delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill brought by the Commonwealth of Vir
*23
ginia to have the State of West Virginia’s proportion of the public debt of Virginia as it stood before 1861 ascertained .and satisfied. The bill was set forth when the case was before this court on demurrer.
The answer admits a debt of about $33,000,000, but avers that the main object of the internal improvements in connection with which it was contracted wafe to afford outlets to the Ohio River on the west and to the seaboard on the east for the products of the eastern part of the State, and to develop the resources of that part, not those of what is now West Virginia. In aid of this conclusion it goes into some elaboration of details. It admits the proceedings for the separation of the State and refers to an act of May, 1862, consenting to the same, to which we also shall refer. It denies that it received property of more than a little value from Virginia or that West Virginia received more than belonged to her in the way of surplus revenue on hand when she was admitted to the Union, and denies that any liability for these items was assumed by her constitution. It sets forth in detail the proceedings looking to a settlement, but as they have no bearing upon our decision we do not dwell upon them. It admits the transactions of Virginia with the bondholders and sets up that they discharged the Commonwealth from one-third of its debt and that what may have been done as to two-thirds does not concern the defend *25 ant, since Virginia admits that her share was not less than that. If the bonds outstanding in 1861 have been taken up it is only by the issue of new bonds for two-thirds and certificates to be paid by West Virginia alone for the other third. Liability for any payments by Virginia is denied and accountability, if any, is averred to be only on the principle of § 9 of the Wheeling ordinance, to be stated. It is set up further that under , the constitution of West Virginia her equitable proportion can be established by her legislature alone, that the liquidation can be only in the way provided by that instrument, and hence that this suit cannot be maintained. The settlement by Virginia with her creditors also is pleaded as a bar, and that she brings this suit solely as trustee for them.
•- The grounds of the claim are matters of public history. After the Virginia ordinance of secession, citizens of the State who dissented from that ordinance organized a government that was recognized as the State of Virginia by the Government of the United States'. Forthwith a convention of the restored State, as it was called, held at Wheeling, proceeded to carry out a long entertained wish of many West Virginians by adopting an ordinance for the formation of a new State out of the western portion of the old Commonwealth. A part of § 9 of the ordinance was as follows: “The new state shall take upon itself a just proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia prior to the first day of January, 1861, to be ascertained by charging to it all state expenditures within the limits thereof, and a just proportion of the ordinary expenses of the state government, since any part of said debt was contracted; and deducting therefrom the monies paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth from the counties included ■ within the said new state during the said period.” Having previously provided for a popular vote, a constitutional convention, etc., the ordinance in' § 10 ordained that when the General Assembly should give *26 its consent to the formation of such new State, it should forward to the Congress of the United States such consent, together with an official copy of such constitution, with the request that the new State might be admitted into the union of States.
A constitution was framed for the new State by a constitutional convention, as provided in the ordinance, on November 26, 1861, and was adopted. By Article 8, § 8, “An equitable proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia, prior to the first day of January in' the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, shall be assumed by this State; and the Legislature shall ascertain the same as soon as may be practicable, and provide for the liquidation thereof, by a sinking fund sufficient to pay the accruing interest, and redeem the principal within thirty-four years.” An act of the legislature of the restored State of Virginia, passed May 13, 1862, gáve the consent of that legislature to the erection of the new State “under the provisions set forth in the constitution for the said State of West'Virginia'.” Finally Gongress gave its sanction by pn act of December 31, 1862, c. 6; 12 Stat. 633, which recited the framing and adoption of the West Virginia constitution and the consent given by the legislature of Virginia through the last mentioned act, as well as the request of the West Virginia convention and of the Virginia legislature, as the'grounds for its consent. There was a provision for the adoption of an emancipation clause before.the act of Congress should take effect, and for a proclamation by the President, stating the fact, when the desired amendment was made. Accordingly, after the amendment and a proclamation by President Lincoln, West Virginia became a State on June 20, 1863.
