107 Tenn. 705 | Tenn. | 1901
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries. On the trial below, at the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony, the defendant interposed a demurrer to the evidence, which was overruled by the Court, and the plaintiff’s damages assessed by a jury at $600. Defendant company appealed and has assigned errors.
The declaration alleged that defendant company is engaged in operating a furnace at Johnson City, and plaintiff (Hamilton) was engaged as a section hand about said furnace, under one Craig, in keeping the railway tracks in repair; that, on the day of the accident, Craig ordered the plaintiff out of the section work department to work near the mouth of an ore crusher, to shovel ore from the crusher by means of a common short-handled shovel; that this
This is a substantial statement of the cause of action as outlined in the declaration. The plaintiff testified, viz.: “I was called from the track to the stockhouse, and went there and fed the rock and ore crusher about three-quarters of an hour. Other hands helped while I was feeding it. We were then ordered by our boss down to the bottom floor at the mouth of the crusher, and began shoveling away the crushed ore from the crusher." I was beneath the elevated track at the crusher. The ore had been dumped through the car and fed into the crusher, and I had gone below to take the crushed ore from the crusher. It was while shoveling ore from the crusher that I was injured by the falling of a lump of ore, weighing five or six pounds, from the car on the elevated track above.”
Another witness described the accident as follows, to wit: “The train came up with a car of iron ore on the trestle, and they, began to unload the ore; when it was partly unloaded they told witness and plaintiff to go down to the stockhouse floor and shovel back rock from the crusher. The crusher was not then running. While we were shoveling down there the train backed up and the engine went off somewhere to do some other work. The engine
The proof tends to show that this piece of ore fell off the brake-beam, where it had probably lodged when the ore was being dumped from the car into the crusher. The proof also tends to show that the defendant company had instructed the ‘ workmen to be careful and not leave any rock on the trestle, so that they would fall on the men below. But the piece of ore in question had, in some way, become lodged on the brake-beam of the ,car. The brake-beam was at the end of the car. . The proof also tends to show that such an accident had never happened before.
With this statement of the case we proceed to notice the assignments of error. The Circuit Judge, in overruling the demurrer to the evidence, did not state the reasons for his action, but we are satisfied the Court rested the . liability of the company upon the ground that it had not furnished the plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. This is the ground of liability claimed by plaintiff in his declaration. Much of the able argument of counsel for plaintiff in error is directed towards showing that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover on the ground that a warning should have been given him that the en
It was held by this Court, at Knoxville, September term, 1900, . in Nelson v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., that the defendant, in this case, in operating its tram cars about its furnace yards, was not liable for the negligence of an engineer in injuring a carpenter of the company on the track, for the reason that the negligence of the engineer was that of a fellow-servant, and that the different department rule is restricted to railroad companies. The fact that an engine was used in handling cars of iron ore upon the elevated track does not convert it into a commercial railroad. Coal Mining Co. v. Davis, 6 Pickle, 719. It is insisted in this case that the loading and unloading of the car in question was the duty of the fellow-servants of the plaintiff. Hence, if the car was negligently unloaded, leaving a piece of ore on the brake-beam, that negligence was the act of a fellow-servant. It is insisted, however, on behalf of plaintiff, that it is the duty of the master or employer to keep his
While the defendant company is not liable for the negligence of the fellow-servant, yet, if the company has itself been guilty of any negligence concurring in producing the injury, there is liability. The question, whether or not the company had provided a reasonably safe place for the plaintiff to work, was submitted to the Court by the demurrer to the evidence, and his action in overruling the demurrer was a resolution of that contention against the company. In looking to the evidence on this subject, we cannot say there was no evidence which would have warranted a jury in finding that these premises were not reasonably safe.
The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.