Reversed by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ and Judge DUNCAN joined.
Petitioner Virginia International Terminals (“VIT”) petitions for review of an order of the Benefits Review Board of the United States Department of Labor, which granted attorney’s fees to respondent Benny R. Edwards on a supplemental claim *315 for compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (LHWCA). Because we hold that Edwards is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under the LHWCA, we reverse the judgment of the Benefits Review Board.
I.
Edwards was injured on February 22, 2002, while working as an employee of VIT. He filed an LS-203 “Claim for Compensation” form with the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”) on February 28, 2002, seeking disability compensation under the LHWCA. J.A. 7. In response to this filing, VIT voluntarily paid Edwards temporary total disability benefits for a period beginning on February 26, 2002, and filed a “Payment of Compensation Without Award” form with the OWCP, dated March 18. J.A. 8. VIT terminated those disability payments as of March 31, 2002, because a doctor had cleared Edwards to resume work on April 1. J.A. 9. Thus, within eighteen days of the initial filing of Edwards’ claim related to the February 22 injury, VIT voluntarily paid him disability benefits for the period from February 26 through March 31.
Several months later, on July 29, 2002, Edwards’ counsel sent a brief letter to the Program Director at OWCP, requesting disability benefits relating to the same February 22 injury for the period from February 23 through February 25 and requesting “a conference on the issue of temporary total disability benefits” for that period. J.A. 10. On August 1, the district director replied with a letter to Edwards’ counsel, requesting medical evidence to support his demand for additional benefits and noting that VIT’s representative claimed that “there was no support of loss time [sic] until February 26th.” J.A. 38. Edwards’ counsel replied on August 26, declining to provide medical support and requesting formal adjudication before an ALJ. J.A. 50-51. On August 27, rather than undergoing formal adjudication, VIT paid benefits for the three contested days. J.A. 13. At no point did the district director hold an informal conference or issue a written recommendation on the issue of the three days’ supplemental benefits claimed by Edwards.
Subsequently, Edwards’ counsel filed a petition for $117.00 of attorney’s fees for work in connection with the request for the three days’ - supplemental benefits. J.A. 15-16. VIT objected to the fee petition, and the ALJ denied the petition on the grounds that fees were not authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 928(b). J.A. 17. On appeal, the Benefits, Review Board reversed the ALJ’s decision and held that attorney’s fees were due pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(a). J.A. 68-71. VIT now petitions for review of the Board’s order, arguing that neither section 928(a) nor section 928(b) authorizes a fee award in this case.
II.
We review the Benefits Review Board’s interpretation of the LHWCA de novo, because the Board is not a policy-making agency and its statutory interpretation is thus not entitled to any special deference from the court.
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,
Section 928 of the LHWCA provides for attorney’s fees in two relevant sets of circumstances. First, section 928(a) provides for a-fee award in cases where the employer refuses to pay any compensation after the filing of a claim and the claimant *316 subsequently successfully prosecutes the claim with the assistance of an attorney:
If the employer or carrier declines to pay any compensation on or before the thirtieth day after receiving written notice of a claim, for compensation having been filed from the deputy commissioner, on the ground that there is no liability for compensation within the provisions of this chapter and the person seeking benefits shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there shall be awarded ... a reasonable attorney’s fee against the employer or carrier....
33 U.S.C. § 928(a) (emphasis added). Second, section 928(b) provides for a fee award in cases where the employer initially pays voluntary compensation and a subsequent dispute arises about total amount of compensation due — but only in highly specified circumstances:
If the employer or carrier pays or tenders payment of compensation without an award ... and thereafter a controversy develops over the amount of additional compensation, if any, to which the employee may be entitled, the deputy commissioner or Board shall set the matter for an informal conference and following such conference the deputy commissioner or Board shall recommend in writing a disposition of the controversy. If the employer or carrier refuse to accept such written recommendation, within fourteen days after its receipt by them, they shall pay or tender to the employee in writing the additional compensation, if any, to which they believe the employee is entitled. If the employee refuses to accept such payment or tender of compensation, and thereafter utilizes the services of an attorney at law, and■ if the compensation thereafter awarded is greater than the amount paid or tendered by the employer or carrier, a reasonable attorney’s fee ... shall be awarded in addition to the amount of compensation.... In all other cases any claim for legal services shall not be assessed against the employer or carrier.