It was held in 1870 that the. foregoing constituted an agreement between the old State and the new,
Virginia
v.
West
Virginia,
The case is to be considered in the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a quasi-international controversy, remembering that there is no municipal code governing the matter, and that this court may be called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State alone..
Missouri
v.
Illinois,
The amount of the debt January 1, 1861, that we have-to apportion no longer is in dispute. The master’s finding was accepted by West Virginia and at. the. argument we understood Virginia not to press her exception that it should be enlarged by a.disputed item. It was $33,897,073.82, the sum being represented mainly by interest-bearing bonds. The first thing to be decided is what the final agreement was that was made between thei two States. Here again we are not to be bound by techni
*28
cal form. A State is superior to the forms that it may require of its citizens. But there would be no technical difficulty in making a contract by a constitutive ordinance if followed by the creation of the contemplated State.
Wedding
v.
Meyler,
We are of opinion that the contract established as we have said, is not modified or affected in any practical way by the preliminary suggestions of the Wheeling ordinance. Neither the ordinance nor . the special mode, of ascertaining a just proportion of the debt that it puts forward is mentioned in the constitution of West Virginia, or in the act of Virginia giving her consent, or in the act of Congress by which West Virginia became a State. The ordi *29 nance required that a copy of the new constitution should be laid before Congress, but said nothing about the ordinance itself. It is enough to refer to the circumstances in which the separation took place to show that Virginia is entitled to the benefit of any doubt so far as the construction of the contract is concerned. See opinion of Attorney-General Bates to President Lincoln, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 426. The mode of the Wheeling ordinance , would not throw on West Virginia a proportion of the debt that would be just, as the ordinance requires, or equitable, according to the promise of the constitution, unless upon the assumption that interest on the public debt should be considered as part of the ordinary expenses referred to in its terms. That .we believe would put upon West Virginia a larger obligation than the mode that we adopt, but we ar.e of opinion that her share should be ascertained in a different way. All the modes, however, consistent with the plain contract of West Virginia, whether under the Wheeling ordinance or the constitution of that State, come out with surprisingly similar results.
It was argued, to be sure, that the debt of Virginia was incurred for local improvements and that in such a case, even apart from the ordinance, it should be divided according to the territory in which the money was expended. We see no sufficient reason for the application of such a principle to this case. In form the aid was an investment. It generally took the shape of a subscription for stock in a corporation. To make the investment a safe one the precaution was taken to require .as a condition precedent that two or three-fifths of the stock should have been subscribed for by solvent persons fully able to pay, and that one-fourth of the subscriptions should have been paid up into the hands of the treasurer. From this point of view the venture was on behalf of the whole State. The parties interested in the investment were the same, wherever the sphere of corporate action might be. The whole State *30 would have got the gain and the whole State must bear the loss, as it does not appear that there are any stocks of value on hand. If we should attempt to look farther, many of the corporations concerned were engaged in improvements that had West Virginia for their objective point, and we should be lost in futile detail if we should try to unravel in each instance the ultimate scope of the scheme. It would be unjust, however, to stop with the place where the first steps were taken and not to consider the purpose with which the enterprise was begun. All the expenditures had the ultimate good of the whole State in view. Therefore we adhere to our conclusion that West Virginia’s share of the debt must be ascertained in a different way. In coming to it we do but apply against West Virginia the argument pressed on her behalf to exclude her liability under the Wheeling ordinance in like cases. By the ordinance West Virginia was to be charged with all state expenditures within the limits thereof. But she vigorously protested against being charged with any sum expended in the form of a purchase of stocks.
But again, it was argued that if this contract should be found to be what we have said, then the determination of a just proportion was left by the constitution to the legislature of West Virginia, and that irrespectively of the words of the instrument it was only by legislation that a just proportion could be fixed. These arguments do not impress us. The provision in the constitution of the State of West Virginia that the legislature shall ascertain the proportion as soon as may be practicable was not intended to undo the contract in the preceding words by making the representative and mouthpiece of one. of the parties the sole tribunal for its- enforcement'. It was. simply an exhortation and command from supreme to subordinate authority to perform the promise as soon as might be and an indication of the way. Apart from the *31 language used, what is just and equitable is a judicial question similar to many that arise in private litigation, and in nowise beyond the competence of a tribunal to decide.
