125 Me. 432 | Me. | 1926
This is a process wherein the petitioner seeks release from the custody of the sheriff, claiming that he is now unlawfully imprisoned in the county jail and is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the defendant. The case is reported to the Law Court for final determination iipon an agreed statement of facts.
The petitioner then made application for a writ of habeas corpus, addressed to a justice of this court holding the April, 1926, term in said county of Hancock. The writ was granted and by virtue thereof the petitioner was brought before said Justice, when and where it was made to appear that the defendant sheriff was' holding the petitioner by virtue of the sentence above quoted. The sitting Justice did not grant release under the writ but in view of the important questions of law involved reported the case to the Law Court as above stated.
The petitioner was sentenced under the provisions of Public Laws, 1923, Chapter 167, where the penalty provided reads as follows:
“Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than three hundred nor more than six- hundred dollars and costs, and in addition thereto shall be imprisoned for not less than three months nor more than six months, and in default of payment of fine and costs shall be imprisoned for six months additional.”
The .petitioner claims release from further imprisonment under said sentence because of the provisions of R. S., Chap. 137, Sec. 50, which reads as follows:
“Except when, otherwise expressly provided, any convict, sentenced to pay a fine or costs, and committed for default thereof and for no other cause, who is unable to pay the same, may be liberated by the sheriff, after thirty days from his commitment, by giving his note for the amount due, to the treasurer of the same county, accompanied by a written schedule of all his property of every kind, signed and sworn to before the sheriff, jailer or any justice of the peace or
The'issue, therefore, is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to release from further imprisonment by reason of the statutory provisions for the release of poor convicts last above quoted. His contention is that having served the five months’ imprisonment imposed upon him, then at the expiration of said term he stands committed for default of payment of the fine and costs, and for no other cause, and that being unable to pay the same, after thirty days from his commitment, to wit, after thirty days from the expiration of the five months’ sentence, he is entitled to release upon complying with the terms of the act relating to the release of poor convicts.
This contention calls for an examination and interpretation of the last named act and the act under which he was sentenced and committed.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. This rule is so universal that citation of decided cases becomes unnecessary. And it has been frequently stated, in effect, that the intention of the Legislature constitutes the law. The object in construing penal, as well as other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent. That is the law. The proper course in all cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context and promotes, in the fullest manner, the policy and objects of the Legislature. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall., 385, 18 U. S., (L. ed.), 830. In State v. Bass, 104 Maine, 288, our own court, while not unmindful of the rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, said “But though penal laws are to be construed strictly, yet the intention of the legislature must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes, and they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the will of the legislature.” See also Keller v. State, 11 Md., 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226, and note; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md., 184, 74 Am. Dec., 522 and note. The rule of strict construction of a penal law is subordinate to the rule of reasonable, sensible construction, having in view effectuation of the legislative purpose, and is not to be so unreasonably applied as to defeat the true intent and meaning of the enactment. See 25 R. C. L., 1084, and long list of authorities there cited.
Exclusive of penalties provided for the violation of that portion of B. S., Chap. 127, which relates to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, our legislature, from time to time, has defined and fixed penalties for the violation of more than two hundred crimes. Those
Under the common law rule it is the practice, when punishment inflicted is by. sentence to pay a fine, to include in the judgment an order- that the prisoner be committed to jail until the fine is paid. This has been the practice in England from the earliest times until a comparatively recent date, and this rule has been followed very generally in this country, either from the adoption of the common law doctrine or. by statutory provision in the several states. Note in Ex parte Bryant, 12 Am. St. Rep., 202. Detention of a condemned person in jail for failure to pay a fine is only a means provided for the enforcement of the. pecuniary penalty imposed by the sentence. Actual payment of the fine itself is the punishment. Imprisonment for default of payment- is a mere incident of the fine. LeClair v.. White, 117 Maine, 335. When humanity and justice demanded the prisoner’s release if he had “not sufficient wherewith to support him or herself -in prison or to pay prison charges,” was doubtless the originating reason for this statute providing for the release of poor convicts. The statute, in modern form, still exists but its mandatory words, in our state .have given way to discretionary ones, and there has also been added the restrictive clause ‘ Except when otherwise expressly provided.”
Returning to the petitioner’s demand for release wherein he claims literally the right of freedom because of R. S., Chap. 137, Sec. 50, let us see what the result might be as affecting this and other cases.
As above stated, exclusive of penalties for infraction of so-called liquor laws, there are upon our statute book more than two hundred crimes defined, and penalties provided for violation thereof. Of this number more than fifty per cent, of the penalties are imprisonment or fine. The length of time for incarceration, and the amount of fine, vary greatly in their terms.
Let us take, as an example, the punishment for manslaughter which may be imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. Suppose a person convicted of that crime is fined five hundred dollars and committed until the fine and costs are paid. If the petitioner’s contention as to release of poor convicts is sound then, at the end of thirty days’ imprisonment, the convict would be entitled to release and a possible term of-twenty years be reduced to the paltry term of one month. Under the per
But we must go further and give full effect to the restrictive words "Except when otherwise expressly provided.”
As we have already said, our Legislature has defined, and provided penalties for infraction, of more than two hundred crimes, exclusive of the so-called prohibitory law. In the latter law the punishment provided differs materially in its terms from other penalties. We take judicial notice of the fact that our Legislature, through increasing severity of punishment, has endeavored to stamp out the evils resulting from the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor. In 1917, Chapter 291, of the Public Laws, there was passed an act "To amend chapter one hundred and twenty-seven of the Revised Statutes, to make plain the penalties imposed under certain sections thereof.” Again by Public Laws, 1923, 167, the act under which this petitioner was sentenced, the Legislature amended the law. In these amendments appear the feature not common to penalties for infraction of other criminal statutes, namely imprisonment and fine, together with an express provision that if fine and costs are not paid then the person convicted shall be further imprisoned for a definite period. This is materially different from a mere commitment to enforce payment of fine and costs, to which we have referred. ‘ ‘ This term of imprisonment was apparently regarded by the law makers as the proper alternative in case of the non-payment of the fine,” to borrow an expression from Rollins v. Lashus, 74 Maine, 218.
We are of opinion that this additional imprisonment, in default of' payment of fine and costs, brings the situation well within the meaning of the words "Except when otherwise expressly provided.” For this, and other reasons herein found, we are further of opinion that this construction of the statute conforms to the rules of construction already referred to, will best serve to effectuate the legislative purpose, and will not defeat the true intent and meaning of the enactment.
The mandate, therefore, will be,
Release of petitioner denied.