local union, and as a rank-and-file Teamster, he was eligible to participate in at least four Teamsters-affiliated pension plans. When Virtue also sought to participate in the IBT’s Family Protection Plan, typically only available to full-time IBT officers and employees, his request was denied. He then brought this lawsuit under Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), seeking declaratory and injunc-tive relief on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated persons. He argued that a 2001 amendment to the Plan that barred part-time “stipend” employees from participating violated ERISA’s anti-cutback provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), by improperly terminating benefits already accrued. Virtue now seeks, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, to certify as a class the group of all individuals adversely affected by the amendment. Because Virtue’s own claim is time-barred, however, he cannot satisfy the four prerequisites to class certification required by Rule 23(a), and the Motion will be denied.
I. Background
According to Defendants, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters has 1.4 million members, accounting for one out of every ten union members in the United States. See
Virtue was a long-time Teamster member and, eventually, a local union president. See Opp. at 7-8; Exh. 5 (Deposition of Daniel Virtue) at 6:10-8:10, 9:9-20, 13:2-12, 25:1-8, 74:19-21. From October 2000 to January 2007, furthermore, he served in a variety of positions for the IBT. See Second Am. Compl., ¶ 2. Although Virtue’s appointment letters said nothing about pension coverage as a result of his IBT employment, Virtue testified that he believed he could be eligible to participate in the Plan at issue in this case. See Virtue Dep. at 115:12-19, 117:2-12. In May 2002, the IBT attempted to disabuse him of this notion, mailing to Virtue and all other similarly situated employees a notice informing them of their status as stipend employees and referring them to the Stipend Employee Policy, which specified that such employees were only eligible for travel-accident insurance. See Opp., Exh. 4 (Correspondence Regarding Roger Hunt and Robert White). The IBT reiterated this position in 2006, when the former Mrs. Virtue’s divorce attorney, Christina M. Veltri, requested information regarding “all benefits” Virtue had with the IBT. See Virtue Dep., Exh. 8 (Correspondence with Christina Veltri). The IBT informed Veltri and Virtue that he was “considered a ‘Stipend employee’ and only receives the Travel Accident Insurance benefit” from the IBT. Id. Nonetheless, in 2009, following his termination from IBT service, Virtue wrote the IBT to apply for benefits under the Plan. See Mot., Exh. B (Declaration of Daniel Virtue), ¶ 22. Both Virtue’s request and his subsequent administrative appeals were denied. Id.
In April 2012, Virtue brought this action on his own behalf and that of a class of similarly situated persons, pursuant to Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3). In his Complaint, he alleges that the Plan’s 2001 Amendment and the associated Stipend Employee Policy had the effect of impermissibly cutting back benefits owed to Stipend Employees under the Plan in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). See Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 16-32. On behalf of himself and the putative class, he seeks reformation of the Plan (Counts I and II), and for himself alone, he requests an order requiring the Plan to provide him with benefits going forward (Count III), and a distribution of past benefits allegedly due to him (Count IV). Id. The Court now considers Virtue’s Motion to certify a class “consist[ing] of those individuals eligible to participate in the Plan on November 16, 2001, who have been excluded from participation on the basis of being a ‘Stipend’ employee.” See Mot. at 1 n. 1.
II. Legal Standard
To certify a class under Rule 23, Plaintiff must show that the proposed class satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the three Rule 23(b) requirements. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)-(b); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. —,
In deciding whether to certify a class under Rule 23, a district court must undertake a “rigorous analysis” of whether the requirements of the Rule have been satisfied. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,
III. Analysis
Before a Court may consider the options under Rule 23(b), Rule 23(a) requires that a putative class meet all four prerequisites for certification—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a); see also Wal-Mart,
A. Statute of Limitations
Virtue alleges a violation of ERISA’s anti-cutback rule, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), which bars ERISA-covered benefit plans from enacting most amendments that would decrease participants’ accrued benefits, and brings his claim under its civil-enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which permits civil actions by plan participants “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.” See Second Am. CompL, ¶¶ 16-21. He argues that the Plan’s “stipend employee” policy, embodied in Amendment 2001-C, “had the necessary consequence of terminating the accrued benefits of persons already in the Plan” as of the date of the amendment. See id., ¶¶ 17-19. It was, moreover, promulgated without appropriate notice to the affected employees and was thus “a prohibited amendment under ... the anti-cutback rule.”
Under these circumstances, courts in this district have applied the District of Columbia’s statute of limitations for breach-of-eon-tract actions, see D.C.Code § 12-301(7), which runs for three years from the time when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered the injury that is the basis of the action.” Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan,
Defendants argue that Virtue’s claim is time-barred because they “clearly repudiated” his right to benefits under the Plan on two separate occasions. See Opp. at 21, 26. First, they contend that Virtue received notice of his ineligibility in May 2002, when the IBT sent a letter to “stipend employees” informing them of their status and of the IBT’s policy that such employees were not entitled to any benefits other than travel-accident insurance. See id. at 20-21; Hunt/ White Correspondence. Second, Defendants assert that the IBT again informed Virtue in 2006—in connection with his divorce proceedings—that he was not eligible to participate in the Plan. See Opp. at 26. The Court agrees: at the very least, this second notice triggered the statute of limitations, which began to run in April 2006 and expired no later than April 2009. Likewise, the Court finds that the Plan is likely correct that the claims of all the putative class members here are time-barred because the notice mailed to all “stipend employees” in 2002 informing them of their ineligibility for plan benefits qualifies as a “clear repudiation” of their entitlement to benefits.