The ground now is clear, so far as the original contract between the two States is concerned. The effect of that is that West Virginia must bear her just and equitable proportion of the public debt as it was intimated in
Hartman
v.
Greenhow,
102 U- S. 672, so long ago as 1880, that she should. It remains for us to consider such subsequent acts as may have affected the original liability or as may bear on the determination of the amount to be paid. On March 30, 1871, Virginia, assuming that the equitable share of West Virginia was about one-third, passed an act authorizing an exchange of the outstanding bonds, etc., and providing for the funding of two-thirds of the debt with interest accrued to July 1, 1871, by the issue of new bonds bearing the same rate of interest as the old, six per cent. There were to be issued at the same time, for the other one-third, certificates of same date, setting forth the amount of the old bond that was not funded, that payment thereof with interest at the rate prescribed in the old bond would be provided for in accordance with- such settlement as should be had between Virginia and West Virginia in regard to the public debt, and that Virginia held the old bonds in trust for the holder or his assignees. There were further details that need -not be mentioned. The coupons of the new bonds were receivable for all taxes and demands due to the State.
Hartman
v.
Green-how,
The. burden under the statute of 1871 still being greater, than Virginia felt able to bear, a new refunding act was passed on March 28, 1879, reducing the interest and providing that Virginia would negotiate or aid in negotiating *32 with West Virginia for the settlement of the claims of certificate holders and that the acceptance of certificates ‘for West Virginia’s one-third’ under this act should be an absolute release of Virginia from all liability on account of the same. Few of these certificates were accepted. On February 14, 1882, another attempt was made, but without sufficient success to make it necessary to set forth the contents of the statute. The certificates for balances not represented by bonds, “constituting West Virginia’s share of the old debt,” stated that the balance was “to be accounted for by the state of West Virginia, without recourse upon this commonwealth.”
On February 20, 1892, a statute was passed which led to a settlement, described in the bill as final and satisfactory. This provided for the issue of bonds for nineteen million dollars in exchange for twenty-eight millions outstanding, not funded, the new bonds bearing interest at two per cent for the first ten years and three per cent for ninety years; and certificates in form similar to that just stated, in the act of T882. On March 6, 1894, a joint resolution of the Senate and House of Delegates was passed, reciting the passage of the four above mentioned statutes, the provisions for certificates, and the satisfactory adjustment of the liabilities assumed by Virginia on account of two-thirds of the debt, and appointing a committee to negotiate with West Virginia, when satisfied that a majority of the certificate holders desired it and would accept the amount to be paid by West Virginia in full settlement of the one-third that Virginia had not assumed. The State was to be subjected to no expense. Finally an act of March 6, 1900, authorized the commission to receive and take on deposit the certificates, upon a contract that the certificate holders would accept the amount realized from West Virginia in full settlement of all their claims under the same. It also authorized a suit if certain proportions of the certificates should be so de *33 posited, as since then they have been — the State, as before, to be subjected to no expense.
On January 9,1906, the commission reported that apart from certificates held by the State and not entering into this account, there were outstanding of the certificates of 1871 in the hands of the public $12,703,451.79, as we have said, of which the commission held $10,851,294.09, and of other certificates there were in the hands of the public $2,778,239.80, of which the commission held $2,322,141.32.
On the foregoing facts a technical argument is pressed that Virginia has discharged herself of all liability as to one-third of the debt; that, therefore, she is without interest in this suit, and cannot maintain it on her own behalf; that she cannot maintain it as. trustee for the certificate holders,
New Hampshire
v.