33 U.S.C. § 928(b) (emphases added). VIT argues that neither of these provisions entitles Edwards to a fee award. We agree.
A.
First, contrary to the Board’s interpretation, Edwards is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the plain language of section 928(a). That section authorizes a fee award only if “the employer ... declines to pay any compensation on or before the thirtieth day after having received written notice of a claim for compensation having been filed from the deputy commissioner. ...” 33 U.S.C. § 928(a) (emphasis added). VIT contends, that this section is inapplicable because VIT voluntarily paid Edwards compensation for the February 22 injury by March 18, within thirty days of the February 28 filing of his LS-203 form. In contrast, Edwards argues that the submission of his informal July 29 letter to the Program Director constituted a separate “claim for compensation having been filed” within the meaning of section 928(a), and that VIT’s initial refusal to pay the additional three days’ benefits on that supplemental claim constituted “declinpng] to pay any compensation” on that “claim.” 33 U.S.C. § 928(a).
We reject Edwards’ argument for two reasons. First, the most natural reading of the phrase “filing a claim” refers to a formal action that initiates a legal proceeding, rather than an informal action that seeks to alter or amend a pre-existing settlement on a prior claim.
See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictio
*317
nary
849 (1986) (defining “file” as “to place (as a paper or instrument) on file among the legal or official records esp.
hj formally
receiving, endorsing, and entering” and “to perform the
first
act of (as a lawsuit):
commence
” (emphases added));
Black’s Law Dictionary
642 (7th ed.1999) (defining “file” as “[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record” and “to commence a lawsuit”). Moreover, the context in which the phrase is used, namely a statutory provision that carefully details the procedural conditions for a fee award, confirms that this narrow and unambiguous meaning of the phrase is correct, rather than the broad, vague meaning of “filing a claim” that Edwards would ascribe.
See Brown v. Gardner,
Second, under a longstanding canon of interpretation, adjacent statutory subsections that refer to the same subject matter — here, attorneys’ fee awards under the LHWCA — must be read
in pari materia
as if they were a single statute.
See United States v. Srnsky,
In holding to the contrary, the Board relied principally on
Pool Co. v. Cooper,
B.
Likewise, as the ALJ initially held, Edwards is not entitled to a fee award under section 928(b). Where “the employer, or carrier pays or tenders payment of compensation without an award ... and thereafter a controversy develops over the amount of additional compensation,” section 928(b) requires
all
of the following: (1) an informal conference, (2) a written recommendation from the deputy or Board, (3) the employer’s refusal to adopt the written recommendation, and (4) the employee’s procuring of the services of a lawyer to achieve a greater award than what the employer was willing to pay after the written recommendation.
Id.
None of these four conditions is fulfilled in Edwards’ case, because the district director never held an informal conference or issued a written recommendation on the supplemental claim.
*
The failure to hold an informal conference or issue a written recommendation is fatal to a claim for attorney’s fees under the plain terms of section 928(b).
See Pool Co.,
Edwards protests that, despite the word “shall” in section 928(b), the decision to hold an informal conference actually lies within the discretion of the District Director.
See
20 C.F.R. § 702.311. But the fact that the District Director has power to determine whether the conditions of section 928(b) are satisfied does not nullify those mandatory statutory conditions.
See Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc.,
CONCLUSION
Because neither section 928(a) nor section 928(b) authorizes a fee award in this case, the judgment of the Benefits Review Board is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of petitioner VIT.
REVERSED
Notes
At oral argument, Edwards' counsel suggested that the Director's individual communications with the parties by telephone and the letter of August 1, taken collectively, could be treated as an "informal conference,” and that the August 1 letter could be treated as a "written recommendation.” But even if it were plausible to treat the phone calls and letter as a de facto "informal conference,” it is obvious that the letter, which merely demanded medical evidence to support the supplemental claim, did not constitute a "written recommendation” for the disposition of that claim under section 928(b). See J.A. 38 ("If you want the 23rd to the 25th of February paid, then provide medical to support the claim. [VIT’s ágent] says that there was no support of loss time until February 26th and she paid that.”).