delivered the opinion of the court.
This is а motion on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia that theycourt proceed to determine all questions
*18
left open by the decision of March 6, 1911.
The Attorney General of West Virginia answered that the members of the Legislature convened in May, 1911, were elected before this cause had been argued and under conditions that left them uncertain as to the wishes of their constituents; that the Governor was of opiniоn that he could not constitutionally amend his proclamation so *19 as to embody consideration of the debt, and that there is no one •in. West Virginia except the Legislature that has рower to deal with the matter. He then suggested a doubt whether the Virginia Debt Commission was empоwered to deal with the case in its present phase, in view of the provision in the Resolutiоn creating it that it should not negotiate except upon the basis that Virginia is bound' only for the two-thirds of the debt that she had provided for, and concluded that this court ought not to act befоre the West Virginia Legislature at its next regular session can consider the case in the spirit anticipated by the opinion of the court.
With regard to the doubt implied by the Governor of Wеst Virginia whether it now is incumbent upon that State to take the initiative, and that suggested by its Attorney Genеral whether the Virginia. Debt Commission has the necessary power, we are of opinion thаt neither of them furnishes a just ground for delay. The conference suggested by the court is a cоnference in the cause. The body that directed the .institution of the suit has taken the proper step on behalf of the plaintiff, and it is for the defendant to say whether it will leave the court to enter a decree irrespective of its assent or will try to reach a result that the court will accept. The conference is not for an independent compromise out of court, but an at- . tempt to settle a decree. The provision as to negotiations, in the Virginia Resolution preceding the statute authorizing this suit, refers, we presume, to а settlement out of court and has nothing to do with the conduct of the cause. If the partiеs in charge of 'the suit consent, this court is not likely to inquire very curiously into'questions of power, if, on its part, it is satisfied that they have consented to a proper decree.
A question like the present should be disposed of without undue delay. But a State cannot be expected to move with the celerity of a .private business man; it is enough if *20 it proceeds, in the languаge of the English Chancery, with all deliberate speed. Assuming, as we do, that the Attorney General is correct in saying that only the Legislature of the defendant State can act, we are оf opinion that the time has not come for granting the present motion. If the authorities of West Virginia see fit to await the regular session of the Legislature, that fact is not sufficient to prоve that when the voice of the State is heard it will proclaim unwillingness to make a rational effort for peace.
Motion overruled without prejudice.