Louisiana,
The liability of West Virginia is a deep-seated equity, not discharged by changes in the form of the debt, nor split up by the unilateral attempt of Virginia to apportion specific parts to the two States. If one-third of the debt were discharged in fact, to all intents, we perceive no reason, in what has happened, why West Virginia' should not contribute her proportion of the remaining
*34
two-thirds. But we are of opinion that no part of the debt is extinguished, and further, that nothing has happened to bring the rule of
New Hampshire
v.
Louisiana
into play. For even if Virginia is not liable she has the contract of West Virginia to bear an equitable share of the whole debt, a contract in the performance of which the honor and credit of Virginia is concerned, and which she does not lose her right to insist upon by her creditors accepting from necessity the performance of her estimated duty as confining their claims for the residue to the party equitably bound. Her creditors never could have sued her if the supposed discharge had not been granted, and the discharge does not diminish her interest and right to have the whole debt paid by the help of the defendant. The suit is in Virginia’s own interest, none the less that she is to turn over the proceeds. See
United States
v.
Beebe,
It remains true then, notwithstanding all the transactions between the old Commonwealth and her bondholders, that West Virginia must bear her equitable proportion of the whole debt. With a qualification which we shall mention in a moment, we are of opinion that the nearest approach to. justice that we can make is to adopt a ratio determined by the master’s estimated valuation of the real and personal property of the two States on the date of the separation, June 20, 1863. A ratio determined by population or. land area would throw a larger share on West Virginia, but the relative resources of the *35 debtor populations are generally recognized, we think, as affording a proper measure. It seems to us plain that slaves should be excluded from the valuation. The master’s figures without them are, for Virginia $300,887,367.74, and for West Virginia $92,416,021.65. These figures are criticised by Virginia, but we see no sufficient reason for going behind them, or ground for thinking that we can get nearer to justice in any other way. It seems to us that Virginia cannot complain of the result. They would give the proportion in which the $33,897,073.82 was to be divided, but for a correction which Virginia has made necessary. Virginia with the consent of her creditors has cut down her liability to not more than two-thirds of the debt, whereas at the ratio shown by the figures her share, subject to mathematical correction, is about .7651. If our figures are correct, the difference between Virginia’s share, say $25,931,261.47, and the amount that the creditors were content to accept from her,'say $22,598,049.21, is $3,333,212.26; subtracting the last sum from the debt leaves $30,563,861.56 as the sum to be apportioned. Taking .235 as representing'the proportion of West Virginia we have $7,182,507.46 as her share of the principal debt.
We have given our decision with respect to the basis of liability and the share of the principal of the debt of Virginia that West Virginia assumed. In any event, before we could put our judgment in the form of a final decree there would be figures to be agreed upon or to be ascertained by reference to a master. Among other things there still remains the question of interest. Whether any interest is due, and if due from wháit time it should be allowed and at what rate it should be computed, are matters as to which there is a serious controversy in the record, and concerning which there is room for a wide divergence of opinion. There are many elements to be taken into account on the one side and on the pther, The circumstances of the asserted default and *36 the conditions surrounding the failure earlier to procure a determination of the principal sum payable, including the question of laches as to either party, would require to be considered. A long time has elapsed. Wherever the responsibility for the delay might ultimately be placed, or however it might be shared, it would be a severe result to capitalize charges for half a century — such a thing hardly could happen in a private case analogous to this. Statutes of limitation, if nothing else, would be likely to interpose a bar. As this is no ordinary commercial suit, but, as we have said, a quasi-international difference referred to this court in reliance upon the honor and constitutional obligations of the States concerned rather than upon ordinary remedies, we think it best at this stage to go no farther, but to await the effect of a conference between the parties, which, whatever the outcome, must take place. If the cause should be pressed contentiously to the end, it would be referred to a master to go over the figures that we have given provisionally, and to make such calculations as might become necessary. But this case is one that calls for forbearance upon both sides; Great States have a temper superior to that of private litigants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided for patriotism, the fraternity of the Union, and mutual consideration to bring it to an end.