Case Information
*1 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
VIRGINIA, ET AL . DENNIS L ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16–1177. Decided June 12, 2017
P ER C URIAM .
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state prisoner is eligible for fed- eral habeas relief if the underlying state court merits ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that this demanding standard was met by a Virginia court’s application of Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S. 48 (2010). The question presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in con- cluding that the state court’s ruling involved an unreason- able application of this Court’s holding.
I
On July 6, 1999, respondent Dennis LeBlanc raped a 62- year-old woman. He was 16 at the time. In 2003, a state trial court sentenced him to life in prison for his crimes. In the 1990’s, Virginia had, for felony offenders, abolished parole that followed a traditional framework. See Va. Code Ann. §53.1–165.1 (2013). As a form of replacement, Virginia enacted its so-called “geriatric release” program, which allows older inmates to receive conditional release under some circumstances. LeBlanc v. Mathena , 841 F. 3d 256, 261 (CA4 2016) (citing Va. Code Ann. §53.1–40.01).
Seven years after respondent was sentenced, this Court
decided
Florida
.
Graham
established that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders convicted
of nonhomicide offenses from being sentenced to life with-
*2
out parole. While a “State is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a
nonhomicide crime,” the Court held, it must “give defend-
ants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilita-
tion.”
Respondent later filed a motion in state trial court—the
Virginia Beach Circuit Court—seeking to vacate his sen-
tence in light of . The trial court denied the mo-
tion. In so doing, it relied on the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia’s decision in
Angel Commonwealth
,
“Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a con- viction for a felony offense . . . (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may peti- tion the Parole Board for conditional release.” §53.1– 40.01.
The
Angel
court explained that “[t]he regulations for
conditional release under this statute provide that if the
prisoner meets the qualifications for consideration con-
tained in the statute, the factors used in the normal parole
consideration process apply to conditional release deci-
sions under this statute.”
The Virginia Supreme Court, in reviewing the trial court’s ruling in the instant case, summarily denied re- spondent’s requests for appeal and for rehearing.
In 2012, respondent filed a federal habeas petition in
the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§2254. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the
petition, but the District Court disagreed and granted the
writ. The District Court explained that “there is no possi-
bility that fairminded jurists could disagree that the state
court’s decision conflicts wit[h] the dictates of .”
LeBlanc
v.
Mathena
,
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state trial court’s ruling was an unreasonable application of . 841 F. 3d, at 259–260. In the panel majority’s view, Virginia’s geriatric release program did not provide a meaningful opportunity for juvenile nonhomicide offenders to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
Judge Niemeyer dissented. He criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to respect, in any meaningful way, the defer- ence Congress requires federal courts to give state court decisions on postconviction review.” Id. , at 275.
The Commonwealth of Virginia petitioned for certiorari. The petition is now granted, and the judgment is reversed: The Virginia trial court did not unreasonably apply the rule.
II
In order for a state court’s decision to be an unreason-
able application of this Court’s case law, the ruling must be
“objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear
error will not suffice.”
Woods Donald
,
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred by
failing to accord the state court’s decision the deference
owed under AEDPA. did not decide that a geriat-
ric release program like Virginia’s failed to satisfy the
Eighth Amendment because that question was not pre-
sented. And it was not objectively unreasonable for the
state court to conclude that, because the geriatric release
program employed normal parole factors, it satisfied
’s requirement that juveniles convicted of a non-
homicide crime have a meaningful opportunity to receive
parole. The geriatric release program instructs Virginia’s
Parole Board to consider factors like the “individual’s
history . . . and the individual’s conduct . . . during incar-
ceration,” as well as the prisoner’s “inter-personal rela-
tionships with staff and inmates” and “[c]hanges in atti-
tude toward self and others.” See 841 F. 3d, at 280–281
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing Virginia Parole Board
Policy Manual 2–4 (Oct. 2006)). Consideration of these
factors could allow the Parole Board to order a former
juvenile offender’s conditional release in light of his or her
“demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” , 560
U. S., at 75. The state court thus did not diverge so far
from ’s dictates as to make it “so obvious that . . .
there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ ” about
whether the state court’s ruling conflicts with this Court’s
case law.
White
v.
Woodall
,
“Perhaps the logical next step from” Graham would be to hold that a geriatric release program does not satisfy the Eighth Amendment, but “perhaps not.” 572 U. S., at *5 ___ (slip op., at 11). “ [T]here are reasonable arguments on both sides.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12). With respect to petitioners, these include the arguments dis- cussed above. Supra, at 4. With regards to respondent, these include the contentions that the Parole Board’s substantial discretion to deny geriatric release deprives juvenile nonhomicide offenders a meaningful opportunity to seek parole and that juveniles cannot seek geriatric release until they have spent at least four decades in prison.
These arguments cannot be resolved on federal habeas review. Because this case arises “only in th[at] narrow context,” the Court “express[es] no view on the merits of the underlying” Eighth Amendment claim. Woods , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does the Court “suggest or imply that the underlying issue, if presented on direct review, would be insubstan- tial.” Marshall v. Rodgers , 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) ( per curiam ) (slip op., at 7); accord, Woodall , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 5). The Court today holds only that the Virginia trial court’s ruling, resting on the Virginia Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Angel , was not objectively unrea- sonable in light of this Court’s current case law.
III
A proper respect for AEDPA’s high bar for habeas relief avoids unnecessarily “disturb[ing] the State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, den[ying] soci- ety the right to punish some admitted offenders, and in- trud[ing] on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.” Harrington , supra , at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). The federalism interest implicated in AEDPA cases is of central relevance in this case, for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir- cuit’s holding created the potential for significant discord in the Virginia sentencing process. Before today, Virginia *6 courts were permitted to impose—and required to affirm— a sentence like respondent’s, while federal courts presented with the same fact pattern were required to grant ha- beas relief. Reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case—rather than waiting until a more substantial split of authority develops—spares Virginia courts from having to confront this legal quagmire.
For these reasons, the petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
G INSBURG , J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
VIRGINIA, ET AL . DENNIS L ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16–1177. Decided June 12, 2017
J USTICE G INSBURG , concurring in the judgment.
v.
Florida
, 560 U. S. 48 (2010), as today’s
per
curiam
recognizes, established that a juvenile offender
convicted of a nonhomicide offense must have “some mean-
ingful opportunity to obtain release [from prison] based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
Id.
, at 75.
See
ante
, at 2. I join the Court’s judgment on the under-
standing that the Virginia Supreme Court, in
Angel
v.
Commonwealth
, 281 Va. 248, 704 S. E. 2d 386 (2011),
interpreted Virginia law to require the parole board to
provide such a meaningful opportunity under the geriatric
release program. See
id.
, at 275,