B. Notice to Virtue
Under the ERISA “clear repudiation” doctrine, “some ‘event other than a denial of a claim’ may trigger the statute of limitations by clearly alerting the plaintiff that his entitlement to benefits has been repudiated.” Miller,
Given his deposition testimony, Virtue wisely does not appear to contest that he in fact received and understood this notice, nor does his Reply brief indicate that he believes this notice was not a clear repudiation of his right to benefits under the Plan. While his Reply takes issue with the adequacy of the notice mailed to all “stipend employees” in 2002, Virtue presents no argument or evidence to suggest that this individual letter was not “clear” or that it did not “ma[k]e known [to him as] the beneficiary” that he was ineligible for participation in the Plan. Indeed, such an argument would face an uphill battle. The Plan’s April 14, 2006, letter is precisely the kind of notice other circuits have recognized as satisfying the dear-repudiation rule and triggering the statute of limitations. For example, in Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 73 Pension Fund,
In light of this clear notice, the Court must find that Virtue was or should have been aware of the Plan’s repudiation of his right to benefits no later than April 2006. As a result, the statute of limitations began to run that month and expired no later than April 2009, nearly three years before Virtue filed this lawsuit. His claim is thus time-barred.
Because Virtue’s own claim here is clearly precluded by the statute of limitations, he cannot serve as an adequate representative of the class. “Inherent in Rule 23 is the requirement that the class representatives be members of the class.” Great Rivers Co-op. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Industries, Inc.,
C. Notice to the Class
In the event another putative class member were to consider being substituted here as a plaintiff—or filing his own suit— the Court believes it worthwhile to discuss a likely additional impediment. Setting Virtue’s divorce proceeding aside, the statute of limitations still appears to bar any claim. In May 2002, the IBT sent all stipend employees (that is, all members of the putative class) “a letter informing them that they fell into the category of stipend employee and attached the IBT’s Stipend Employee Policy ... [, which] explicitly states that a stipend employee is not entitled to any benefits other than travel accident insurance.” See Opp. at 20-21; Hunt/White Correspondence. The Plan argues that this notice constituted a clear repudiation of any entitlement to Plan benefits for all stipend employees. See Opp. at 21. Such a position seems persuasive, and it would mean that the statute of limitations in fact expired in May 2005, some seven years before Virtue filed this lawsuit.
Virtue takes issue with this theory, arguing first that the notice was ineffective because it was mailed by the IBT, not the Plan itself, and second that the notice was unclear because “the cover letter [did] not state that the recipient is ineligible for benefits under the Plan.” See Rep. at 12-13. Virtue’s first contention is contrary to the teachings of the Supreme Court and several federal circuit courts, which suggest that notice from an employer can be adequate in these circumstances because the decision regarding which employees to include in an ERISA-covered benefit plan rests with the employer, not the plan itself. See, e.g., Tinley v. Gannett Co., Inc.,
Virtue’s contention that the notice was itself unclear is also weak. He points to no authority—and, indeed, the Court has found none—prescribing the precise form of notice required to constitute a clear repudiation or requiring that such notice include an explicit covering statement indicating that the recipient of the notice is ineligible for benefits. The notice here plainly states that the recipients are considered stipend employees, and the attached “Stipend Employee Policy” explains, with similar clarity, that those stipend employees were not eligible for benefits beyond travel-accident insurance. Any reasonable reader of this notice would conclude that he—as a stipend employee—was ineligible for pension benefits under the Plan. Indeed, correspondence from two other members of the putative class confirms that the notice had precisely this effect: both Roger D. Hunt and Bob White indicated to the IBT that they understood the letter to inform them that they were ineligible for benefits under the Plan. See Hunt/White Correspondence.
The class Virtue seeks to certify—“those individuals eligible to participate in the Plan on November 16, 2001, who have been excluded from participation on the basis of being a ‘Stipend’ employee,” see Mot. at 1 n. 1—all received this notice, which clearly repudiated their right to benefits under the Plan. As a result, the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class apparently began to run in May 2002 and expired in May 2005. Because it appears, then, that the claims of all members of the putative class are time-barred, it is likely that a new named plaintiff would be unable to achieve any more success than Virtue himself, unless the May 2002 notice was not, in fact, mailed to all Stipend Employees. Of course, anyone who became a stipend employee after the notice was sent in May 2002 would be barred by the terms of the amendment itself.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court believes that class certification is not appropriate in this matter. An Order denying Plaintiffs Motion and setting a status hearing will issue this day.